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iAbstract
Is it through emotion that we know ourselves? A psychophysiological
investigation into self-reference and emotional valence.
The aims of the present thesis were two fold. The first aim was to investigate
the relationship between self-referential and emotional processing. The second aim
was to investigate the extent to which self-referential processing is altered as a function
of mood. In order to address these two aims, a variety of behavioural and physiological
measures were recorded and a new methodology was employed in the following
experimental chapters.
The aim of experiment one was to investigate how non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals evaluate the emotional valence and self-referential content of word stimuli
at a behavioural level. A self-positivity bias was identified in non-dysphoric
individuals, positive words were rated as self-referential and negative words were rated
as non-self-referential. Compared to non-dysphoric individuals, dysphoric individuals’
evaluations of self-reference but not emotional valence were altered. Event-related
potentials (ERPs) were employed in experiment two to investigate self-referential
processing at a neural level. A two stage model of processing was identified in which,
an evaluation of emotional valence was found to occur prior to an interaction between
self-reference and emotional valence. A self-positivity bias was identified in the ERP
component known as the N400. ERP waves were more negative going to self negative
and non-self-positive words when compared to self-positive and non-self-negative
words. This bias was explained in terms of the semantic mismatch hypothesis. The
aim of experiment three was to investigate how the neural processing of self-referential
and emotional information is altered as a function of mood. Differences between non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were identified during the early stages of
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processing in an emotion task. Between group differences were identified during the
later stages of processing in a self-reference task, around 400 ms. Skin conductance
and heart rate were employed in experiment four to examine autonomic responses
during self-referential and emotional processing in healthy individuals. Both decision-
making tasks were found to elicit similar physiological responses. These findings were
taken to suggest that a large component of self-referential processing involves the
processing of emotional information. Finally, the aim of experiment five was to
investigate if person-referent processing was altered during the experience of a negative
mood. The behavioural and neural responses of non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals were compared across self-referent and other-referent decision-making
tasks. Between group differences were specific to the self-reference task at the
behavioural level. However, group differences were identified in both the self-referent
and other-referent tasks at the neural level. The results provide partial support for the
hypothesis that negative mood is associated with specific impairments in self-
referential processing.
Overall the results of the present thesis illustrate that the processing of
emotional information plays a large role in self-referential decision-making.
Furthermore, the N400 was found be involved in this type of decision-making at the
semantic level. Negative mood was associated with greater changes in self-referential
processing than in other forms of emotional or person-referent processing. In the final
chapter, a two stage model is proposed to account for self-referential processing. The
implications of this model are discussed in terms of two macro-cognitive theories,
interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS) and SPAARs. Finally, the limitations and
future directions for developing this line of research are outlined.
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1
- Chapter 1 -
Literature review
1.1: A theoretical investigation into the concept of self
The concept of self pervades everyday consciousness and pervades the
discipline of psychology. If any individual walking down the street was asked, they
would probably be able to give you a relatively good explanation of the term ‘self’ as
they understand it. The Oxford English Dictionary (2000) defines the self as:
1. a person’s essential being that distinguishes them from others.
2. a person’s particular nature or personality
Although this definition seems straight forward, the notion of self has been a hotly
debated issue in religion, philosophy and psychology for centuries. Therefore, it is
important to begin by developing a working definition of the self which distinguishes
the concept of self used in every day life from the concept that is used in the social
sciences. In order to appreciate the modern scientific definition of self, we need to
understand its origins.
1.2: The self: A historical review
The earliest discussions of self that are available to us are provided by the
writings of the early classical Greek philosophers. Although the classical
philosophers did not explicitly address the concept of self, Plato, Pythagoras and
Socrates all proposed dualist theories as to how the mind or soul interacted with the
body and controlled behaviour and action. Even Aristotle, who proposed that the
brain was central to cooling the blood, suggested that men must have individual
conscious awareness of the mind’s influence on bodily sensation (Popper & Eccles,
1977). These theories of consciousness acted as precursors which inspired the
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modern day conception and scientific study of self. After the introduction of
Christianity into Europe, religious scholars also discussed the idea of self, often in
terms of the soul which was created by, and answerable to God. However, these ideas
referred to the self as an immaterial entity that could not be examined using scientific
method. It was not until the 17th century and the advent of modern western
philosophy that the modern concept of self began to take form.
1.2.1: Modern conception of self: Early philosophical thoughts.
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is acknowledged by many as the founder of
modern western philosophy. Although psychology as a scientific discipline was not
established until several centuries later, many of the early psychological theories of
self were influenced by his theories in epistemology (Smith, 2001). As a rationalist,
Descartes’ project was to establish a set of principles, using logical reasoning alone,
which could known to be true (Newman, 1999). It is in his first truth principle that
Descartes raised the issue of the self1. He asserted that: ‘I think, and my thoughts
cannot be separated from me, therefore I exist’ (Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch,
1984). More commonly known in its revised form: Cogito Ergo Sum or ‘I think
therefore I am’(Descartes, 1644, part 1, article 7), this statement represents a
definition of the self in its simplest form, I exist. It refers specifically to our
conscious awareness of the immediate present. Descartes could only know the
existence of his own mind; the existence of all other things, including the external
world could be doubted. Descartes use of the term ‘I’ also highlights the
individualistic and subjective character of experience.
1 At this time, terms such as the mind, consciousness, soul and self were used interchangeably.
Differences between these terms lead to great debate within epistemology and the development of a
research area known as philosophy of mind. Although these questions are outwith the scope of the
present thesis, these issues should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion.
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Although Descartes did not discuss the self directly in this first principle, the
concept ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’ was taken up by later philosophers in the guise of self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness represents the bare bones of the self as we know it
today. The term is not taken to acknowledge the existence of a substantial self in
terms of an individual’s personal identity (Meditations II as cited in Newman, 2005).
In his discussions of a substantial self, Descartes deferred to the notion of God.
However, his ideas on immediate conscious awareness were employed by John Locke
(1632-1704) and initiated the philosophy of self and theories regarding self-
consciousness.
John Locke is cited as establishing the modern concept of self (Chappell,
1994). He revised Descartes’ ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’ in great detail.
Locke defines the self as:
‘that conscious thinking thing, - whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual,
material, simple or compounded, it matters not)- which is sensible or conscious of
pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as
far as that consciousness extends.’
(Locke, 1690; chapter XXVII)
Where Descartes was concerned with establishing the existence of his own individual
mind, Locke was more concerned with understanding the content of the mind and
how we experience the external world. Lock developed Descartes conceptualisation
of self-consciousness in three ways. He stressed that real life experience, extended
memory and the existence of other selves were also important to a concept such as the
self. Each of these points will be dealt with in turn.
Locke asserted that conscious awareness of real life experience was an
important aspect of the self. As an empiricist, Locke believed that the mind was a
tabula rasa on which experience writes its record. He stressed the importance of how
we perceive the external world using our senses and generate ideas about the world
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from these senses. He also used a secondary term, ‘reflections’ to describe how we
gain knowledge about ourselves by reflecting on our past experience. He suggested
that it is by using these two processes of perception and reflection that we gain
knowledge about the world and our place in it. In doing so he illustrated how
conscious awareness of our own personal circumstances contributes to the way in
which we experience and interpret the world.
Secondly, Locke illustrated the value of memory to the concept of self. He
discussed personal identity at great length and believed that the self and consciousness
are almost inseparable. Using several thought experiments Locke showed that
personal identity of the self exists only to the extent that the self has conscious
awareness of its past thoughts and actions and can be held responsible for them
(Lowe, 1995). His introduction of memory was of paramount importance as it laid
the groundwork for theories of personal identity in psychology and personal
culpability within the justice system (Magee, 2000).
Finally, Locke stated that the concept of self is functional in that can be used
to distinguish one individual mind from other thinking things:
‘For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which
makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all
other thinking things.’
Locke (1690; chapter XXVII)
Although this aspect of the self was not discussed further, or picked up by other
philosophers of the time, the relationship between the self and other selves is
fundamental to the modern day conception of self. The emphasis of this relationship
has been particularly important for social psychologists, who devoted a great deal of
research into the investigation of such relationships, as in, for example interpersonal
and intergroup conflict.
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Locke is known to be instrumental in establishing the self as a series of
conscious events united through memory to create an awareness of previous thoughts
and actions. However British empiricist, David Hume (1711-1776), discussed the self
in a radically different way, possibly in response to Locke’s unitary self (Bennett,
1971). Hume’s admits in the Appendix of A Treatise that his discussion of the self is
brief and his ideas are ill-formed. It is the extent to which his views differed from
those held at the time, and the influence he had on his successors which make him
worthy of mention.
Hume proposed that thinking consists of a succession of detached perceptions,
a view he also held in relation to the self. Hume broke perception down into ideas
and impressions, ideas being derived from our impressions. He discussed the concept
of self in the following manner:
“But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several
impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise
to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the
whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there
is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions
and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot
therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is
derived; consequently there is no such idea.”
Hume (1739, Book I, Part 4, section 6)
Hume categorically stated that there is no idea of a unitary self as discussed by Locke.
Although Descartes and Locke both stressed the importance of immediate conscious
awareness to the self, they did not define it solely in these terms. They also
acknowledged the unity of self over time. Although Hume stated that the self does
not exist, ironically his beliefs were important to its study. Firstly, unlike Locke and
Descartes, Hume’s ‘bundle theory of self’ makes no reference to a self which exists
beyond the life of the individual. Therefore, Hume developed previous ideas and
placed the concept of self within nature, thus allowing the concept to be investigated
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empirically using the scientific method. Secondly, Hume questioned the unity of the
self over time and in doing so opened up an avenue for discussion of the self as a
divided concept. Due to the influence of religion at the time and the importance of the
concept of self or soul to Christianity, this was a controversial statement (Morris,
2001). Nonetheless it was an important step, and the unitary self versus divided self
argument has been a point of contention within psychology and philosophy ever since
(for a review, see Markus & Cross, 1990).
Hume’s work had a strong influence on his successors. The famous German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) wrote that it was Hume’s work that woke
him from his ‘dogmatic slumber’ (Kui-Want & Klimowski, 2005). At that time,
philosophers were divided into two philosophical positions as to how the mind
perceived the world. The empiricists (such as Locke & Hume) believed that
information about the world was provided by experience. In contrast, the rationalists
(such as Descartes, Lebiniz & Spinoza) believed that knowledge was provided a
priori, by some metaphysical source. Kant refuted both these positions and in doing
so revolutionised philosophy of mind and the concept of self.
Kant placed the mind at the centre of knowledge. He stated that individuals
receive information (perceptions) from experience through the senses. However, he
also proposed that these perceptions are shaped by the construct and form of the mind
using a priori categories (concepts) and organisation (McCormick, 2006). Where the
empiricists and the rationalists viewed the mind as a passive recipient of information
about the world, Kant introduced the idea that the mind is active in shaping perceived
reality.
Kant proposed that ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ accounts for our
conscious experience. He stated that the self which accompanies our conscious
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awareness arises as a construct of the activity of the mind when synthesising
perceptions and concepts (or cognitions). Kant reacted against Hume’s bundle theory
of self, and stated that the self was more than the sum of an individual’s sensations
(Brook, 1996). In terms of consciousness, he stated that the self was condito sine quâ
non: ‘without which it could not be’.
Kant also separated two components of the self; ‘transcendental apperception’
and ‘empirical self-consciousness’. Transcendental apperception is similar to
Descartes ‘I think’, and was defined ‘not how we appear, not how we inwardly are,
only that we are’. In this context, Kant described the self as the subject of conscious
experience. The empirical self provides us with an awareness of our inner
psychological states (Brook, 1996). This aspect of self is the foundation on which
knowledge about our selves as individuals can be built.
Overall Kant made two contributions to the growing philosophical debate
surrounding the concept of self. Firstly, he attempted to combine the empiricist and
rational perspectives of the time to show that the mind was an active participant in
creating the world it perceives. Through this position, Kant identified the
transcendental self. He stated that the self was more than the perceptions and
cognitions of an individual. Secondly and more importantly, he explicitly divided the
concept of self into two, the self which is the subject of conscious experience, and the
self which is an object of this conscious experience and which has an awareness of the
inner sense of the individual.
These modern western philosophers provided the foundation for the concepts
of self which are used in psychology today. Descartes reintroduced the very basic
concept of self, cogito ergo sum, into modern philosophy and begun debate on the
question ‘what constitutes the self?’ As a response to this minimal self, Locke united
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the self across time as a function of memory and addressed issues of personal identity
and other thinking things. Hume’s ideas were also influential within the
psychological definition of self, as they emphasised the importance of using
experience and observable phenomenon in order to gain knowledge about the world.
These ideas established the self as an object of empirical investigation, and removed
the discussion of the self from methaphysical levels. Finally Kant divided the self
into two components, the theoretical apperception, ‘I as a subject’ and the empirical
self-consciousness, ‘I as an object’.
1.2.2: The self within psychology: 19th century to William James
In the 19th century, experimental psychology began to develop as a scientific
discipline. The work of Fechner and Helmholtz in psychophysics added validity to the
notion that the workings of the mind could be studied using quantifiable measures
(Coon, 2000). These experimental techniques were used to measure aspects of
sensation, perception and thought. However concepts such as the self were still
deemed too metaphysical to be observed using these methods.
At that time, the self and many other concepts within psychology were still
placed within the realms of religious or moral philosophy. However William James’
Principles of Psychology (1890) brought together the current literature in psychology,
philosophy and physiology to form an arena for scientific investigation (Coon, 2000).
Within this text James devoted the largest chapter to “The consciousness of self”,
while topics such as attention and memory remained minimal. This focus elegantly
highlights how valuable James believed investigations into the concept of self and
individual’s subjective and objective experience were to psychology and the
understanding of human experience.
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James provided comprehensive theoretical accounts of what he regarded to be
the constituent parts of the self. In a similar way to Kant, he divided the self into two
main components, the ‘empirical me’ which is composed of the material, spiritual and
social selves, and also the pure ego. The ‘empirical me’ encompasses what is today
known as the substantial self. This discussion of self deviates from the concept of self
utilised by the early philosophers; Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant all stated that to
understand and obtain knowledge about a substantial self was not possible. However,
within the new discipline of psychology James stated that it was unnecessary for the
researcher to explain the objective nature of the mind:
‘About such ultimate puzzles he in the main need trouble himself no more than the
geometer, the chemist, or the botanist do, who make precisely the same assumptions
as he’.
James (1890; 184)
Although he did not conduct any experimental research on the self, in describing what
he thought to be the elementary components of a substantial self, James provided a
framework for the study of self within psychology. His ideas on personal identity,
social selves and self-love were influential in social psychology. The material self,
and spiritual self discussed aspects of personality theory and his section on
malfunction of the self revealed the importance of individual case study research
within psychopathology.
James is critical of each of the philosophical positions discussed previously,
however his ideas on the self are clearly influenced by them. His position is similar to
that of Locke and Kant. He proposed that the self provides unity to our thoughts and
underlies our stream of consciousness across past, present and future. He also utilised
Hume’s associationist ideas to discuss the many selves that individuals show within
the social world. The basic concept or concepts of self discussed by Willam James
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are largely similar to the way the self is discussed within contemporary psychology
(Robin, Norem & Cheek, 1999).
This modern definition can be used as a working definition of self within the
present thesis. The self represents a complex psychological construct which can be
contemplated in many different ways. The core of the self consists of conscious
awareness of the thought of an individual mind as distinguished from other minds.
This thought can be unified across time by a stream of consciousness through past,
present and future events. The identity of the self is also developed across time
through memory for previous events. The substantial self consists of our knowledge
about ourselves as objects within the world. This self is also identified through
memory. However, unlike the unified stream of consciousness, it is adaptive and
therefore can be modified by the social environment in which it is contained.
1.2.3: The self in the 20th century
As psychology began to utilise experimental methods, investigation into the
self again became a point of contention. The self represented a complex
psychological construct which was not amenable to investigation using the rigorous
methods of the psychophysicists. The method of investigation into more complex
aspects of psychology such as consciousness, self, understanding, expectation and
belief was labelled systematic experimental introspection (Titchener, 1911). Early
psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener believed this technique
could assess an individuals’ phenomenal experience at an experimental level, in order
to allow insight into the mental processes which underlie cognition (Hernstein &
Boring, 1965).
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In an early experiment into the self, Titchener asked several observers to
introspect on the continuity of the self, its mode, and the conditions of its appearance.
He found that the extent to which individuals were conscious of selfhood varied
throughout the population sample. He postulated that the self represented an
intermittent mode of conscious experience which occurred most frequently within a
social context, when reference to self-knowledge was made conscious through either
explicit or implicit modes of expression. From these results Titchener suggested that
the constituent components of the self are not fully accessible through consciousness
and that psychology could not be defined as a science of the self as conscious as
previously stated (Calkins, 1910).
During the early 20th century, introspection came under scrutiny as its methods
were subjective and the results showed great variability across participants. This
caused researchers to become disillusioned with the subjective experimental
technique, as it only provided information regarding aspects of mental processing
which entered conscious awareness and could be semantically formulated (Bargh &
Ferguson, 2000). Therefore, introspection failed to identify the underlying
mechanisms involved in complex cognitive processing.
The doctrine of behaviourism formulated by Watson (1913) and Skinner
(1938) proposed that all behaviours were a result of unconscious processes which
could not be examined through subjective experience. It arose as a reaction to the
difficulty in interpretation of the data generated through the introspective technique.
Behaviourism postulated that mental processes are associated with behavioural
analogues, and therefore in order to study the mind, psychology must become a
science of behaviour (Lycan, 1990). Unfortunately its mechanistic account of
behaviour as stimulus and response had no place for investigations into elusive
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concepts such as the self. During the reign of behaviourism, research focused on how
conditioning could account for the shaping, extinction and differentiation of
behaviours. The concept of self was hypothesised to be shaped by human experience
and therefore was difficult to define solely in terms of rewards and punishments. This
conceptualisation lead to the virtual disappearance of scientific investigations into the
self within the psychological literature until the 1970s (Robins et al., 1999).
The cognitive revolution however, renewed interest in psychological states
and internal mental processes as an explanation of human behaviour (Bargh &
Ferguson, 2000). With cognitive psychology, in contrast to behaviourism, all
behaviour requires explanation at the level of mental processes, taking into
consideration mental representations, intentions and beliefs (Reber, 1995).
The rise of cognitive psychology placed the self back at the forefront of
psychological research and the 1970s saw a dramatic rise in research into the concept
of self. Since the beginning of the century the discipline of psychology had developed
extensively and therefore the many aspects of the self were investigated across the
diverse areas of psychological study (Robins et al., 1999). Social psychologists
examined how the self differed across both social and cultural contexts (Tajfel, 1981,
Zurcher, 1977). Cognitive psychologists examined the development and
representation of self in memory and attention (Rogers, Kuiper & Kircher, 1977) and
clinical psychologists examined the role of the self within psychopathology (Beck,
1967).
The scientific methods employed in the new area of cognitive psychology
provided researchers with the tools to investigate the questions that remained at the
forefront of investigations since the theories of self put forward by the early
philosophers: what constitutes the self and how is it represented in the mind? By
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investigating if self-knowledge has influence over other mental processes such as
memory and attention it is possible to determine if the self is a construct which is
useful in explaining the functioning of the human mind.
1.3: The cognitive self: Experimental evidence
From 1975, the cognitive literature began to use schemata as an explanation
for how information is structured in the mind (Bobrow & Norman, 1975). Schemata
refer to cognitive structures which represent knowledge about a concept or type of
stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes (Bargh &
Ferguson, 1988). Markus (1977) stressed the importance of efficient information
processing and suggested that a large amount of information processed by individuals
is information that is related to their own thoughts and behaviours. She suggested that
attempts to organise, evaluate and explain one’s own behaviour would result in the
formation and maintenance of cognitive structures specific to that information. These
cognitive structures were referred to as self-schemata. It was hypothesised that to
allow for the efficient processing of self-related material, information about the self
may be represented differently from other types of information within the mind.
Markus (1977) conducted two studies in which she selected participants based
on their descriptions of themselves in relation to the trait of independence. One third
of the participants rated themselves as highly independent, a third as highly dependent
and one third as aschematic, or as neither extremely independent nor dependent. In
the first task, participants were presented with a set of trait descriptors which they
were asked to rate as self- or non-self-descriptive. They were then provided with a set
of behavioural descriptions and asked to cite past behaviours associated with the trait
of independence. Finally they were given a set of behavioural descriptions and asked
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to predict how likely they were to behave in such a way in the future. In the second
task participants completed a suggestibility questionnaire and then were provided with
false information regarding their scores on the questionnaire. Independents were told
they were highly suggestible and followers. Dependents were told they were non-
suggestible and good leaders.
The results showed that individuals who rated themselves as highly
independent or dependent endorsed more schema based trait adjectives as self-
descriptive than aschematics. These participants also showed faster response times
for schema-related words, provided more specific evidence for past behaviours and
resisted incongruent schematic information to a larger extent than the aschematic
groups. From these findings, Markus (1977) concluded that information associated
with an individual’s self-concept is processed differently from other types of
information. More specifically, Markus argued that self-schemata facilitate the
processing of information about the self. This seminal paper led to interest into how
the self functions as a cognitive construct within the mind.
Although this paper is of major importance to the psychological study of self-
representation, it has limitations. It only investigates how individuals represent
themselves on one specific trait, dependency. Therefore, it fails to identify how
individuals represent and evaluate themselves across many different contexts and
personality variables. Markus addressed this issue in later work that focused on the
influence of culture on the self-concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Wurf,
1987). Another series of studies which investigated the self-representation in a
different way was conducted by Rogers, Kuiper and Kircher.
Rogers, Kuiper and Kircher (1977) were interested in investigating how self-
schemata function on a more general level, with reference to more than one
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personality trait. They proposed that self-schemata function as an interaction between
previous experience and incoming information. Specifically, they argued that the self
acts as a superordinate schema at encoding, which elaborates new information within
memory. They developed a paradigm which examined the relative strength of self-
reference as an agent which facilitates information processing at encoding. If the self
does act as a schema at encoding, then it was hypothesised that individuals would
show better memory for information presented within a self-referential condition
when compared to other memory encoding conditions. The experimental paradigm
they employed is now known as the self-reference paradigm.
The self-reference paradigm was a modified version of Craik and Tulving’s
(1975) depth of processing paradigm. Within the self-reference paradigm,
participants were asked to rate a set of personality adjectives within four different
encoding conditions: structural (is the word presented in big letters?), phonemic (this
word rhymes with XXXX?), semantic (this word means the same as YYYY?) and
self-referent (this word describes you?). Using this method Rogers et al. (1977) were
able to compare the processing of information across four different encoding
conditions. In order to identify if there were any mnemonic advantages associated
with self-reference when compared to other types of information, participants were
asked to recall the adjectives that they had been presented with. It was hypothesised
that if self-reference does function as a schema based elaborative agent at encoding,
then self-reference would produce greater incidental recall within the depth of
processing paradigm.
The results revealed that participants showed greatest recall of words
presented within the self-reference condition, when compared to the semantic,
structural and phonemic conditions. These results confirmed the findings of Markus
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(1977) and led Rogers et al. (1977) to conclude that self-reference is a powerful
encoding device which is facilitated by an underlying self-schema which elaborates
incoming information.
However, the findings of this study were tentative. The self-reference
condition differed from the other encoding conditions in terms of the level of person-
related processing involved. Within the self-reference condition the participants were
required to make person-related evaluative judgements regarding the extent to which
they identified with the personality traits presented to them. Within the semantic,
structural and phonemic conditions participants were asked to make descriptive
factual decisions regarding the content of the personality traits. Therefore the
mnemonic difference found within the study might have been the result of task-related
differences in mnemonic processing rather than reflecting the existence of a cognitive
self-schemata.
In order to address this problem Kuiper and Rogers (1979) conducted a set of
experiments which expanded the original self-reference paradigm to include an other-
referent condition in which participants were asked the question “Rate whether this
word describes the experimenter”. This extra condition allowed Kuiper and Rogers
compare self-referent processing to other types of information processing while
controlling for components person-evaluation. In addition to the recall task, Kuiper
and Rogers asked participants to provide difficulty ratings to determine how difficult
participants found the decision-making task and confidence ratings to determine how
confident participants were on the decisions made.
In the first experiment, participants showed greater recall within the self-
referent condition when compared to the other-referent and semantic conditions.
They also rated these decisions as easier and rated them with more confidence. It is
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interesting to note that words recalled from the self-reference condition had shorter
response times than words recalled from the other-referent condition. Task difficulty
was associated with increased reaction time. Therefore these results indicated that the
better performance within the self-referent condition was not due to task difficulty
inducing deeper processing. The results from the recall, reaction time at encoding,
and the difficulty and confidence ratings led Kuiper and Rogers (1979) to conclude
that individuals utilise different information processing mechanisms when processing
self-referential information than when processing other types of information.
The increased recall found within the self-referent condition when compared
to other-referent and semantic conditions is now labelled the self-reference effect and
has been replicated using different stimuli, dependent variables and methodologies
(Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Brown, Keenan & Potts; 1986; Maki & McCaul, 1985;
Reeder, McCormick & Essleman, 1987).
Symons and Johnson (1997) conducted a review of the self-reference effect
within memory. They found that overall, self-referential encoding does promote
better recall on average than other types of encoding processes. They also found that
the effect size was smaller when self-reference was compared to other-referent
conditions as opposed to semantic conditions. The smaller effect size may be due to
the differences in the level of evaluation and decision-making employed in the
different conditions. There was also a smaller effect size for self-reference when
nouns were used as stimuli rather than trait adjectives, and when imagery tasks were
used rather than self-descriptive tasks. These findings suggest that the self-reference
effect is highly susceptible to task manipulation. The results led Symons and Johnson
to conclude that self-reference facilitates recall relative to semantic and other-
reference due to elaborated and organised processing of encoded information. They
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state that processing information about the self is a uniquely efficient process,
suggesting that information about the self forms a well organised and elaborated
schema within memory.
These findings go some way towards answering the age old question of the
philosophers ‘what constitutes the self and how is it represented in the mind?’. The
results suggest that the self-schema represents a powerful, highly efficient and
organised form of information processing. From this research, however, it is not
possible to determine if the highly developed self-schema represents a unique and
specialised form of processing, or if self-referent information is very well rehearsed
and organised in well developed cognitive representations, such that self-schemata
employ the same underlying mechanisms as other forms of information processing.
1.3.1: The neural basis of self-reference
The development of modern neuroimaging techniques has allowed researchers
to take their investigations regarding the self and the self-reference effect to the neural
level. A growing body of research aims to identify if there is a region or network
within the brain which uniquely represents a self-schema by facilitating the processing
of self-referential information. The comparison of neural activations associated with
self-referential, other-referential and semantic conditions allows researchers to
determine if these processes utilise separate functional networks within the brain. If
separate functional networks were identified then this would provide further evidence
to suggest that self-reference does in fact represent a unique and specialised form of
cognitive processing.
Craik et al. (1999) used positron emission tomography (PET) to investigate the
self-reference effect within Rogers, Kuiper and Kircher’s (1977) paradigm. The four
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conditions in which trait adjectives were presented were: self, other, general (how
socially desirable is the trait described by the adjective?) and syllable (how many
syllables does the adjective contain?). The results revealed increased frontal
activations within the self-reference condition when compared to the other-referent,
general and syllable conditions. More specifically, the statistical parametric mapping
(SPM) analysis revealed an increase in activity within the right anterior cingulate
cortex. The partial least squares (PLS) analysis revealed that activations specific to
the self condition accounted for 15% of the variance within bilateral medial frontal
lobes, right middle frontal gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. From these findings
Craik et al. concluded that the concept of self was necessary for episodic retrieval and
that its involvement was associated with neural activity in the right frontal lobe.
Subsequently, several other studies have identified activations within the
prefrontal cortex, specifically within medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior
and anterior cingulate corticies, which are associated with self-referential processing
(Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Zysset et al., 2003). These studies all use
modifications of the self-reference paradigm. Other studies which utilised different
stimuli - picture and word stimuli (Köhler, Winocur & McIntosh, 2000), faces
(Kircher et al., 2000), one, two or three exemplar stimuli (Lepage, Habib, Cormier,
Houle & McIntosh, 2000) and voices (Cabeza et al., 2004) - also found similar results.
Table 1.1 provides a summarised account of the neural regions associated with self-
reference as identified by previous neuroimaging studies (see p21). The consensus in
results appears to indicate that self-reference is a unitary construct that is represented
by activity in a network of brain structures within the mPFC and the cingulate cortex.
This network is activated specifically during self-referential processing when the self-
schema is hypothesised to be involved in facilitating information processing.
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1.4: Self-Reference and emotional valence
The research discussed above presents a strong case that information about the
self is organised into a self-schema and is represented by a specific set of regions
within the brain. However, information about the self is usually embedded with other
types of information. In the studies described above, the investigators did not separate
the dimension of self-relevance from the dimension of emotional valence. This is
very striking given that previous research, particularly in social and clinical
psychology, has shown that the emotional valence of incoming information may be an
important aspect of self-related processing.
1.4.1: The self-positivity bias
Many investigators have examined how people preferentially process and
encode emotional information that is relevant to the self (Miall, 1986). Studies
conducted across a range of different contexts show that individuals tend to view
themselves through rose-tinted lenses (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, &
Vredenburg, 1995). A meta-analysis investigating this self-positivity bias in
attribution research suggests that individuals tend to attribute positive traits and
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Table 1.1: Table of neuroimaging studies investigating self-referential processing in healthy individuals.
Author Participants Stimuli Paradigm Used Behavioural/Physiological
measures
Activations associated with Self-reference conditions
Fink et al.
1996
7 males Auditory sentences (i) rest,
(ii) impersonal, (iii) personal
Imagery task PET Increases in right hemisphere; hippocampal, parahippocampal,
amgdaloid, anterior insula, posterior cingulate, temproparietal
junction, prefrontal cortex.
Decreases; bilateral lateral inferior parietal cortex, left inferior
occipital cortex, right fusiform gyrus, left inferior frontal cortex.
Craik et al.
1999
4 males
4 females
Positive and negative
personality trait adjectives (i)
self, (ii) other, (iii) social
desirability, (iv) syllables
Four choice
judgement task
PET, reaction time, recognition Increases in left hemisphere; medial superior frontal gyrus,
inferior frontal gyrus.
Decreases; left inferior parietal gyrus, right superior parietal
lobule, left fusiform gyrus, right precentral gyrus.
Kircher et
al.
2000
Exp I
6 males Morphed faces (i) self, (ii)
partner, (iii) other
Recognition task fMRI, reaction time, recognition Own face increases: right hippocampal formation, insula,
anterior cingulate, superior/middle temporal, left inferior
parietal, left middle, superior frontal gyrus, right precuneus,
right subthalamic nucleus, cerebellum.
Kircher et
al.
2000
Exp II
6 males Self-descriptive personality
traits, rated by participants
earlier
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI, reaction time, recognition Left hemisphere increases; precuneus, superior parietal lobe,
anterior cingulate gyrus, cingulum, anterior insula and inferior
frontal gyrus, post central gyrus , putamen and medial
geniculate body.
Johnson et
al. 2002
7 males
4 females
Auditory self-evaluative
statements
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI, reaction time Increases: anterior medial prefrontal cortex, posterior
cingulate.
Zysset et al.
2002
8 males
5 females
Visual statements (i)
evaluative, (ii) semantic, (iii)
episodic, (iv)episodic, (vi)
null events
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI Evaluative increases: left fronto-opercular cortex, frontomedial
cortex.
Episodic increases: Left and right superior frontal sulcus, right
middle frontal gyrus, inferior precuneus, left and right
intraparietal sulcus.
Kelley et al.
2002
13 males
11 females
Personality trait adjectives (i)
self, (ii) other, (iii) letter case
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI Decreases: medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate.
Fossati et al.
2003
6 males
8 females
Personality trait adjectives (i)
self, (ii) other, (iii) target
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI, reaction time Increases: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, left posterior
cingulate.
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letter Self-positive increases: right insula, temporal, occipital, inferior
parietal regions.
Self-negative decreases: left and right insula, left inferior
parietal and right and left occipital cortex.
Zysset et al.
2003
7 males
11 females
Positive and negative
sentences (i) semantic ,(ii)
evaluative, (iii) baseline
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI Evaluative increases: dorsal and ventral anteriomedial
prefrontal cortex, inferior precuneus, posterior cingulate
cortex.
Cabeza et al.
2004
3 males
10 females
Photographs (i) taken by
participant, (ii) taken by other
participant
Recognition task fMRI, recognition Medial prefrontal cortex, parahippocampal regions,
hippocampal formation.
Levine et al.
2004
2 males
3 females
Oral dialogues (i) personal
semantic, (ii) personal
episodic, (iii) other episodic,
(iv) general semantic
Imagery generation fMRI, rating of vividness Increases: bilateral retrosplenial posterior cingulate cortex,
precuneus, bilateral anteromedial prefrontal and dorsal
paracingulate cortex.
Decreases: right ventromedial prefrontal cortex, left superior
temporal gyrus, left interior parietal cluster, left primary motor
cortex, primary visual cortex.
Fossati et al.
2004
4 male
7 female
Positive and negative
personality trait adjectives (i)
self, (ii) other, (iii) target
letter
Recognition task fMRI, reaction time, recognition Self-negative increases: right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
right premotor cortex, right parietal, right extra-striate cortex,
left caudate, right and left cerebellum.
Self-positive increases: right anterior cingulate and right medial
prefrontal cortex.
Johnson et
al. 2005
9 male
8 female
Coloured squares (i) self-
referential preference, (2)
non-self preference, (3) non-
self factual
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI, reaction time Increases: anterior medial prefrontal cortex, retiosplenial
cortex, caudate bilaterally, left posterior temporal cortex, left
anterior hippocampus.
Moran et al.
2006
17male
25 women
Positive and negative
personality trait adjectives
(i)self-reference
Two choice
judgement task
fMRI, reaction time Self-reference increases: medial prefrontal cortex, posterior
cingulate and caudate bilaterally.
Self-positive increases: ventral anterior cingulate cortex
Self x Valence interaction increases: inferior prefrontal cortex,
dorsal anterior cingulate supplementary motor area.
This table shows that out of the 12 studies conducted investigating self-referential processing 9 have identified changes in neural activations within the medial prefrontal
cortex within the self condtion. Activations are also often identified within the anterior and posterior cingulate.
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outcomes to internal, stable and global personal characteristics, whereas negative
traits and outcomes are identified as unrelated to personal characteristics (Mezulis,
Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004). Individuals consistently view themselves as
possessing more positive personality traits and exhibiting more positive behaviours
and behavioural characteristics than other individuals. By the same token, individuals
view themselves as having less negative personality traits and negative behavioural
characteristics than other individuals (Allison, Messick & Goethals, 1989; Mesick,
Bloom, Blodizar & Samuelson, 1985). This pheonomeon is known as the self-
positivity bias (Heine, Lehman, Markus & Kitayama, 1999), and illustrates that a
close relationship exists between self-reference and emotional valence.
Although the self-positivity bias is known to be a robust finding, its
importance has not been discussed in relation to the cognitive construct of the self-
schema. The self-positivity bias illustrates that most information individuals identify
as self-referent is also universally identified as positive and most information that is
identified as non-self-referent is universally identified as negative. None of the
studies discussed previously, have addressed the possible role of emotional valence
within self-referential processing. It is possible that the addition of a stimulus
category such as emotional valence would act as a further organisational agent during
information processing. Therefore, the emotional valence of stimuli within the self-
referential condition may have facilitated information processing within the self-
reference condition to a greater extent that in the other decision-making conditions.
These differences may have contributed to the neural activations thought to be
specific to self-referential processing.
More recently the self-positivity bias has been investigated in more detail.
Pahl and Eiser (2005) investigated differences in the self-positivity bias in traits rated
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as extreme or moderate in emotional content. Sedikides and Green (2004) used recall
tasks to investigate the underlying cognitive basis of the self-positivity bias. Finally
several studies have attempted to identify the brain regions associated with self-
related emotional processing.
1.4.2: Self-referential and emotional valence: neuroimaging studies
Fossati et al. (2003) carried out an fMRI study using the self-reference
paradigm and conducted post hoc analyses on the emotional valance of stimuli both
within the self-reference condition and across all conditions. As in previous
neuroimaging studies (see Table 1.1), they found activations within the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex specific to the self-reference condition. The activation in this region
was not found to be affected by emotional valence. No main effect of valence was
identified. However reductions in response to negative words were identified within
the self-reference condition in the left and right insula, temporal, occipital and inferior
parietal regions. The authors suggest that these findings provide evidence that a
widely distributed network of brain regions is involved in self-referential processing.
They postulate that the medial prefrontal cortex mediates self-reference whereas other
regions may be involved in other aspects of information processing, such as emotional
valence, which are also important when evaluating self-reference.
The study conducted by Fossati. (2003) was the first attempt to address the
issue of emotional valence within self-referential processing using neuroimaging
techniques. Their findings provide preliminary evidence to suggest emotional valence
is involved in the processing of self-referential information at a neural level.
However, when the self-positivity bias is considered in relation to the self-reference
paradigm commonly employed, one other factor needs to be addressed: the decision-
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making tasks involved. As discussed in Section 1.3 the self-reference paradigm
compares participants’ responses in a self-referential condition to their responses in an
other-referent condition. Both conditions consist of a decision-making task (i.e., Does
this word describe you?), therefore the participants are given the choice to make either
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. In the neuroimaging studies discussed, the influence of this
decision-making task (the difference between the ‘yes’ & ‘no’ responses) was not
considered. As the emotional valence of stimuli and participants’ evaluation of self-
reference are known to be highly correlated (see Section 1.4.1), it is unclear whether
the activations identified by Fossati et al. are the result of emotional valence or
whether they may in fact be the result of neural differences which occur when making
decisions about self-referential information.
Moran et al. (2006) resolved this issue by analysing both self-evaluation (‘like
me’ vs., ‘not like me at all’) and the emotional valence of the stimuli (positive vs.
negative) within the self-reference decision-making task. They demonstrated a clear
distinction between the processing of self-relevant information and the processing of
emotional valence. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was found to respond
preferentially to highly self-relevant (like me) material, as reported by Craik et al.
(1999), Fossati et al. (2003) and Kelley et al. (2002). The emotional valence of self-
relevant material (information evaluated as ‘like me’) activated an adjacent region, the
ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC). Based on this apparent functional
dissociation between the processing of self-relevance and emotional valence and the
anatomical proximity of the two regions, Moran et al. suggested that a possible
functional hierarchy may be involved in the processing of self-relevant and emotional
information. They suggested that when information is first encountered, the mPFC
signals the self-relevance of the information. After this step, information which is
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identified as highly self-relevant is then tagged for valence in the vACC. This
functional hierarchy represents a tentative model of self-referential processing and
therefore requires further investigation. One way to investigate this model further
may be to employ another neurophysiological measure known as event-related
potentials (ERPs).
Event-related potentials (ERPs), described in Section 2.4.1, are a physiological
measure of the electrical activity in the brain which is time-locked to stimulus
presentation. ERPs are a valuable psychophysiological measure as they provide a
temporal record of the various stages of information processing. The functional
hierarchy suggested by Moran et al. differentiates between two stages of processing:
they hypothesise that the processing of self-relevance occurs prior to the processing of
the emotional valence of information identified as highly self-referent. If a temporal
dissociation between these two stages could be identified using ERPs then this would
provide further support for Moran et al.’s functional hierarchal model of self-
referential processing.
1.5: Aims and hypotheses (I)
Within the current literature, the relationship between self-reference and
emotional valence is becoming more complex. Therefore, the first overall aim of the
present thesis is to attempt to clarify this relationship. This will be done in two ways.
Firstly, an alternative methodology will be devised to investigate the relationship
between self-referential and emotional processing. Secondly, alternative
physiological measures which are more suited to investigating all stages of
information processing will be employed.
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Within the self-reference paradigm, the role of emotional valence has
previously been investigated by identifying the behavioural and neural activations
which are associated with the presentation of positive and negative stimuli within a
self-referent decision-making task (Fossati et al., 2003; Moran et al., 2006).
However, research which has identified the self-positivity bias in healthy individuals
illustrates that a close relationship exists between self-reference and emotional
valence. Due to this close relationship, it is difficult to determine the extent to which
self-reference and emotional valence contribute to the advantages of self-referential
processing identified within the self-reference paradigm (see Section 1.4.1). In order
to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the role of emotional processing within self-
reference, it would be prudent to investigate the mechanisms underlying emotional
processing itself. One way of exploring this further would be to ask participants to
complete both an emotional decision-making task and a self-referential decision-
making task. This methodology was employed in the research presented in the
following experimental chapters (see Chapters Three, Five & Six).
By presenting participants with both self-referential and emotional decision-
making tasks it will be possible to identify the behavioural and physiological
correlates which are associated with each type of processing. If the correlates in each
of the two decision-making tasks are similar then this would provide evidence to
suggest that the processing of emotional valence is an important aspect of self-
referential processing. However, if the behavioural and physiological correlates
which are identified within the self-referential decision-making task differ to those
identified in the emotional decision-making task then this would provide evidence to
suggest that self-referent processing represents a specialised form of information
processing.
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The physiological measures employed in the following experiments also differ
from the neuroimaging techniques employed in the previous research. To the author’s
knowledge, no previous studies have employed ERPs to investigate self-referential
processing. By employing ERPs to investigate the processing of emotional valence
within the self-reference task it may be possible to identify and separate these two
variables temporally. If these two variables can be separated temporally then this
would provide evidence to support the functional hierarchy model of self-referential
processing proposed by Moran et al. (2006) (see Chapter Four). Furthermore, if the
ERP correlates which are found to occur in the self-reference task do not occur in the
emotional valence task then this would provide evidence to suggest that self-reference
represents a specialised form of processing (see Chapters Five & Seven).
The relationship between self-reference and emotional valence has not been
investigated to a large extent within the general population. However, due to the
potential therapeutic benefits of understanding this relationship, a great deal of
research has been done with clinical populations. The next section will provide a
broad overview of some of the theories and experimental studies which have led
research within this field.
1.6: Alterations in self-reference as a function of mood
1.6.1: A negative self-view: cognitive theories of depression
Negative thoughts about the self have been identified as one of the core
features of depression (Hammen, 1997). Two of the most commonly used indexes for
identifying depression, the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders
(DSM-IV) and the international classification of diseases (ICD-10), both list elements
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of a negative self-view, such as self-dislike, worthlessness and low self-esteem, as
important indicators of a depressive episode. This negative self-view was identified
by Aaron T. Beck in many of his depressed patients and formed the basis of one of the
earliest and most widely researched cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1967;
1978).
Based on the negative thought patterns identified in his patients, Beck
proposed a schema theory of depression. He proposed that the experience of
depression results from negative distortions in thought patterns within the ‘cognitive
triad’. The cognitive triad consists of the schemata that an individual holds about
their self, the world they live in and their future. In his classical formulation of the
theory, Beck (1967; 1978) proposed that negative distortions within the cognitive
triad occur in early life. Individuals who possess a negative cognitive triad, or
dysfunctional attitudes, are vulnerable to experiencing depressive episodes in later
life. Environmental triggers can lead to a depressive episode when current
circumstances activate the negative schemata held by the vulnerable individual.
On first inspection, Beck’s schema theory seems concise and well supported
by clinical observation. However, when put to the test by scientific research, several
limitations have been identified. The theory was initially developed for use in clinical
practice and not as a scientific explanation of the cognitive mechanisms underlying
depression. Therefore, researchers found it difficult to define hypotheses and
predictions which could be used to test the theory experimentally (Teasdale &
Barnard, 1993).
As stated above, Beck stressed that the negative distortions present in the
cognitive triad occur in early life and predispose individuals to depressive tendencies.
If negative thinking is a precursor to depression then it should be possible to identify
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these negative thinking patterns in vulnerable individuals during periods of normal
mood as well as during depressive episodes. However, research has found that the
presence of dysfunctional attitudes is a poor indicator of future depressive episodes
(Barnett & Gotlib, 1988, 1990; O’Hara, Rehm & Campbell, 1982). Furthermore,
studies have shown that negative beliefs about the self are present during depressive
episodes but not present during remission (Power, 1990). These findings suggest that
negative thinking may in fact be a consequence of depression rather than a casual
factor.
Another influential theory of depression proposed by Seligman (1975) and
later modified by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) and Petersen and
Seligman (1984) is helplessness or hopelessness theory. This theory is based on more
general theories concerned with attributional style. According to attribution theory,
individuals intuitively form causal relationships between events which occur within
their environment (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Hopelessness theory states that
certain attributional styles are more likely to result in the occurrence of depression.
Abramson et al. (1978) suggest that individuals who make internal attributions (in
which individuals themselves are the cause) stable attributions (in which the cause is
unchanging) and global attributions (in which the cause will occur in a wide variety of
situations) are more vulnerable to depressive episodes.
A meta-analysis by Sweeny et al. (1986) involving over 100 experiments and
15,000 participants identified a correlation between this attributional style and
depression. Furthermore, a longidutinal study by Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus and
Seligman (1992) showed that over a five year period attributional style predicted the
occurrence of a depressive episode in children. One potential limitation of the theory,
however, is that is focuses on the causes of events. Hopelessness theory fails to
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consider that the negative consequences of events, and the coping or social problem-
solving skills employed to deal with these events may also be relevant to the onset and
maintenance of depressive episodes (Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
Even in these early cognitive theories of depression, emotional biases within
self are identified as central to the experience of a depressive episode. Many other
theories of depression, also acknowledge the role of self to the onset and maintenance
of depression. Ingram (1990), and Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), hypothesise that self-
focused attention and rumination play a role in emotional disorders. Self-focused
attention has been defined as “an awareness of self-referent internally generated
information” (Ingram, 1990 p. 156) and rumination as the tendency to consistently
focus on the implication of self-negative information (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Studies by Ingram (1990) and Mor and Winquist (2002)
suggest that depressed individuals do in fact show higher levels of private self-
focused attention and rumination when compared to anxious individuals.
These theoretical positions illustrate the importance of investigating the
emotional component of self-referent processing as it may contribute to the
development or maintenance of depression.
1.6.2: Self-referential processing in dysphoria and depression: experimental evidence
The earliest studies investigating self-reference in depression were done in
order to investigate Beck’s negative self-schema concept. Several seminal studies
utilised the self-reference paradigm devised by Rogers, Kuiper and Kircher (1977) to
examine how emotional adjectives were processed by non-depressed and depressed
individuals. Using depressed patients and non-depressed individuals, Bradley and
Mathews (1983) found that depressed individuals recalled significantly more negative
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than positive adjectives within the self-referent task (a self-negativity bias) whereas,
consistent with the self-positivity bias identified in the general population, non-
depressed individuals showed the reverse effect. Studies by Derry and Kuiper (1981)
and Mineka and Sutton (1992) found similar effects. The results of all three studies
also suggest that emotional biases within the self-reference task occur for both recall
and the number of adjectives endorsed as self-referential.
A study conducted by Kuiper and Derry (1982) employed a similar design to
investigate differences between non-depressed and mildly depressed individuals. The
results for non-depressed individuals were similar to the findings discussed above.
Non-depressed individuals showed a self-positivity bias within memory. Mildly
depressed individuals did not display a self-negativity bias. In fact, enhanced recall
was found for both positive and negative adjectives within the self task when
compared to the recall of stimuli presented in a semantic task. These findings were
taken to suggest that the self-schema is markedly different in mildly depressed
individuals when compared to non-depressed individuals. Even during states of mild
of depression, individuals are beginning to incorporate negative information into their
self-schema.
Although the results do provide evidence to suggest that self-referential
processing is altered as a function of mood, the claim that these findings support
Beck’s negative self-schema concept has been criticised. According to Beck’s theory,
the memory bias for self-relevant negative information in depression is the result of
the reactivation of an enduring self-negative schema. However, this self-negative bias
may also be the result of differences in the selection strategies employed by depressed
individuals or due to other information processing biases which facilitate the
accessibility of negative information (Segal, 1988; Williams, Watts, MacLeod &
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Mathews, 1997). Research by Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) proposed that it may not
only be the content of information which plays a role in self-schemata but also the
interconnectedness between the information which is important.
A series of studies by Segal and colleagues (Segal, 1988; Segal, Hood, Shaw
& Higgins, 1988; Segal & Vella, 1990; Segal, Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis & Horowitz,
1995) examined this hypothesis in depression. They utilised a modified version of the
Stroop naming task. Prior to the colour naming task, individuals were presented with
a prime which was either self-referential or non-self-referential in content. The
amount of interference in colour naming the target was measured as an index of
relatedness. Using this methodology, Segal et al. (1988) and Segal and Vella found
that interference on the colour naming task was greatest for depressed individuals
compared to normal individuals when the prime and target words were both self-
referent. No differences in emotional valence were identified in these studies. In a
further study, Segal et al. (1995) systematically manipulated the valence of the
stimuli. Depressed individuals were found to exhibit the longest colour-naming
latencies when self-referent negative information was primed with a similar self-
referent negative stimulus. As in previous studies, these findings support the
hypothesis that the self becomes more negative during depression. They suggest that
the self-schema concept is still useful when attempting to understand emotional biases
in depression and broaden our understanding of this concept. They illustrate that the
definition of self-schema should consider both the content of and interconnectedness
between emotional information (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998).
More recently, a comprehensive study by Dozois and Dobson (2001)
examined the content and organisation of the self-schema in four groups: purely
depressed individuals, depressed/anxious individuals, purely anxious individuals and
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non-psychiatric controls. Examining these groups allowed the authors to differentiate
those aspects of the self-schema which are altered in emotional disorders from those
alterations which are specific to the experience of depression. They employed two
tasks to examine the content (self-reference task & emotional stroop) and two tasks to
examine the cognitive organisation (redundancy card sorting, psychological distance
scaling task) of the self-schema.
As in the previous studies, compared to non-psychiatric controls, depressed
individuals endorsed more negative attributes as self-referential, recalled higher
numbers of self-negative stimuli showed greater interconnectedness between self-
negative information. However these biases in the self-negative schema were also
present in all other psychiatric groups, suggesting that the self-negative bias is not
specific to depression. More interestingly, biases in self-positive information were
found to be specific to the depressed psychiatric groups. When compared to non-
psychatric and anxious control groups, both depressed groups were found to endorse
fewer and recall lower numbers of positive attributes and have less interconnectedness
between self-positive information.
One limitation of this study is that the sample group consisted of only women.
Therefore, these findings should not be generalised to the male population. Despite
this restriction, this study represents an elegant investigation into the self-schema in
depression. Although the concept of the self-schema has been altered since it was
first proposed by Beck, research findings consistently illustrate that the highly
elaborated and organised self-schema is dramatically altered during the experience of
negative mood. Furthermore, research should consider not only self-negative
information, but also the changes which occur during the processing of self-positive
information.
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1.7: Aims and hypotheses (II)
As stated previously, a close relationship is thought to exist between self-
reference and emotional valence in healthy individuals. Due to this close relationship,
it is possible that the self-reference task emphasises the emotional content of
experimental stimuli to a greater extent than other decision-making tasks examined
within the self-reference paradigm (see Section 1.4.1 for a review). Previous research
has also identified that self-referential processing is altered as a function of mood (see
Section 1.6.2). Due to this close relationship between self-reference and emotional
valence within self-referential decision-making, it is not possible to determine from
previous research if the changes in self-referential processing during negative mood
are the result of specific changes in self-referential processing, or if they are the result
of a more general bias in emotional processing.
The second aim of the present thesis is to investigate how self-referential
processing is altered as a function of mood. The responses of individuals who are
experiencing high levels of negative mood will be compared to the responses of
individuals experiencing low levels of negative mood, in both self-referential and
emotional decision-making tasks. Using these methods, it will be possible to examine
if differences between the two groups occur in both self-referential and emotional
decision-making tasks, or if emotional biases during the experience of negative mood
are specific to self-referential processing. If differences identified between the two
groups are specific to self-referential processing then this would provide stronger
evidence to suggest that the emotional biases associated with negative mood occur
specifically in the context of self-schema based processing.
The neuroimaging studies identified a functional hierarchy of self-referential
processing in healthy individuals. To date, no research has employed
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neurophysiological techniques to examine changes in self-referential processing as a
function of mood. By employing ERPs to investigate the changes in self-reference
and emotional valence during negative mood, it would be possible to identify if the
changes in these two types of processing at the behavioural level, are also evident
within the brain. ERPs provide a temporal measure of electrical activity within the
brain from stimulus onset until response. Recording ERPs within the present study
would also be valuable as it would be possible to investigate between group
differences at all stages of the decision-making process, including the early stages of
processing which are not accessible to experimental investigation using behavioural
measures alone.
1.8: Summary and Research Overview
The question of ‘What constitutes the self?’ has been of interest to religious
scholars, philosophers and psychologists for centuries. Our conscious awareness and
understanding of ourselves as living beings is what separates us from much of the
animal kingdom. Our representation of ourselves as unique individuals separates us
from each other, and the knowledge and understanding of this representation provides
us with personal identity. Therefore, an understanding of concepts such as self-
awareness and self-representation as discussed by Descartes, Locke and James are
fundamental to psychology and knowledge of the human mind.
The work of early philosophers laid the foundation for the study of the self as
a psychological construct within empirical science. The aim of the early research was
to understand how the self was experienced using techniques such as introspection,
however these methods were deemed too subjective to provide an accurate account of
the concept of self.
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After the cognitive revolution, investigation began into how the self functions
within the mind. Studies by Markus (1977) and Rogers et al. (1977) suggest that
information about the self is represented by a cognitive structure called a self-schema.
Symons and Johnson (1997) show that this self-schema is a highly elaborated and
organised structure which facilitates the processing of self-related information. More
recent studies by Craik et al. (1999) sought to identify the mechanisms underlying this
self-schema at a neural level in an attempt to establish if there is a brain region or
network specific to the processing of self-related information. Using modern imaging
techniques, these studies aimed to investigate the same questions that were asked by
early philosophers: how is the self represented in the mind, and how does it function?
The results of these studies suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
and connecting regions, the anterior and posterior cingulate, may play a role in the
processing of self-referential information. However, studies by Heine et al. (1999)
and Mezulis et al. (2004), examining the emotional content of the self, suggest that
emotional valence also plays a role within self-referential processing. The extent to
which emotional valence plays a role in self-referent processing needs to be addressed
before the neural correlates of self-related processing can be evaluated.
Fossati et al. (2003) and Moran et al. (2006) conducted studies which
examined the neural relationship between self-reference and emotional valence. The
findings of Moran et al. supported Craik et al. (1999) that the mPFC is involved in the
processing of self-referent material. However, Moran et al. also identified regions
specific to the processing of emotional valence within self-reference. Research
should now focus on the investigating the extent to which emotional valence
influences self-referential processing.
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Studies conducted by Bradley and Mathews (1983) and more recent research
by Dozois and Dobson (2001) identified that during depression, emotional biases are
present within self-reference. These findings illustrate that, the self-positivity bias
which exists in healthy individuals is altered as a function of mood. Further research
is required to identify if alterations in self-reference are specifically related to self-
referential processing or if they the are result of more general biases in the processing
of emotional information.
1.8.1: General aims and hypotheses
In order to assess the extent to which emotional valence contributes to self-
referential processing, it would be useful to identify the mechanisms associated with
both types of processing. If decisions about emotional valence and self-reference are
carried out by similar cognitive mechanisms, then both types of processing should
elicit similar responses. However, if self-referential processing represents a unique
cognitive mechanism, then responses elicited by self-reference should differ to those
elicited by emotional valence.
In order to provide a full understanding of the nature of emotional and self-
referential processing, several experiments will be conducted in which behavioural
(word rating, frequency of response & response time), autonomic (heart rate, skin
conductance) and neurophysiological (event-related potentials) measures will be
recorded.
The studies done by Dozois and Dobson (2001) and Segal et al. (1988)
illustrate that the relationship between self-reference and emotion is altered as a
function of mood state. Therefore, investigating the relationship between these two
variables during the experience of negative mood may help further clarify the
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relationship between self-reference and emotion and may also give us some insight
into how this relationship is altered as a function of mood both behaviourally and
psychophysiologically.
1.8.2: Outline of following chapters
Chapter Two is a reference chapter. It provides a brief explanation of all the
questionnaires, physiological techniques and word stimuli employed within the
following experimental chapters.
The aim of Chapter Three is to provide an experimental test of the stimuli
employed within the following chapters. This first experiment presents a behavioural
study of how non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals evaluate information within
both self-referential and emotional contexts. The results will be discussed in relation
to the two overall aims of the thesis: (I) to clarify the relationship between self-
reference and emotional valence, (II) to investigate how individuals’ responses to self-
referential and emotional information are altered as a function of mood.
The aim of Chapter Four is to identify if ERPs can be employed to investigate
self-referential processing. To allow a comparison of the results of this study to the
previous research conducted using neuroimaging techniques, a modified version of
the self-reference paradigm is examined. Results are discussed in reference to the
functional hierarchy model proposed by Moran et al. (2006) and previous research
into the self-positivity bias. Some limitations of this paradigm are identified, in
particular the extent to which this paradigm can be used to investigate aspects of
emotional processing.
The two overall aims of the thesis are brought together in the fifth chapter. In
this experiment, the behavioural and physiological (ERPs) responses of non-dysphoric
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and dysphoric individuals are recorded during both self-referential and emotional
decision-making tasks. The results support the findings of the previous chapters and
illustrate that neural activations within self-referential decision-making differ between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups.
The aim of the sixth chapter is to investigate other physiological responses of
non-dysphoric individuals within the two decision-making tasks. Participants’ heart
rate and skin conductance responses are recorded. These measures provide an index
of the physiological emotional response which occurs in both self-referential and
emotional decision-making tasks. The results are discussed in terms of the extent to
which the self-referential and emotional decision-making tasks elicit similar
autonomic responses.
The aim of Chapter Seven is to address the issue of person-evaluation
processing. Non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals’ behavioural and physiological
responses are recorded during both self-referential and other-referential decision-
making tasks. The results are discussed in terms of the extent to which self-reference
represents some form of person-referent processing.
Chapter Eight brings together the findings of all the previous experimental
chapters. These findings are discussed in terms of the two overall aims of the thesis
presented in this introduction. A theoretical model of self-referential processing is
proposed. This model is then discussed in relation to two current models of
psychopathology. Finally, some limitations of the present research are discussed
alongside future directions for this research area.
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- Chapter 2 -
Methodology
2.1: Introduction
The aim of the present chapter is to give an overview of the procedures and
assessments that were used in the studies reported in subsequent experimental
chapters. The first section will discuss the self-report measures used to assess the
level of negative mood experienced by participants. It will also summarise the
measures employed to examine control variables such as intellectual ability. The
second section outlines the psychophysiological measures which were employed. In
this section, discussion focuses around the underlying mechanism involved in each
measure, the way in which it is recorded, and how it is used as a psychophysiological
index. The third section outlines the word stimuli used in all experiments and the
pilot study conducted to obtain this information.
2.2: Self-report measures: experimental variables
2.2.1: Revised Beck Depression Inventory II
The Revised Beck Depression Inventory II or, BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) measures the presence and severity of symptoms of depression in individuals
aged 13+ (see Appendix I). It was developed to adhere to the criteria for diagnosing
Major Depression as recommended by the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-IV,
1994). In line with these criteria, participants are asked to rate their experience of
symptoms ‘during the past two weeks, including today’.
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The inventory assesses a variety of symptoms of depression indicating
pessimisim, loss of pleasure, punishment feelings, suicidal thoughts or wishes,
indecisiveness, changes in sleeping pattern, agitation, tiredness and fatigue. The
inventory consists of 21 items. Each item is measured on a 4 point scale; 0 indicates
that the symptom is not present, ‘I do not feel sad’ and 3 indicates that the symptom is
strongly present, ‘I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it’. The range of scores
can vary from 0 to 63. A higher score indicates a more severe form of depressive
symptomatology.
The BDI-II is a revision of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), which was
devised in 1961 (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbarugh, 1961). The BDI is one
of the most widely used instruments for detecting and assessing the severity of
depression in a variety of populations (Piotrowski & Keller, 1992).
Several studies have examined the factor structure of the BDI-II. Most studies
find support for a two factor model consisting of cognitive-affective and somatic-
vegetative factors. Generally the BDI is known to reflect the cognitive, affective,
somatic and vegetative symptoms associated with depression and therefore provides
an overall representation of the extent to which an individual is experiencing
symptoms of depression (Osman et al., 1997; Steer, Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1999;
Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000; Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004; Ward, 2006).
The BDI is known to be one of the best instruments for assessing the extent to
which individuals are experiencing symptoms of depression (Michalak et al., 2004).
More recently, several studies have shown that the BDI-II also represents a valid and
reliable screening instrument. The BDI-II has been shown to have high levels of test-
retest stability with correlations ranging from 0.69 - 0.93 (Beck et al., 1996; Wiebe &
Penley, 2005; Yin & Fan, 2000), suggesting that BDI scores remain relatively stable
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over time. The BDI-II has high internal consistency, with correlations ranging from
0.84 - 0.93 (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Osman et al., 1997; Whisman et al.,
2000; Wiebe & Penley, 2005; Yin & Fan, 2000). Finally, the BDI-II exhibits good
convergence with other measures of depression: BDI-IA (r = 0.93), Hamilton Rating
Scale for Depression (r = 0.71) (Beck et al., 1996), Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-
Depression Scale (r = 0.77) (Osman et al., 1997) and divergent validity with measures
of anxiety: Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = 0.60), Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (r =
0.47) (Beck et al., 1996), Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-Anxiety Scale (r = 0.44)
(Osman et al., 1997). Together these data support the use of the BDI-II as a valid and
reliable measure for detecting and assessing levels of depressive symptomatology
over time, independent of other psychopathologies.
2.3: Self-report measures: control variables
As word stimuli were employed in the present research, it was important to
control for reading ability and general intellectual ability. This was done to ensure all
participants could read and understand the words presented to them in the
experiments. These measures also controlled for reading impairments such as
dyslexia. The Test of Word Reading Efficiency (TOWRE) was employed with non-
dysphoric participants as a simple measure of reading ability (see Section 2.3.1).
Dysphoria and depression have been associated with slowed response times
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). As the TOWRE scores are based on
speed of reading, the National Adult Reading Test was employed as an alternative test
of reading ability for dysphoric participants (see Section 2.3.2).
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2.3.1: Test of Word Reading Efficiency
The Test of Word Reading Efficiency (TOWRE) was devised to provide a
norm-referenced measure of general reading ability in children and young adults (see
Appendix II). The test itself consists of two components, a sight word efficiency
subtest and a phonetic decoding efficiency subtest. The sight word test assesses the
number of printed words that an individual can accurately identify within a 45 second
time period. The phonetic decoding test assesses the number of printed non-words
that can be decoded within the same time period. Either one or both subtests can be
employed depending of the nature of the experimental procedure (Torgesen, Wagner,
& Rashotte, 1999). In the present set of experiments the sight word test was
employed. The test has shown adequate internal reliability (α = 0.90) and test-retest
reliability (r = 0.83 - 0.96) (Torgesen et al., 1999) and has been shown to distinguish
dyslexic from non-dyslexic individuals within the student population (Carroll & Lles,
2006).
2.3.2: National Adult Reading Test
The national adult reading test (NART) was devised as a measure of
premorbid intelligence levels within clinical populations, particularly dementia (see
Appendix III). Estimates of general intelligence are often based on various factors
within an indiviudal’s life history. However measures such as education level or
occupation may not represent an accurate measure of overall intelligence. The NART
provides objective and standardised measures of verbal performance and full-scale IQ
(Nelson & Willison, 1991).
The NART consists of 50 words presented on individual cards. All 50 words
are atypical of the common grapheme-phoneme and stress rules common within the
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English lexicon. If the word is unfamiliar or not recognised by the participant, the
irregular nature of the words should result in incorrect pronunciation. The words are
presented in order of difficulty with ‘chord’ being the easiest and ‘campanile’ the
most difficult. Individuals are asked to respond to each word even if they do not
recognise it. The score consists of the total number of errors made. Scores can range
from 0 - 50 and full-scale IQ can be predicted within the range 70 - 131 (Nelson,
1982).
The NART is a popular measure of general intelligence and its psychometric
properties have been tested extensively. Several studies have shown high levels of
inter-rater reliability (0.96 - 0.98), good test-retest reliability (r = 0.98) and construct
validity (Crawford et al., 1989; O’Carroll, 1987; & Schlosser & Ivison, 1989). The
NART has also been used in other populations as an index of general intelligence:
depression (Evans & Katona, 1993; Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995; Watts et al., 2002) and
bipolar disorder (Lebowitz et al., 2006).
2.4: Physiological Measures
2.4.1: Event-Related Potentials
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a non-invasive technique which allows
researchers to record electrical activity generated in the brain from electrodes placed
upon the scalp. EEG provides a continuous temporal measurement of the electrical
activity which occurs at electrode sites during a testing session. This technique was
originally devised by Hans Berger (1929), who was also the first person to suggest
that electrical activity recorded from the scalp may be related to mental processes
(Stern, Ray & Quigley, 2001). Since then, EEG has become a popular
neurophysiological tool used to examine various psychological processes.
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The advancement of computer technology has allowed for more refined
analyses of EEG output. Therefore more recent research has focused on electrical
activity which is time locked to specific known events. These events are defined as
event-related potentials (ERPs). In terms of the relationship between ERPs and
psychological processes, Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles (2000) define ERPs as:
‘manifestations of brain activities that occur in preparation for, or in response to,
discrete events, be they internal or external to the subject. Conceptually, ERPs are
regarded as manifestations of specific psychological processes’.
Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles. (2000, p 53).
Recording ERPs within controlled experimental paradigms provides us with
information about the electrical activity going on in the brain associated with a time-
locked event. By manipulating experimental parameters we can then determine under
what conditions these patterns of electrical activity vary. In this way, it is possible to
identify patterns of activity which are associated with specific psychological
processes. ERPs are also known to have excellent temporal resolution and can
therefore provide us with information about the different stages of information
processing. ERPs can provide us with information about what processes are
important at different stages of information processing.
2.4.1.1: Underlying mechanism
It is generally accepted that ERPs reflect patterns of brain activity. It is
thought that ERPs are the result of the post-synaptic potentials generated from
populations of neurons (Allison, Wood, & McCarthy, 1986). However, there are two
important features of these neuronal populations which need to be considered when
recording ERP activity at the scalp. Firstly, a group of neurons must be active
synchronously (all active at the same time), in order to generate enough activity to be
recorded at the scalp. Secondly, the population of neurons must have an open field
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distribution. This means that the neurons must be geometrically organised in such a
way that their summated activity can be recorded at the scalp (Coles & Rugg, 1995).
Due to the parameters of ERP recording it is not possible to record electrical activity
from all areas of the brain. In particular, neuronal populations deep within the brain
or those with a closed-field organisation are not amenable to ERP recordings.
Therefore careful attention is required when drawing inferences about the functional
significance of ERP findings.
2.4.1.2: Recording ERPs
Time-locked ERPs are derived post hoc from continuous EEG recording
during an experimental session. EEG is recorded by placing a number of electrodes
on the scalp of a participant and recording the electrical activity generated at these
electrode sites. The number of electrodes utilised is often defined by the research
question being examined. However the standard placement of electrodes is taken
from the international 10-20 system (Jasper, 1958). This system defines electrode
placement in terms of distance from two main axes; the nasion-inion axis (anterior-
posterior) and the left-right ear axis (left-right postauricular points), see Figure 2.1
(Coles & Rugg, 1995). The electrical activity from an active electrode is then
compared to a reference electrode. There are a variety of reference methods which
are employed. An average reference is utilised in the present set of experiments,
whereby the voltage from the active electrode is calculated in relation to the mean
electrode voltage across all electrodes on the scalp (Coles & Rugg, 1995).
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Figure 2.1: Electrode placement as defined by the international 10-20 system.
The right hemisphere is represented by even numbers and the left hemisphere is represented by odd
numbers. The numbers increase in value as they move further away from the vertex and closer to the
ear. The letters represent the brain region above which the electrodes are located F=frontal,
C=central, P=parietal, O=occipital, T=temporal.
Taken from Kouri., & Lukes (2001)
During the recording of the EEG signal, event markers are recorded to indicate
stimulus presentation and response. Epochs (i.e 100 ms pre-stimulus to 1500 ms post-
stimulus) surrounding the event are then determined in order to identify ERPs. ERPs
are relatively small (1-10 μV) in relation to the EEG signal (approx 100 μV).
Therefore the data must be averaged over multiple trials in order to increase the
signal-to-noise ratio. After averaging, random electrical noise is reduced and the ERP
wave should represent the pattern of electrical activity associated with stimulus
presentation.
An ERP is represented temporally by a wave function consisting of a number
of components. These components describe the latency and polarity of voltage
changes that occur in relation to an event. For example, components which have a
negative polarity and occur around 200 ms are called N200 components, and
components which have a positive polarity and occur around 300 ms are called P300
components (Figure 2.2). By comparing ERP waves under different experimental
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conditions it is possible to identify differences in the electrical activity of the brain in
relation to psychological processes. Differences can occur in latency, where ERP
components can occur earlier or later than in a comparison condition. Differences can
also occur in amplitude whereby the amplitude of an ERP component may increase or
decrease.
ERP researchers should be aware of several potential artefacts that may lead to
distortions in ERP data. Electrical activity generated from sources other than the
brain can be problematic. These sources include external electrical supplies, muscle
movements, eye movements and eye blinks. Most of these problems can be resolved
using high-pass or band-pass filters which allow the relevant electrical signal to be
processed (i.e voltage of between 0.01-10 μV). To reduce the artefact caused by eye
blinks and eye movements correction algorithms are often used (Fabiani et al., 2000).
Figure 2.2: Examples of early, middle and late ERP components.
Taken from Doncin (1979)
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2.4.1.3: ERPs as a psychological index
ERPs are of value as a psychological measure as they provide physiological
correlates of psychological processes. Due to their excellent temporal resolution,
ERPs can provide information about the timing and amplitude of different stages in
information processing. ERP Components have been identified at various times after
ERP onset and are hypothesised to index different cognitive processes.
Response-related potentials such as the lateralised readiness potential (LRP)
and contingent negative variation (CNV) are found to occur in response to a warning
signal. Prior to a required response, the LRP occurs over the motor cortex on the side
of the brain contralateral to the side of the body on which a movement is required.
(Coles & Rugg, 1995). The CNV occurs in response to a warning stimulus which
indicates the onset of a second stimulus which requires a response. The CNV is
thought to originate in the region of the thalamus (Nagai et al., 2004) These potentials
are found to be associated with movement generation and preparation (Donchin,
1978; Kutas & Donchin, 1977). Early ERP components that occur from 100 to 300
ms (Figure 2.2) have been associated with selective attention, feature analysis and
sensory memory (Fabiani et al., 2000). Finally late ERP components are endogenous,
because they are solely influenced by an individual’s perception or interpretation of
an event. Two important components are the P300 and the N400. These components
have been associated with memory and language processing respectively. The P300
is found to be sensitive to task-relevant stimulus probability (Dunan-Johnson &
Donchin, 1977) and novelty (Friedman, Simpson, & Hamberger, 1993). Memory is
subsequently found to be greater for items which elicit a larger P300. These findings
led Donchin (1981) to suggest that the P300 is involved in the updating of
environmental context. The N400 was identified by Kutas and Hillyard (1980) and
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occurs in a linguistic context, specifically when a semantically incongruous word is
presented within the context of a sentence i.e ‘The pizza was too hot to cry.’ (Kutas &
Van Petten, 1988). It is thought to be associated with the semantic integration process
(Brown & Hagoort, 1993).
These findings illustrate the value of ERPs as a neurophysiological tool. ERPs
provide a direct measure of the brain activity associated with different psychological
processes . ERPs can also be useful in identifying what psychological processes are
important at different stages of information processing.
2.4.2: Skin Conductance
By placing two electrodes on the skin and recording the current between them,
Fére (1888) found that the skin momentarily becomes less resistant to the flow of an
electrical current when presented with sensory or emotional stimulation (Dawson,
Schell, & Filion, 2000). Fere’s experiment is thought to be one of the earliest
experiments to illustrate that electrodermal activity (EDA) might be associated with
psychological processes. This method became more popular in the 20th century with
researchers such as Carl Jung (1907) suggesting that EDA can give us insight in to
‘the secrets of mental life’ (Stern et al., 2001). Since then EDA has become a popular
physiological index of psychological processes. The advantages of EDA are that it is
relatively simple and inexpensive to record, and more importantly, that it is
responsive to events of psychological significance.
2.4.2.1: Underlying Mechanism
Several theories were put forward to account for changes in EDA. Secretory
theory, initially attributed to Tarchonoff (1889, 1890) became generally accepted as
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providing the most accurate account of the underlying mechanism (Venables &
Christie,1973). According to the secretory theory, changes in the levels of eccrine
sweat glands result in changes in EDA. Skin conductance responses fail to occur in
individuals after the removal of sweat glands (Quinton, 1983) and also when activity
of the eccrine sweat glands is blocked pharmacologically using Atropine (Foster &
Werner, 1970). Boucsein (1992; p 76) states that there is ‘ample empirical evidence
that sweat gland activity in conjunction with the epidermal membrane processes plays
a major role in the causation of electrodermal phenomena’.
The sympathetic component of the autonomic nervous system is known to
regulate sweat gland activity, mainly through cholinergic innervation (Dawson et al.,
2000). Therefore when the sympathetic nervous system is active, levels of sweat rise
in the sweat glands generating an increase in skin conductance. Boucsein (1992)
suggested two neural models which may underlie the various roles of sweat gland
activity through the sympathetic nervous system. The first model suggests that the
limbic system and hypothalamus are involved in thermoregulation and sweat gland
activity in response to emotional stimuli. The second model suggests that the
premotor system is involved when sweat glands are active in preparation of a motor
action. Although little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying skin
conductance, the strong relationship between EDA and psychological processes
suggests that EDA can still be used as tool in order to further understand
psychological processes.
2.4.2.2: Recording Skin Conductance
EDA can be measured in several ways such as skin conductance and skin
resistance. However in recent research, the measure of skin conductance has been
Methodology
53
popular (Boucsein, 1992). Skin conductance will be recorded in the present study and
therefore further discussion will focus specifically on this measure. Skin conductance
is measured by passing a small direct current through a pair of electrodes placed on
the surface of the skin. Ohm’s law (Figure 2.3) states that the resistance of an
electrical circuit (the two electrodes and the skin through which the electrical current
is passed) is equal to the voltage applied between the two electrodes divided by the
electrical current flowing through the conductor (the skin) (Dawson et al., 2000).
Conductance is the reciprocal of resistance. Therefore, by using Ohm’s law we can
determine skin conductance.
R = V/I, where R=resistance, V= voltage, I=current.
Figure 2.3: Ohm’s Law.
Adapted from Boucsein, (1992)
By measuring the current passing between the two electrodes (Figure 2.4) and
holding the voltage constant we can record the conductance properties of the skin
(Venables & Christie, 1973). The basic unit of measurement for skin conductance is
micro Siemens (μS).
Figure 2.4: Skin Conductance electrode placement.
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Skin conductance can be measured in two ways; skin conductance level and
skin conductance response. Skin conductance level measures tonic activity. Tonic
activity refers to general increases or decreases in skin conductance and is measured
continuously through out an experimental session. Changes in amplitude commonly
vary between 2 - 20 μS. Changes in skin conductance level across different
experimental blocks can be compared using this measure. A second measure, skin
conductance response, measures increases in skin conductance that are specifically
linked to a known event, for example experimental stimulus. Skin conductance
responses are short (1 - 3 seconds), relatively small (0.2 – 1.0 μS) increases in skin
conductance which are recorded after stimulus onset within an experimental block.
Changes in skin conductance in response to specific experimental stimuli both within
and between experimental blocks can be compared in this way.
Sometimes non-specific changes in skin conductance also occur. These are
small increases in skin conductance which occur spontaneously in response to some
unknown event, these include various external and internally generated events (e.g.,
noises or thoughts). It is important to identify and control for such changes during
experimental sessions. Non-specific changes in skin conductance sometimes occur
due to physiological events such as a cough or a deep breath or sigh. Therefore it is
also of value to record participants’ respiration rate in order to provide additional
information about non-specific changes in skin conductance.
2.4.2.3: Skin conductance response as a psychological index
Changes in skin conductance are associated with psychological phenomena,
and vary in response to emotional stimuli and arousing events (Dawson et al., 2000).
A large body of research conducted by Lang and colleagues at the Center for
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Psychophysiology, University of Florida has provided an account of skin conductance
as an index of emotional and arousing events (e.g., Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997;
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001).
Humans are known to exhibit a wide variety of emotional responses. However
Lang et al. (1997) suggested these emotional responses evolved as a system for
motivated action or behaviour. They proposed emotional responses can be explained
by a simple two factor model. One factor is represented by emotional valence and the
other factor is represented by arousal. Emotional valence (positive – negative) is
proposed to indicate the appetitive or defensive nature of a response, and arousal
(calm – aroused) to indicate the degree to which an individual is motivated to carry
out the response (Bradley et al., 2001). By controlling both the emotional valence and
level of arousal of pictorial stimuli presented to participants, Bradley et al. (2001)
found that skin conductance response increased with arousal but not with emotional
valence. They conclude that skin conductance provides a useful measure of the
motivational significance of stimuli.
2.4.3: Heart Rate
Willem Einthoven, the inventor of the modern electrocardiogram (ECG),
designed early devices called string galvanometers which were used to measure the
electrical activity of the heart muscle (Einthoven, 1895). This discovery furthered our
understanding of how the heart functions and constituted an important step in modern
medicine. For his work, Einthoven won the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1924 (Stern
et al., 2001). The electrocardiogram has since been used extensively in medicine.
However it has also been of value within psychophysiology.
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2.4.3.1: Underlying mechanism
The heart (or myocardium) is a muscle which serves to pump blood round the
body, providing oxygen and nutrients to different bodily systems. It generates its own
electrical activity which causes constriction and relaxation of the 4 chambers in the
heart in order to move blood through the body. The ECG measures the electrical
activity of the heart during this action. Through a process of depolarization and
repolarization of cells which make up the muscle surrounding the heart chambers,
deoxygenated blood is pumped from the right atrium to the right ventricle, through the
pulmonary system (the lungs) in which the blood is oxygenated. The oxygenated
blood is then pumped through the left atrium into the left ventricle where it is pumped
to the rest of the body (Brownley, Hurwitz, Schneiderman, 2000).
From this ECG output various changes in the electrical activity of the heart
can be identified. Of particular interest to psychophysiologists is the measure of heart
rate, which can be defined as the number of heart beats per unit time (which is usually
recorded in minutes) (Stern et al., 2001).
2.4.3.2: Recording Heart Rate
ECG is measured through the placement of a number of unipolar electrodes on
different locations on the body. Einthoven proposed a measurement triangle which is
now known as “Einthoven’s triangle” as a standard system for electrode placement for
use with ECG. This system is used today in psychophysiology (Brownley et al.,
2000). A typical ECG electrode set up involves the placement of Silver-
SilverChloride (Ag-AgCl) electrodes on the left and right arms and the left leg (Figure
2.5). These electrodes are then connected to an electrocardiogram in order to amplify
and record the electrical activity of the heart.
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Figure 2.5: Standard electrode placement for ECG.
Heart rate is obtained from the ECG output. The interval between each
cardiac cycle is calculated (interbeat interval), where a shorter interval indicates
accelerated or increased heart rate and a longer interval indicates decelerated or
decreased heart rate. Often the ECG output is filtered using a high-pass filter (30 -
35Hz) to reduce artefact created by external electrical appliances.
2.4.3.3: Heart Rate as a psychological index
The heart is responsible for circulating blood around the body and thus
keeping us alive. To achieve this function, heart rate must be adaptive to various
internal and external influences. It is responsive to changes in external stimulation
such as changes in temperature or changes in air pressure. It is also responsive to
internal action such as changes in motor activity (such as exercise) and digestion.
However, of relevance here is that heart rate varies in relation to psychological stimuli
and, in particular, emotional response.
In the series of studies mentioned above (Section 2.4.2.3), Lang and
colleagues also examined event-related heart rate in relation to emotional and
arousing pictorial stimuli. Greenwald, Cook III, & Lang, (1989) found accelerated
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heart rate in response to pleasant pictures and decelerated heart rate in response to
unpleasant pictures regardless of arousal level. This early study provided a strong
motivation for the use of heart rate as a measure of emotional response.
An early study by Lang & Hnatiow (1962) examined how heart rate changed
across a five second time period. They found that when individuals view pictures,
heart rate shows a triphasic response. The results of more recent studies have
indicated that different components of this response are altered in relation to the
pleasant and unpleasant content of the pictures being viewed. Bradley et al. (2001)
found that in response to unpleasant pictures, individuals show an initial large and
sustained deceleration in heart rate. In contrast, in response to pleasant pictures, the
initial deceleration is smaller and a subsequent acceleration and secondary
deceleration also occur. These findings suggest that there is not a linear relationship
between the emotional content of pictures and heart rate, and illustrate that heart rate
should be measured temporally from stimulus onset.
As heart rate changes in relation to emotional valence and not arousal, it may
be useful to examine differences in heart rate in relation to self-referential and
emotional stimuli in order to examine further the role of emotion in relation to self-
reference. By measuring heart rate we can obtain information on how emotional
valence is processed within both self-referential and emotional contexts. If heart rate
is found to differ between positive and negative stimuli within both the self task and
the emotion task, then this would provide evidence to suggest that emotional valence
is important to both information processing tasks. However if differences are
identified at between the two tasks then this would illustrate a difference in the
processing of emotional information within a self-referential context.
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2.5: Word Stimuli
All the research discussed in the present thesis employed word stimuli to
investigate the relationship between self-reference and emotion. In order to obtain a
set of appropriate stimuli a pilot study was conducted. The aim of this pilot study was
to acquire a large set of word stimuli in which participant ratings of self-reference and
emotional valence were known. To do this, a number of participants were presented
with a questionnaire and simply asked to rate the self-referential and emotional
content of words stimuli using a five-point Likert scale.
2.5.1: Method
2.5.1.1: Word database
Words were selected from experimental studies which previously controlled
for emotional valence across positive, negative and neutral dimensions (Bradley &
Lang, 1999; Brittlebank, Scott, & Williams, 1993; Green & McKenna, 1996; Ridout,
2005).
395 words were selected for use in the final questionnaires and information
was collated on word frequency, word length and word type (see Appendix IV).
These variables were not controlled for at this stage in order to provide the largest
pool of words possible.
2.5.1.2: Questionnaires
To prevent fatigue effects, the 395 words were divided up into eight
questionnaires, seven consisting of 50 words and one consisting of 45 words. To
prevent order effects, two versions of each of the eight questionnaires were created.
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Each version presented the words in a different randomised order, this lead to the
construction of sixteen separate questionnaires.
Each word was rated on two five-point Likert scales, emotion and self-
reference. On the emotion scale, the anchors ‘positive’, ‘negative’ were presented at
the 1 or 5 endpoints and ‘neutral’ was maintained as a midpoint. Similarly, the
anchors ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ were presented at the 1 or 5 endpoints of the self-
reference scale. These anchors were alternated between the one and five endpoints
across words to prevent practice effects.
2.5.1.3: Participants
457 (341 female, mean age 20.03, s.d 3.71) participants took part in the pilot
study, with a mean 55 participants completing each of the eight versions of the
questionnaire. All participants were undergraduate psychology students from a
number of Scottish universities. All participants spoke English to university entrance
requirements.
2.5.1.4: Procedure
The questionnaires were completed within the students’ class time. A
researcher introduced the topic area, the instructions and questionnaires were then
handed out. The questionnaires took approximately ten minutes to complete. After
completion, all participants were debriefed as to the nature of the pilot study and its
use within future experiments.
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2.5.2: Findings
2.5.2.1: Data analytic strategy
To obtain overall ratings of emotional content, the participants’ scores for each
word were averaged together. The same process was conducted on the participants’
self-referential ratings for each word. A scatter plot was produced and a Pearson’s
correlation conducted, to identify the relationship between the self-referential and
emotional content of each word. This was done in order to determine how the words
should be categorised in future experiments.
2.5.2.2: The relationship between self-reference and emotion
The scatter plot (see Figure 2.6) suggests that a strong positive relationship
exists between the emotional and self-referential variables. The Pearson’s correlation
supports this relationship, r = 0.92, p < 0.001. Emotionally negative words are
identified as non-self-referential, while emotionally positive words are identified as
self-referential.
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between self-reference and emotion.
A strong positive relationship exists between self-reference and emotion. Positive words are rated as
like me and negative words are rated as not like me.
2.5.2.3: For use in the present thesis
This set of 395 words formed the database of word of stimuli employed in the
present thesis. From the data shown in Figure 2.6 it is obvious that it was not possible
to obtain sets of word stimuli which the general student population rated as self-
referential and negative or non-self-referential and positive. Therefore for the present
research, three word categories were defined (i) self-positive, (ii) non-self-negative
and (iii) neutral. The self-positive word category consisted of all words rated between
3.5 – 5 on both the self-referential and emotional Likert scales. The non-self-negative
word category consisted of all words rated between 1 – 2.5 on both Likert scales and
the neutral word category consisted of all words rated between 2.5 – 3.5 on both
Likert scales.
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Once the word categories were identified, further selection was carried out to
control for word length, word type and word frequency. Information about word
frequency was obtained from the British National Corpus
(http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/). This left 80 words in each word category (see
Appendix V). Two one-way ANOVAs revealed no significant differences in word
frequency, F(2, 239) = 1.51, p > 0.2, or word length, F(2, 239) = 0.51, p > 0.6. A chi-
square analysis revealed that there were no significant differences in word type, χ2 <
1, df = 4, p > 0.9
The way in which the word categories were employed varied across the
experimental chapters. Discussion of how the word categories were utilised will be
provided in the methods section of each experimental chapter as required.
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- Chapter 3-
Experiment 1: Changes in the relationship between self-reference and emotional
valence as a function of mood.
3.1: Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.4.1, healthy individuals present with a self-positivity
bias across a variety of situations, such as academic and sports performance and the
evaluation of future events (Alison et al., 1989; Mesick et al., 1985; Mezulis et al.,
1999). Furthermore this bias has been found to be altered in clinical populations (see
Section 1.6.2). Some studies have found a reduction in the self-positivity bias
(Sweeny et al., 1986) where others have found a complete reversal (Bradley &
Mathews, 1983).
One limitation of previous research into the relationship between self-
reference and emotional valence is the way in which the stimuli are presented. In the
self-reference paradigm, individuals are explicitly asked to rate the extent to which
they identify with the presented information. The evaluation of this information
represents a direct measure of self-reference. However, participants are not asked
directly about the emotional valence of the information presented. Emotional valence
is measured indirectly through pre-validated measures. With the role of emotional
valence becoming increasingly central to the study of self (see Section 1.4.2) it is
important to directly assess the extent to which both emotional valence and self-
reference contribute to biases such as the self-positivity bias. This could be done by
asking participants explicitly to rate experimental stimuli in terms of both self-
reference and emotional valence (see Section 1.5).
To the author’s knowledge, self-reference and emotional valence have not been
directly compared in any study to date. Therefore our understanding of the changes
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in the self-positivity bias during negative mood is limited. From the results presented
by previous investigators (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Sweeny et al., 1986) it has been
difficult to distinguish between the possibilities that changes in the self-positivity bias
as a function of mood are due to changes in individuals’ processing of self-reference,
changes in individuals processing of emotional valence, or possibly, changes in both
in both these dimensions.
3.1.1: Present Study
The aims of the present study are twofold. The first aim is to provide a
preliminary investigation into how self-reference and emotional valence are
evaluated. The second aim is to investigate how the relationship between self-
reference and emotional valence changes as a function of mood state. This second
aim will be achieved by comparing the relationship between self-reference and
emotional valence in individuals who are currently experiencing low levels of
negative mood, to the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence in
individuals who are currently experiencing high levels of negative mood. Individuals
who are experiencing elevated levels of negative mood over a two-week period, but
do not meet the clinical criteria for depression are said to be experiencing dysphoria.
Therefore, the two groups will be labelled as non-dysphoric and dysphoric.
It is predicted that the relationship between the self-referential and the emotional
content of words will differ across non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups. In non-
dysphoric individuals, there is expected to be a strong positive relationship between
words rated in a self-referential and emotional context, supporting the self-positivity
bias identified in previous research (Alicke et al., 1995; Allison et al., 1989; Messick
et al., 1985; Mezulis et al., 1999 & Moran et al., 2006). In dysphoric individuals, it is
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predicted that this relationship will be altered. Based on the previous literature, both
strong and weak levels of this prediction can be made. According to the strong
prediction the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence will be
reversed in individuals experiencing elevated levels of negative mood (Bradley &
Mathews, 1983; Sweeny et al., 1986), such that negative words will be rated as self-
referent, and positive words will be rated as non-self-referent. According to the weak
prediction, there will be no relationship between words presented in both a self-
referential and emotional context (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Mezulis et al., 1999).
3.2: Method
3.2.1: Design and Overview
The aim of the present study was to compare the responses of non-dysphoric
and dysphoric individuals on a set of word stimuli rated for self-reference and
emotional valence. All participants completed the Revised Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI-II), see Section 2.2.1. Participants were asked to rate the set of word
stimuli in terms of self-reference (‘like me’ – ‘not like me at all’) and emotional
valence (positive – negative) of words using two separate five-point Likert scales.
3.2.2: Word Stimuli
Initially, a pilot study was conducted in order to obtain a set of word stimuli
which varied across both self-reference (‘like me’ – ‘not like me at all’) and emotional
valence (positive-negative) dimensions (see Section 2.5). The word ratings of
dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were compared across the three word
categories identified in the pilot study (i) self-referential and positive, (ii) non-self-
referential and negative, and (iii) neutral. Each word category consisted of 80 words.
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A questionnaire booklet was developed with the 240 words. Each word was
presented with two five-point Likert scales. The emotion scale was presented with the
anchors ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. The self-reference scale was presented with the
anchors ‘like me’ and ‘not like me at all’. These anchors were alternated between the
one and five endpoints of the scales. Two versions of the questionnaire were created
to control for word order effects.
3.2.3: Participants
Forty three participants initially took part in the experimental phase.
Participants were classified into dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups on the basis of
their score on the BDI-II questionnaire. Participants with a score below 7 were
classified as non-dysphoric and participants with a score above 15 were classified as
dysphoric (see Table 3.1). The fifteen participants who scored within the 7 - 15 range
were excluded from further analyses. These high cut-off points were used in order to
obtain purely non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups. Raising the cut off score reduces
the number of false positive participants within a population sample (Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1999). All participants spoke English to university entrance requirements. All
participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the study and received payment (£4
per hour) for participation.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of participant variables across non-dysphoric and dysphoric
groups
Non-dysphoric Dysphoric
Number 10 18
Gender 8 female 14 female
Mean age (sd) 20.5 (2.82) 22.3 (6.49)
Mean BDI-II score 3.5 28.1
BDI-II Range 0 – 7 16 – 56
3.2.4:Procedure
Prior to taking part in the study, the experimental procedure was explained and
participants provided informed consent. At this stage individuals were also asked for
information concerning their age, gender and nationality. Participants were then
provided with the booklet and instructed to rate each of the 240 words on two five point
scales. Participants were first asked to rate the emotional content of each word
(positive - negative), and were then asked to rate the self-referential content of each
word (‘like me’ - ‘not like me at all’). A general definition of self-reference was
provided ‘The word can relate to any aspect of your life, work, leisure, your past or it
may explain a personality trait’. All participants were debriefed as to the nature of the
study on completion.
Half the participants completed the mood questionnaire (BDI-II) prior to the word
rating task and half completed the questionnaire after the word rating task.
3.3: Results
3.3.1: Participant Variables
Statistical analyses were conducted to identify any possible confounds
between the two groups in terms of participant variables. Chi-square analyses
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revealed no significant differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups for
gender, χ2(1, N = 27) < 1, or nationality, χ2(3, N = 27) > 1, p > 0.6. A one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant age differences between non-dysphoric and
dysphoric groups, F (1,19) < 1.
3.3.2: A comparison of the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence
in non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals.
In order to replicate the findings of previous studies and investigate the
relationship between self-reference and emotional valence, the correlation coefficients
for self-reference and emotional valence were calculated for each individual
participant using Pearson’s R. These coefficients were then transformed into z-
statistics using the Fisher’s r to z transformation. The mean correlation coefficient
was then calculated for each group and converted back into r prior to comparison.
The Fisher’s r to z transformation was used as it has been found to reduce the
variability associated with using multiple correlations (Corey, Dunlap, & Burke,
1998). A statistical comparison devised by Fisher (1921) was used to compare the
two independent correlation coefficients. The method was taken from Howell (2002).
The difference between the two correlations approached significance, z = 1.36, p <
0.083.
To examine this difference further, the correlations for each group were also
examined independently. In the non-dysphoric group, a positive correlation was
found between self-reference and emotional valence, r (9) = 0.63, p < 0.05. Positive
words were more often rated as self-referent and negative words were more often
rated as non-self-referent. No correlation was identified between self-reference and
emotional valence in the dysphoric group, r (16) = 0.10.
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3.3.3: Differences in the way in which non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals
identify with emotionally valenced information.
To examine the differences identified in the above correlations in more detail,
two 2 (participant group) x 3 (word category) mixed ANOVAs were performed on the
self-reference and emotion ratings, respectively. The factor ‘participant group’
consisted of two levels (dysphoric and non-dysphoric) and the factor ‘word category’
consisted of three levels (self-positive, neutral and non-self-negative).
3.3.3.1: Emotion
The results of the 2x3 mixed ANOVA for emotion identified a main
effect of word category, F(2, 52) = 69.01, p < 0.001. A Bonferroni corrected one way
ANOVA comparing the three word categories revealed that the mean word ratings of
all three word categories significantly differed from each other. Both participant
groups rated positive words (4.09) as highly positive and negative words (1.83) as
highly negative compared to neutral (3.13) words. No other effects or interactions
were identified (see Figure 3.1).
3.3.3.2: Self-Reference
The results of the 2x3 mixed ANOVA for self-reference show a main
effect of word category, F(2, 52) = 12.54, p < 0.001 and an interaction between
participant group and word category, F(2,52) = 11.94, p < 0.001 (see Figure 3.2).
To examine the main effect of word category a Bonferroni corrected one way
ANOVA comparing the three word categories was conducted. The results reveal that
positive words (3.27) are rated highly as ‘like me’ on the Likert scale and negative
words (2.68) are rated as low, as ‘not like me at all’ on the Likert scale
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Figure 3.1: Non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals’ ratings of the emotionality of words.
W o rd G ro u p
P o sitiv e N eu tra l N egative
Se
lf-
R
ef
er
en
ce
Sc
al
e
N
ot
lik
e
m
e
at
al
l
Li
ke
m
e
1 .5
2 .0
2 .5
3 .0
3 .5
4 .0
4 .5
N o n -d ysp ho ric
D ysp h o ric
Figure 3.2: Non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals’ ratings of the self-referential content of
words.
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To examine the participant group x word category interaction, post hoc
comparisons in the form of two within-group ANOVAs, were performed on the non-
dysphoric and dysphoric participants’ word ratings respectively. Non-dysphoric
participants rated positive (3.47), neutral (2.95) and negative (2.32) word categories all
as significantly different from each other, F(2, 18) = 15.09, p < 0.05. In contrast, no
significant differences were identified between any of the three word groups for
dysphoric individuals, F (2, 34) < 1 (see Figure 3.2).
3.4: Discussion
The behavioural results provide evidence to suggest that the methodology
employed within the present study can be used in order to address the two main aims of
the present thesis. In non-dysphoric individuals a positive correlation was identified
between self-reference and emotional valence. As in previous studies (Alison et al.,
1989; Messick et al., 1985; Mezulis et al., 1999), individuals rated positive information
as self-referent and negative information as non-self-referent. As predicted, this finding
provides evidence to suggest that emotional valence is highly involved in self-
referential processing in healthy individuals. In terms of negative mood, the weak
prediction was supported. No relationship was found to exist between self-reference
and emotional valence in dysphoric individuals (Mezulis et al., 1999). Importantly,
further analyses indicated that it is differences in the processing of self-reference, and
not emotional valence, that is associated with differences in mood state. Both non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals rate the emotional content of words in the same
way. This finding suggests that dysphoric individuals can still identify the emotional
valence of stimuli accurately. It is their evaluation of information with reference to their
self-representation which is altered.
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3.4.1: To clarify the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence
The finding that self-reference and emotional valence are correlated highlights
the limitation of using the self-reference paradigm to investigate emotional valence. In
all studies investigating self-reference, with the exception of Moran et al. 2006 the
relationship between self-referential and emotional decision-making has been
confounded. Based on previous findings, it is difficult to identify what elements of
self-referential decision-making are linked to a possible unique mechanism involved in
self-referential processing and, which elements are features of general emotional
processing. By asking both non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals to evaluate
information in both a self-referential and emotional context it is possible to identify and
separate these two types of processing. In the present study, the differences between
the evaluation of self-referential and emotional information are particularly evident
when comparing the responses of non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals.
As predicted, a self-positivity bias was identified in non-dysphoric individuals.
Therefore no differences were identified between self-referential and emotional
processing in this group. These findings suggest that using a simple evaluation task
only provides minimal information with regards to understanding the relationship
between self-reference and emotional valence. To investigate this relationship in
greater detail, further behavioural and physiological measures should also be examined.
Physiological measures such as skin conductance and heart rate are known to differ in
relation to the emotional response elicited by stimuli (see Section 2.4). Using these
measures it would be possible to examine the extent to which stimuli presented in a
self-referential decision-making task elicit a physiological emotional response. If the
physiological responses identified in the self-referential decision-making task parallel
the responses identified in the emotional decision-making task then this would provide
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evidence to suggest that self-referential processing is largely based on the processing of
emotional information (see Chapter Six).
One possible limitation of the study is that the two ratings for the word stimuli
were presented together, therefore it is possible that the correlation identified may be
due to potential trial by trial carry over effects. This is unlikely to be the case as
differences in evaluations were identified between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals. However, in order to reduce this potential bias in the future, it may be
useful to present the trials in two separate tasks. In the self-reference task participants
would only be asked to evaluate the self-referential nature of word stimuli and in the
emotional task participants would only be asked to evaluate the emotional valence of
word stimuli. This separation would reduce any carry over effects and optimise the two
types of processing being investigated. Therefore the two decision-making tasks were
completed separately in the following experimental chapters.
3.4.2: Alterations in the self-reference as a function of mood
As stated above, the weak prediction that no relationship would exist
between self-reference and emotional valence for dysphorics was supported. Several
studies also provide evidence to support the lack of an emotional association with self-
identity in the context of dysphoria and depression. Kuiper and Derry (1982) found
that recall within the self-referent condition, compared to the other-referent condition,
was increased across both positive and negative stimuli. More recently, in a study of
dysphorics, Smallwood (2004) utilised a word fragment task to examine self-reference
and ambiguity. He found that dysphoric individuals used self-referent items to
complete a word fragment task independently of the emotional tone of the stimuli.
Finally, a study by Timbremont and Braet (2004) found that never depressed and
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remitted depressed children endorsed more positive adjectives as self-related whereas
currently depressed children endorsed equal numbers of positive and negative traits.
These findings, and those of the present study, indicate that the context of self-reference
(‘does this word describe me?’) automatically activates the self-schema and that
information processing within this context is altered in dysphoria. More generally,
these findings may indicate that dysphoria is associated specifically with changes in the
sense of self, rather than with changes in all aspects of emotional processing.
Therefore, this finding highlights the importance of identifying and separating self-
referential and emotional processing when investigating negative mood. Dysphoric
individuals may not define their self-identity through emotion in the same way as non-
dysphoric individuals.
Finally two methodological points need to be addressed. The first point
is the distinction between self-negativity biases and attenuated self-positivity biases
identified in previous research. As stated previously, Sweeny et al. (1986) identified a
self-negativity attributional bias in depressed individuals. In contrast, Mezulis et al.
(2004) examined attribution in psychopathology and found that overall, self-serving
biases were attenuated rather than reversed. It is possible that these differences are due
to the extent of depression measured. In the present study, dysphoric students were
classified utilising a high score on the BDI-II. In this population the self-positivity bias
was attenuated but not reversed, supporting the results of Mezulis et al. (2004). It is
possible that individuals who have been diagnosed as clinically depressed would show
a full negativity bias.
The second methodological issue to be examined is the use of the Likert
scale within the construct of self-reference. This scale provided participants with two
options when classifying stimuli as non-self-referent, they could either classify the item
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as neutral in relation to the self or as not related to the self at all. This neutral option
allowed individuals to rate information as neutral in relation to the self rather than non-
self-referent. Previous research into self-reference often utilised a two choice reaction
time task (self/non-self) which does not include a neutral condition (Symons &
Johnson, 1997; Williams et al., 1997). Therefore, it would be interesting for future
research to attempt to include this neutral condition not only in studies examining
emotional processing but also in studies investigating self-referential processing.
In conclusion, the results of the present study indicate that changes in mood
states such as dysphoria are associated with changes in the relationship between self-
reference and emotional valence. Although dysphoric individuals can identify the
emotional valence of stimuli accurately, no relationship exists between the emotional
content of the information and their ratings of self-reference. The study illustrates the
importance of further investigating the role of self-reference within emotional disorders
both within self-reference itself and also when comparing self-referent and emotional
processing.
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- Chapter 4 –
Experiment 2: Can ERPs be used as a tool to investigate the relationship between
self-reference and emotion in the brain?
4.1: Introduction
The aim of the present study is to understand the complex relationship
between self-reference and emotional valence at the neural level. This study aims to
replicate the findings of the previous neuroimaging studies and extend these findings
by employing an alternative neurophysiological measure: event-related potentials
(ERPs).
Previous research (see Section 1.3), has shown that self-reference facilitates
the processing of information from word stimuli. Furthermore, research using modern
neuroimaging techniques has identified that activations specific to self-referential
processing occur within the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), see Table 1.1. These
recent findings appear to indicate that self-reference is a unitary construct, which is
represented by activity in a network of brain structures within the mPFC and the
cingulate cortex.
However, information about the self in word stimuli is usually embedded with
other types of information, for example, if you are asked if the word ‘friendly’
describes you, the emotional valence of that word would play a role in your decision.
Fossati et al. (2003) identified differences in neural activations to positive and
negative words presented within a self-referential context. By further separating the
self-referential judgements into ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ categories Moran et al.
(2006) demonstrated that distinct but closely related regions of the brain are involved
in the processing of self-related (like me) and emotional information (see Section
1.4.2). Based on these findings, Moran et al. suggested a functional processing
hierarchy may be involved in the processing of self-related information. They
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proposed that when information is identified, it is first processed in terms of self-
relevance within the mPFC, then highly self-relevant information is tagged for
valence in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC).
Until now, neuroimaging studies have taken advantage of the excellent spatial
resolution provided by techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These techniques were useful in
identifying the brain structures involved in self-referential processing. However,
these techniques are known to have poor temporal resolution and therefore do not
provide any information with regards to the timing of events involved in the
processing of self-referent information. If affective and cognitive components of the
self do in fact represent separate and distinct aspects of self-referent processing as
Moran et al. (2006) suggested, then these two types of information may be involved at
different temporal stages of processing. If these two aspects of self-referential
processing can be identified and separated temporally then this would provide further
support for the functional processing hierarchy suggested by Moran et al.
4.1.1: The present study
To our knowledge, no previous studies have attempted to investigate the
relationship between self-reference and emotional valence at an electrophysiological
level. Electrophysiological methods like ERPs (see section 2.4.1), can demonstrate
separate processing of different features of a stimulus when these features are
processed at different times. The aim of the present study was to establish if
electrophysiological measures can be used to investigate self-referential processing.
More specifically if ERPs can be used to further clarify the temporal relationship
between self-reference and emotional valence in word stimuli. To address this aim,
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ERPs were recorded while participants made explicit judgements about the self-
referential content of emotional words. If ERPs are sensitive to differences in self-
reference and emotional valence then it would be predicted, based on the functional
hierarchal model, that differences should occur in the timing at which self-reference
and emotional valence are important within self-referential processing.
4.2: Method
4.2.1: Participants
Sixteen participants (13 female, mean age: 21.2 years, SD 2.6 years, 16 right-
handed) took part in a single session lasting approximately one and a half hours. The
Beck Depression Inventory-II was completed by participants in order to control for
negative mood (M = 8.3, SD = 4.1), see Section 2.2.1. All participants spoke English
as their first language and scored within normal ranges on the TOWRE (see Section
2.3.1). All participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the study and received
payment (£8) for participation.
4.2.2: Stimuli and Apparatus
Word stimuli were presented using Experimental Run Time System (ERTS)
software on a 17-inch CRT monitor controlled by a Pentium PC. Responses were
recorded using two buttons mounted horizontally 10 cm apart on a response panel in
front of the participant. Left and right key press responses were made with the index
fingers of the left and right hand, respectively. The stimuli consisted of a selection of
160 affective words identified in an earlier pilot study (see Section 2.5). Only the
self-positive and non-self-negative word categories were employed within the present
experiment. Two words from each category were employed as practice trials.
Therefore 78 words were presented as experimental trial stimuli from each word
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category. Words (letters 20 mm in height) and a fixation cross (6 x 6 mm) were
presented centrally in white on black background. Approximately six characters
subtended 1° of visual angle. Viewing distance was held constant at 75 cm.
4.2.3: Procedure
All participants were tested individually. On arrival, the experimental and
EEG recording procedures were described to the participants. After the participants
provided informed consent and information about age and gender, the EEG recording
was set up.
The first section of the study consisted of a computer based task. Participants
were asked to perform a two-choice judgement task to individually presented words in
two instruction conditions: (1) an emotional judgement task (positive/negative), and
(2) a self-referential judgement task (like me/not like me). The emotional judgement
task was conducted as part of another study, the results of which will not be discussed
presently (see Chapter Five). Participants were asked to indicate their choice by
pressing the appropriate left or right key. The assignment of keys to response
alternatives and the order of conditions were balanced across participants. Each trial
started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the word
stimulus, which was presented until response. 1500 ms after response the next trial
started. In each condition, four practice trials were followed by 156 experimental
trials (presented in three blocks of 52 trials each) with words individually presented in
random order. The same 156 word stimuli were used in both the self task and the
emotion task.
After the computer based task, the electrophysiological recording equipment
was removed and participants were asked to complete several questionnaires. Finally
participants were debriefed, paid credit (£8) and thanked for participation.
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4.2.4: Electrophysiological Recordings
Using a BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system, electroencephalographic
(EEG) activity was continuously recorded from 70 Ag/AgCl electrodes over midline
electrodes Fpz, AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, POz, Oz and Iz and over the left hemisphere,
from electrodes IO1, F1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7, F9, FC1, FC3, FC5, FT7, C1, C3,
C5, M1, T7, CP1, CP5, TP7, P1, P3, P5, P7, P9, PO3, PO7 and O1 and from the
homologue electrodes over the right hemisphere. Two additional electrodes
(Common Mode Sense [CMS] active electrode and Driven Right Leg [DRL] passive
electrode) were used as reference and ground electrodes respectively; cf.
http://www.biosemi/faq/cms&drl.htm. EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at
256 Hz. Off-line trials containing blinks were corrected using a dipole approach
(BESA 2000) and EEG activity was referenced to averaged reference. The analysis
epoch started 200 ms prior to stimulus onset and lasted a total duration of 1500 ms.
EEG and EOG activity were filtered (bandpass 0.01 - 10 Hz, 6 db/oct) and averaged
time-locked to stimulus onset.
4.2.5: Data Analysis
Only trials without EEG or EOG artefacts were included in ERP data analysis.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on RT and ERP data. Conservative
Huynh-Feldt F–tests were used throughout. For post-hoc comparisons, Bonferonni
corrected t-tests were applied.
4.3: Results
4.3.1: Behavioural Results
A two-way ANOVA was performed including the factors emotion (positive
vs. negative), and self-reference (self vs. non-self). No main effects of self-reference
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or emotion in response time were identified, all Fs < 1. However, the interaction
between the two variables was significant, F(1,15) = 35.9, p < 0.001. Post hoc
comparisons revealed participants responded faster to words consistent with the self-
positivity bias (self-positive 1095 ms; non-self-negative; 1098 ms), than to words that
were not consistent with the self-positivity bias (self-negative; 1473 ms and non-self-
positive 1398 ms), all ts > 4.0, all ps < 0.05 (see Figure 4.1). Table 4.1 also shows the
number of items (on average) per condition (see Table 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Responses (ms) to affective words presented in a self-referential context.
Table 4.1: Number of items (on average) per experimental condition
Positive Negative
Self 60.5 16.31
Non-self 17.31 61.56
78 items is the maximum number of items per experimental condition.
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4.3.2: ERP Results
In order to provide information about the spatial location of any potential
effects, ERP data from five specific regions was analysed (Mamassian et al., 2003):
frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, AF7, AF8, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, Fpz, Afz,
Fz), fronto-central (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, FCz,
Cz), centro-parietal (CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8),
temporal (FT7, FT8, T7, T8, TP7, TP8), and occipital (O1, O2, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8,
P9, P10, POz, Oz, Iz). For each region, a three-way ANOVA including the factors
emotion, self and electrode, was performed on subsequent ERP time segments. Mean
ERP amplitudes were calculated for the P1 (80 – 120 ms), N1 (160 – 200 ms) and
subsequent 50 ms time segments from 300 to 600 ms relative to stimulus onset. The
two early time intervals were chosen around the peaks of the P1 and N1 components.
These shorter 40 ms intervals were chosen due of the shorter duration of these early
components. (Sprenglemeyer & Jentzsch, 2006). Previous research has employed 100
ms time intervals for analyses during later stages of processing (Schweinberger et al.
2002), 50 ms intervals were employed within the present study to obtain a more
refined analysis of the temporal waveform. Only effects that were significant in at
least two subsequent time intervals will be reported to reduce the probability of an
alpha error. Other possible forms of spatial-temporal analysis of the ERP data, such
as Principle Component Analysis (PCA) or Independent Component Analysis (ICA),
were not employed. This was because the sample size used in the present study was
not large enough to generate the level of statistical power required for procedures such
as PCA (Chapman & McCrary, 1995).
No effects were significant in the early time interval. A main effect of emotion
was significant at centro-parietal electrode sites in three subsequent time intervals
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from 400 to 550 ms, Fs(1, 15) = 5.5, 4.6, and 4.9, ps < 0.05. This effect was due to
more negative amplitudes for negative as compared to positive word stimuli (see
Figure 4.2). A significant three way interaction between self-reference, emotion and
electrode site was revealed over occipital areas from 450 to 550 ms, Fs(10, 150) =
2.2, and 2.3, ps < 0.05, and fronto-central areas from 450 to 600 ms, Fs(13, 195) =
2.6, 2.4, and 2.1, ps < 0.05. Post hoc analysis revealed that the interaction between
self and emotion was largest at FCz and Cz (Fs > 4.6, ps < 0.05). ERPs were more
negative for words that did not fit within the self-positivity bias (see Figure 4.3), that
is, to positive words rated as non-self-referential and negative words rated as self-
referential.
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Figure 4.2: ERP waveforms at the CPz electrode and topographical scalp distribution (spline
interpolated voltage map) depicting the main effect of emotion within the self-reference task.
The waveforms for words representing positive and negative information are superimposed.
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Figure 4.3: ERP waveforms at the Cz electrode and topographical scalp distribution (spline
interpolated voltage map) depicting the self-reference x emotional valence. Within the self-
reference, for positive words (top panel) and negative words (bottom panel). The waveforms for
words representing self- and non-self related information are superimposed.
4.4: Discussion
The processing of both self-reference and emotional valence are important
aspects of social and cognitive functioning (Mezulis et al., 2004). The aim of the
present study was to examine if ERPs could be employed to investigate the role of
these two dimensions within self-referential processing. Based on the functional
hierarchy model suggested by Moran et al. (2006) it was predicted that differences
should occur in the timing at which self-reference and emotional valence are
processed during a self-referential decision-making task. The results provide partial
support for this hypothesis. There is evidence of temporal and spatial differences in
the processing of emotional valence and self-reference. These differences will be
discussed in relation to the functional processing hierarchy proposed by Moran et al.
Furthermore, there is also evidence that during the later stages of processing, self-
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reference and emotional valence are closely related. This interesting interaction will
be discussed with reference to the self-positivity bias identified in previous literature
(see Section 1.4.1). Importantly, these findings suggest that ERPs can be used as a
neurophysiological tool to investigate aspects of self-referential processing.
4.4.1: The functional processing hierarchy as a model for self-reference
The results of the present study identified a main effect of emotional valence
in ERPs from 400 to 550 ms at centro-parietal electrodes. This difference in
emotional valence was found to be completely independent of self-reference. This
effect was the result of more negative going ERP waves in response to negative when
compared to positive words. Effects of self-reference were found to occur at different
temporal and spatial locations. An interaction involving self-reference was identified
slightly later, around 450 - 600 ms at fronto-central and occipital electrode locations.
ERP waves were more negative going to words which did not fit the self positivity
bias (self negative and non-self-positive) when compared to words which did fit this
bias. These findings support the hypothesis that ERPs can be used to examine both
temporal and spatial differences in the electrophysiological activity associated with
self-referential processing.
Moran et al. (2006) identified a functional disassociation between the regions
involved in the processing of self-reference (mPFC) and the regions involved in the
processing of emotional valence for highly self-referent information (vACC). Based
on these findings, they proposed that information is initially processed in relation to
self-reference in the mPFC before highly self-relevant information is assessed for
emotional valence in the vACC. On a temporal scale, Moran et al.’s model would
predict a main effect of self-reference prior to an interaction between self-reference
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and emotional valence. Furthermore, the difference in emotional valence within the
interaction would be specific to highly self-relevant material (material rated as ‘like
me’). It is evident that although spatial and temporal differences were identified in
ERPs, these differences were not in line with the functional hierarchy proposed by
Moran et al.
It is possible that the difference in results is due in part, to the differences in
spatial and temporal resolution of the neuroimaging measures employed in each
study. The main effect of emotion identified in the present study occurred prior to
any effects involving self-reference and was relatively short lasting, around 150 ms.
It is possible that this effect, although identifiable using ERPs, was not evident in the
Moran et al. (2006) study due the poor temporal resolution of fMRI. The interaction
between self-reference and emotional valence, that differences were identified
between words which fit the self-positivity bias (self-positive & non-self-negative)
and words which do not fit this bias (self negative & non-self-positive), was identified
by Moran et al. in the inferior frontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC)
and at the supplementary motor area regions (see Table 1.1). However this effect was
not discussed with reference to the functional hierarchy model proposed.
Although the results of the present study differ to those identified by Moran
et al. (2006) they are still of interest within a possible functional hierarchy model of
self-referential processing. The results of the present study suggest that during a self-
referential task, individuals process the emotional valence of presented information
prior to, and independent of, any form of self-referential processing. This finding fits
with the idea of a functional processing hierarchy on a temporal scale, suggesting that
a general evaluation of the emotional valence of word stimuli occurs prior to any
judgements involving self-reference. This model is attractive as individuals are faster
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to respond when making decisions about emotional valence when compared to
decisions involving self-reference (see Chapter Five). The findings suggest that when
making decisions involving self-reference, individuals may process the emotional
valence of word stimuli at a slightly earlier stage in order to then facilitate the
processing of self-reference.
It may be possible to examine this hypothesis further in two ways using the
current methodology. If individuals are found to process the emotional valence of
information faster than self-reference then this would provide some evidence to
support the hypothesis that judgements about emotional valence occur prior to any
form of self-referential processing. Furthermore, measures such as heart rate have
been found to index individuals physiological emotional response to positive and
negative stimuli (see Section 2.4.3), therefore if similar responses are found to occur
in both an emotional valence task and a self-reference task then this would also
provide support for the hypothesis that a general evaluation of the emotional content
of word stimuli is a feature of self-referential processing.
4.4.2: Evidence of a self-positivity bias at the neural level
An interaction between self-reference and emotional valence was identified in
the response time measure. This finding supports the behavioural results obtained by
Moran et al. (2006). These results indicate that a close relationship exists between
self-reference and emotional valence. This finding also confirms the self-positivity
bias demonstrated by other investigators (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, &
Vredenburg, 1995; Mezulis et al., 2004, Pahl & Eiser, 2005; Weinstein, 1989).
As stated above, a significant interaction between self-reference and emotional
valence was also identified in the ERP data. From 450 to 600 ms after stimulus onset,
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amplitudes over fronto-central scalp locations became more negative for self-negative
and non-self-positive words as compared to ERPs responses to self-positive and non-
self-negative words. This interaction supports the behavioural evidence provided by
the response time data. One possible interpretation of this result is that the
recognition of self-referent material relies on the recognition of emotional valence and
that the two highly integrated processes may work together in order to assess the
importance of incoming information.
The interaction identified in both the ERP and behavioural data occur in the
same direction as the self-positivity bias identified in previous literature (Mezulis et
al., 2004). The findings show that the ERP waveforms become more negative to
words that are outwith the bias (self negative & non-self-positive) than to self-positive
and non-self-negative words. Therefore the interaction identified provides evidence
for the existence of the self-positivity bias at the neurophysiological level.
Having identified this interaction in the form of the self-positivity bias, it is
worth speculating about the functional significance of this effect. Given the
topography (fronto-central) and the latency of the observed ERP effect (starting at
about 450 ms), it is possible that the differences identified in the present experiment
are due to modulation of the N400 component. The N400 component was initially
identified by Kutas and Hillyard (1980) in studies of language comprehension and has
been found to index semantic mismatch. Differences in the amplitude of the N400
reflect the extent to which the lexical semantic content of a word matches the
semantic specification of the context in which the word is presented. The component
reflects aspects of a semantic integration process (e.g., Brown, & Hagoort, 1993).
The results of the present study appear to indicate that the amplitude of the N400
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reflects the extent to which self-referent information is discrepant with an individual’s
self-concept.
4.4.3: Some limitations?
The present study represents a good starting point in order to investigate the
relationship between self-reference and emotion at a neural level. It provides a
replication of the experimental paradigm used previously to investigate self-referential
processing and illustrates the usefulness of using ERPs to investigate temporal
differences in the processing of self-referential and emotional information. However,
in order to fully clarify this relationship some potential limitations of this paradigm
must be considered.
The modified version of the self-reference paradigm used in the present study
presented participants with equal numbers of positive and negative words and asked
them to make a self-referential judgement about those stimuli (‘like me’ vs. ‘not like
me at all’). Based on the self-positivity bias identified in Chapter 3, healthy
individuals are known to be more likely to select positive words as self-referent, and
negative words as non-self-referent. This bias may cause differences in the frequency
with which participants select emotional words as ‘like me’ or ‘not like me’, such that
a high numbers of positive words would be identified as ‘like me’ and high numbers
of negative words would be identified as ‘not like me. Conversely, low numbers of
positive words would be identified as ‘not like me’ and low numbers of negative
words would be identified as ‘like me’. Therefore it is possible that the interaction
identified in the response time and ERP analyses may be in fact be due to differences
in the frequencies of the evaluative judgements made, rather than due to the self-
positivity bias as initially suggested. Therefore an alternative experimental paradigm
in which the frequency of evaluative judgements is taken into consideration is
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required before the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence can be
fully understood (see Chapter Five).
A second limitation relates to the difference in presentation of self-reference
(as explicit) and emotional valence (as implicit) within the modified self-reference
paradigm. This issue has been discussed in Sections 1.5 and 3.4.1. Based on these
considerations, an alternative methodology is required to further clarify the
relationship between self-reference and emotional valence. One possibility is to
directly compare only high frequency responses (responses to self-positive, and non-
self-negative words) in self-referent (‘like me’ vs. ‘not like me’ judgement) and
emotional (positive vs. negative judgement) decision-making tasks. In this way it
would be possible to compare the processing of positive and negative stimuli in both a
self-referential and emotional context. By asking participants to directly rate the self-
referential and emotional valence of stimuli while recording the participants
physiological activity we could learn two things. Firstly what physiological activity is
associated with both self-referent and emotional processing, and secondly what
physiological activity is unique to each process.
In conclusion, the present study has provided evidence for a two stage model
of self-referential processing, in which a general evaluation of emotional valence
occurs prior to any evaluations involving self-reference. The results also suggest that
the processing of self-reference is carried out in association with the processing the
emotional valence of the word, identified as an electrophysiological correlate of the
self-positivity bias. This finding may have important consequences for research into
normal cognitive function and processing of affective self-referential information. It
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may also contribute to research investigating the neural basis of affect and self-
perception such as depression and anxiety.
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- Chapter 5 –
Experiment 3: Does the neural processing of self-reference and emotion alter as a
function of mood?
5.1: Introduction
Previous research has indicated that self-referential processing is altered as a
function of mood (see Chapter Three & Section 1.6). The findings of Chapter Three
suggest that at a behavioural level, it is evaluations about the self-referential nature
and not the emotional valence of stimuli which are altered. The results of Chapter
Four suggest that a possible neural correlate of the self-positivity bias can be
identified using ERPs. Therefore one aim of the present study is to identify if the
neural activations associated with self-referential processing are altered as a function
of mood. The second aim is to identify if these differences are also evident during
other forms of emotional decision-making.
5.1.1: The present study
Based on early theories of depression (Beck, 1967), more recent research
(Dozois et al., 2001, see Section 1.6) and research conducted in this thesis (see
Chapter Three), alterations of the self are found to be central to the experience of
negative mood. The first aim of the present study was to investigate the processing of
emotional information within the self-referential decision-making task. By recording
the behavioural measures frequency of response and response time we can examine
how non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals respond within a self-referential
context. By also recording participants’ responses during an emotional decision-
making task it will be possible to obtain a baseline measure of emotional decision-
making. If non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals differ from each other in self-
referential but not emotional decision-making we can say with more certainty that the
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differences identified previously in self-referential processing are due specifically to
alterations in the self-schema during the experience of negative mood.
Previous research (Chapter Four) found that a self-positivity bias can be
identified at both behavioural and neural levels in non-dysphoric individuals.
However this study also highlighted that the large differences in responses between
conditions (high number of responses for self-positive and non-self-negative, low
number of responses for self negative & non-self-positive) may act as a confounding
factor. In order to control for this in the present study, the responses in the self-
referential task can be compared to the responses in an emotional decision-making
task. By comparing the responses individuals make within self-referential and
emotional decision-making tasks it will be possible to determine the extent to which
differences in response time are the result of differences in trial number.
From the previous research conducted in the present thesis several predictions
can be made with regards to non-dysphoric and dysphoric responses within the self-
reference task. Firstly, based on the findings of Chapter Four it is predicted that non-
dysphoric individuals will show a self-positivity bias in both frequency of responses
and response time measures. Secondly, based on findings from Chapter Three and
previous research (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Segal et al.,
1995; Dozois & Dobson, 2001) it is predicted that dysphoric individuals will show a
reduction in the self-positivity bias in both frequency of response and response time
measures.
These group differences in the self-reference task will then be compared to the
differences which occur between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals in the
emotion task. If dysphoric individuals show impairments in both the emotion
decision-making task and the self-reference task then this would suggest that negative
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mood is associated with generalised impairments in emotional decision-making.
However if the differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals are
specific to the self-reference task then this would provide further evidence to suggest
that decision-making about self-referential information is specifically impaired during
negative mood.
Using the current methodology in combination with ERP techniques (see
Section 2.4.1) will allow an investigation into how these decision-making processes
take place at the neural level. It may also allow us to identify at which stages of
processing mood plays a role in both decision-making processes. The behavioural
measures provide us with a good understanding of how information is processed
within self-referential and emotional tasks. However in order to avoid the frequency
of response limitation discussed in above, only two factors, task (self, emotion) and
group (non-dysphoric, dysphoric) will be included in the ERP analyses. These
analyses will provide us with information about how negative mood influences self-
referential and emotional decision-making tasks within the brain.
In Chapter Four an ERP investigation of non-dysphoric individuals identified
a neural correlate of the self-positivity bias from 450 to 600 ms at fronto-central and
central electrodes. It is hypothesised that if this correlate does represent some aspect
of self-related processing, then differences between the ERP responses of non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals will occur at these temporal and spatial locations.
If however, differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals are also
identified at these temporal and spatial locations within the emotion task then this
would suggest that the neural correlate identified previously may represent some more
general aspect of emotional processing.
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5.2: Method
5.2.1: Participants
Forty participants took part in the study. Participants’ scores on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II) were recorded (see Section 2.2.1). Scores on the BDI-
II were used as a grouping variable to separate participants experiencing low mood
(dysphoric) from participants with normal mood (non-dysphoric). Participants with a
score lower than 12 were classified as non-dysphoric and participants with a score
above 12 were classified as dysphoric (see Table 5.1). The high cut-off points
employed in Chapter Three (see Section 3.2.3) were not utilised in this experiment or
in experiment eight (see Chapter Five) due to the difficulty in obtaining a suitable
number of participants who scored below 7 on the BDI-II questionnaire, furthermore
previous research has shown that participants who score below 12 on the BDI-II are
experiencing minimal levels of negative mood (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996).
Table 5.1: Comparison of participant variables across non-dysphoric and
dysphoric groups.
Non-dysphoric Dysphoric
Number 20 20
Gender 14 female 16 female
Handedness 19 right-handed 20 right handed
Mean Age (sd) 21.35 (2.74) 20.35 (1.80)
Mean BDI-II Score 5.6 (2.16) 23.05 (10.01)
BDI-II Range 3 – 10 12 – 48
All participants spoke English as their first language and scored within normal
ranges on the Test of Word Reading Efficiency or the National Adult Reading Test
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(see Section 2.3). All participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the study
and received payment (£8) for participation.
5.2.2: Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli and apparatus used were identical to those employed in Chapter
Four (see Section 4.2.2 for a review).
5.2.3: Procedure
The procedure used was identical the procedure employed in Chapter Four
(see Section 4.2.3 for a review).
5.2.4: Electrophysiological Recordings
The set up of the electrophysiological recording was the same set up employed
in Chapter Four (see Section 4.2.4 for a review).
5.3: Results
5.3.1: Participants Variables
Statistical analyses were conducted to identify any possible confounds
between the two groups in terms the participant variables age and gender. Chi-square
analysis revealed no significant differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
groups for gender, χ2(N = 40) > 1. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant age
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups, t(35) = 1.82, p > 0.2.
5.3.2: Behavioural Results
5.3.2.1: Data Analysis
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Two behavioural measures were analysed, frequency of response and response
time. Frequency of response was measured as the number of times participants
responded with a key press within each experimental condition. Responses were
analysed as a percentage (%) of the overall number of stimuli presented. Response
time was measured as the time taken from onset of stimuli until key press response.
Response time was measured and analysed in milliseconds (ms).
All factors were analysed for each behavioural measure and two 4-way mixed
ANOVAs were conducted, including one between groups factor and three within
groups factors. The between groups factor was labelled group (non-dysphoric,
dysphoric). The repeated measures factors were labelled as follows: task (self,
emotion), evaluation (positive evaluation, negative evaluation) and valence (positive
valence, negative valence). To clarify further, the evaluation factor encompasses the
key press responses made by participants. This includes words rated by the
participant as ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ in the self task, and words rated as ‘positive’
and ‘negative’ in the emotion task. The valence factor identifies stimuli which have
been previously rated as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ through normative ratings (see
Section 2.5). For post hoc comparisons, Bonferonni corrected t-tests were applied.
5.3.2.2: Frequency of response
No main effects were identified in the mixed ANOVA. However several
interactions were revealed; an evaluation x valence interaction, F(1, 38) = 522.41, p <
0.001, an evaluation x valence x group interaction, F(1, 38) = 6.13, p < 0.05, a task x
evaluation x valence interaction, F(1, 38) = 19.58, p < 0.01 and finally a four way task
x evaluation x valence x group interaction, F(1, 38) = 11.76, p < 0.001 (see Figure
5.1).
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This four way interaction was further evaluated using Bonferroni corrected t-
tests. The interaction revealed no significant differences in the emotion task between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups (ts < 1.09, ps > 0.28). Both groups rate
emotional information in the same way. Positively valenced information is strongly
evaluated as positive and negatively valenced information is strongly evaluated as
negative (> 80 % of the time).
Significant differences were found between the two groups within the self task
(ts > 2.76, ps < 0.05). Non-dysphorics rated most positive words as self-related (86.0
%) and most negative words as non-self-related (83.3 %). In contrast, dysphorics
rated fewer words in this way; self-positive (67.2 %) and non-self-negative (68.1 %).
Conversely, where non-dysphorics rate few negative words as self-related (16.6 %)
and few positive words as non-self-related (13.3 %), dysphorics show increased
responses within these conditions; self negative (33.7 %) and non-self-positive (29.4
%). These findings suggest that although dysphorics do show a self-positivity bias in
their frequency of responding, this bias is reduced when compared to non-dysphoric
individuals.
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Figure 5.1: The frequency of responses (%) of non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups in all
conditions. The graph illustrates that differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals
occur in the self task but not the emotion task.
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5.3.2.3: Response time
The analysis of response times revealed a main effect of task, F(1, 38) =
30.99, p < 0.001. Several interactions were also identified. An evaluation x valence
interaction, F(1, 38) = 25.40, p < 0.001 and two three way interactions. The three
way interactions were a task x evaluation x valence interaction, F(1, 38) = 4.59, p <
0.05, and a task x valence x group interaction, F(1, 38) = 4.15, p < 0.05 (see Figure
5.2). No four way interaction was identified.
The main effect of task illustrated that individuals were slower to respond in
the self task (1320.2 ms) when compared to the emotion task (1071.4 ms). This
difference suggests that regardless of group, the individuals were significantly faster
during the emotion task when compared to the self task. No other main effects were
revealed.
Bonferroni corrected t-tests were conducted to examine both three way
interactions in more detail. The post hoc comparisons conducted on the task x
evaluation x valence interaction illustrate that significant differences occurred in the
evaluation x valence interaction within the self task but not the emotion task.
Individuals showed faster responses to word which fit the self-positivity bias (self-
positive 1167.2 ms; self negative 1141.5 ms) when compared to words which did not
fit this bias (self negative 1433.0 ms; non-self-positive 1538.7 ms), (ts > 3.37, ps <
0.05). In the emotion task, this evaluation x valence interaction occurs in the same
direction. However, these differences did not reach statistical significance (ts < 2.17,
ps > 0.2).
Post hoc comparisons conducted on the task x valence x group interaction
suggest a trend towards a difference between positive and negative stimuli within the
self-reference task for non-dysphoric participants only (t < 2.68, p = 0.1). However
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the graph presented in Figure 5.2 seems suggest that this finding may be the result
differences in non-dysphoric participants’ responses to self negative and non-self-
positive stimuli rather than due to a more general effect of emotional valence.
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Figure 5.2: Response time (ms) responses of non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups in all
conditions. Significant differences occur between the evaluation and valence factors in the
self task but not the emotion task.
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5.3.2.4: Behavioural results summary
The results of the frequency of response analysis provide support for the
hypothesis that non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals differ specifically during
self-referential processing. As predicted, non-dysphoric individuals show a self-
positivity bias. Positive information is more frequently rated as self-referential and
negative information as non-self-referential. Dysphoric individuals also show a self-
positivity bias. However, when compared to non-dysphoric individuals, the frequency
of dysphoric individuals’ responses to self-positive and non-self-negative stimuli is
reduced and the frequency of their responses to self negative and non-self-positive
stimuli is increased.
Differences between the two groups were not identified in the emotional
decision-making task. The finding that no group differences were identified in the
emotion decision-making task suggests that changes in self-referential processing
during negative mood are not present in other forms of emotional processing.
Several other effects in the response time analysis also highlight differences
between self-referential and emotional decision-making. Firstly a main effect of task
was identified. This effect suggests that individuals are not just using emotional
information to guide their self-referential decision-making within the present
experiment. Furthermore, a self-positivity bias was identified regardless of group.
Individuals were faster to respond to self-positive and non-self-negative stimuli when
compared to self negative and non-self-positive stimuli. No significant differences
were identified in the emotional decision-making task suggesting that the positivity
bias identified in response times is specific to self-referential processing.
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5.3.3: ERP Results
5.3.3.1: Data Analysis
The overall aim of this experiment was to investigate if self-referential
processing is altered as a function of mood. In order to control for the differences in
trial number within the experimental tasks, the factors valence and evaluation were
excluded from the analysis. From the self task, words which were rated as ‘like me’
and positive and ‘not like me’ and negative were included in the analysis. From the
emotion task, words correctly identified as positive and negative were included in the
analysis.
To investigate this using ERPs, three way ANOVAs were conducted including
the between group factor group (non-dysphoric, dysphoric) and the repeated measures
factors task (self, emotion) and electrode (see below). As in Section 4.2.4, only trials
without EEG or EOG artefacts were included in the ERP data analysis. Conservative
Huynh-Feldt F–tests were used throughout. For post hoc comparisons, Bonferonni
corrected one way ANOVAs were applied.
ERP data from specific regions was analysed: anterio-frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3,
AF4, AF7, AF8, Afz), frontal (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, Fpz), fronto-central
(FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6), central (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6), centro parietal
(CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6), parietal (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8), temporal
(FT7, FT8, T7, T8, TP7, TP8), occipital (O1, O2, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, P9, P10,
POz, Iz). In Chapter Four the ERP effects were largest across the midline electrodes
FCz and Cz (see Section 4.3.2). Therefore, to provide a regional analysis of these
electrodes, the midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) were analysed as an
additional electrode group. For each region, a three-way ANOVA including the
factors group, task and electrode, was performed on subsequent ERP time segments.
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Mean ERP amplitudes were calculated for the P1 (100 – 140 ms), N1 (180 – 220 ms)
and subsequent 50 ms time segments from 300 to 700 ms relative to stimulus onset.
5.3.3.2: Early Effects
The early effects identified are outlined in Table 5.2 below. The task x group
interactions highlighted are most relevant to the experimental hypotheses.
Table 5.2: ANOVA table of early effects in the time window 100 – 220 ms.
Electrode site Effect Time
interval
F-Value Between group Post Hoc
Comparisons
Emotion task
F-value
Self task
F-value
Fronto-central Group 100-140 4.43*
Frontal Group 180-220 >4*
Midline E x G 180-220 >3(*)
Fronto-central Task 100-220 >4*
Occipital Task 100-220 >4.5*
Midline T x E x G 180-220 3.16* 5.95** 1.69
Frontal T x G 180-220 4.07(*) 7.67** 1.78
Fronto-central T x G 180-220 8.64** 4.27* 0.98
Occipital T x G 180-200 7.20* 4.18* 0.72
T= task, E = electode and G = group, (*) = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01
Figure 5.3 provides a graphical representation of these interaction effects. The
interactions suggests that during the early time intervals the processing of emotional
information differs across non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups. Figure 5.3 illustrates
that dysphoric individuals ERP responses are larger than that of non-dysphoric
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individuals. At frontal sites where the ERP peak is positive between 180 - 220 ms
dysphoric responses are more positive than non-dysphoric responses. At occipital
sites where the ERP peak is negative, dysphoric responses are more negative than
non-dysphoric individuals. This difference in polarity across the two electrode
locations is labelled the average reference effect, this effect is due to the use of an
average reference electrode as a baseline of general electrical activity in the brain
within the present methodology.
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Figure 5.3: ERP waveforms at FCz and Oz electrodes and topographical scalp distribution
(spline-interpolated voltage map) depicting the task x group interactions occurring during early
processing. The waveforms for words representing non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups are
superimposed.
5.3.3.3: Late effects
In the late time windows, robust main effects of task and task x electrode
interactions were identified (see Table 5.3). In relation to the experimental
hypothesis, a task x group interaction, outlined in bold, was also identified at midline
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electrodes, Figure 5.4. This effect occurred from 400 to 650 ms mainly as a
significant trend, reaching significance between 400 – 450 ms, F(1, 38) = 4.10, p <
0.05, and 500 – 550 ms, F(1, 38) = 4.61, p < 0.05. Post hoc comparisons revealed a
trend towards differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals within the
self task, F(38) = 3.90, p = 0.05, but not in the emotion task, F(38) < 1. At this stage
of processing dysphoric individuals ERP waves show reduced amplitude within the
self task when compared to non-dysphoric individuals.
Table 5.3: ANOVA table of late effects in the time window 300 – 900 ms
Electrode Site Effect Time Window F-Value (>)
Midline Task 300 – 400 5.0**
T x E 350 – 700 8.0***
T x G 400 – 650 3.5*
Anterio-Frontal Task 400 – 700 5.5**
T x E 400 – 700 2.0**
Frontal Task 350 – 700 6.5**
T x E 550 – 700 2.5**
Parietal Task 450 – 550 4.0**
T= task, E = electrode and G = group, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001
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Figure 5.4: ERP waveforms at the FCz electrode and topographical scalp distribution (spline -
interpolated voltage map) depicting the task x group interaction occurring during the late stages
of processing. The waveforms for the non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups are superimposed.
5.3.3.4: ERP results summary
The results suggest that individuals, regardless of group differentiate between
the self and emotion tasks at both early and late stages of processing. These effects
are robust, long lasting and occur across several brain regions. Task x group
interactions are also found to occur both at early and late stages of processing.
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However the nature of these interactions differs across the different time intervals. At
early stages, differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals occur in
the emotion task and not the self task. Dysphoric individuals’ ERPs are larger than
non-dysphoric ERPs to emotional information. At the later stages of processing
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals occur in the self task
but not the emotion task whereby dysphoric individuals ERP waves are more negative
going than non-dysphoric individuals.
The task x group interaction identified in the later stages of processing
supports the prediction that non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals differentiate
between self-referential information at midline electrodes from 400 to 650 ms.
5.4: Discussion
The overall aim of the present study was to investigate the extent to which
self-referential processing is altered as a function of mood. The findings provide
evidence to suggest that self-referential processing is indeed altered as a function of
mood at both behavioural and neural levels.
5.4.1: Behavioural findings
5.4.1.1: Within the self task
The prediction that non-dysphoric individuals would show a self-positivity
bias in frequency of responses and response time was supported. As previous
research suggests (see Chapter Four, & Section 1.4.1), non-dysphoric individuals
respond more frequently to, and have faster response times for positive information
when rated as self-referential and negative information when rated as non-self-
referential when compared to self negative and non-self-positive information.
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The prediction that dysphoric individuals would show an alteration in the self-
positivity bias was supported in the frequency of response but not the response time
measure. As in previous studies, dysphoric individuals were found to endorse more
negative traits and less positive traits as self-referential when compared to non-
dysphoric individuals (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Derry & Kuiper 1981; Mineka &
Sutton, 1992; Dozois & Dobson, 2001, Dozois & Dobson, 2003). Although, this
alteration in the self-positivity bias was not identified in response times, changes in
self-referential processing in depression have been less consistent in the response time
measure than in frequency of response or recall (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Clifford
& Hensley, 1987; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Dobson & Shaw 1987; Dozois & Dobson,
2001).
The difference in self-referential processing identified between non-dysphoric
and dysphoric groups provides strong evidence to suggest that this type of processing
is altered as a function of mood. In dysphoric individuals a self-positivity bias was
identified, however this bias was reduced in comparison to non-dysphoric individuals.
This finding differs to studies of clinically depressed individuals where a self-
negativity bias was identified (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Segal et al. 1995). One
similar study by Kuiper and Derry (1982) also failed to find a self-negativity bias.
They found that recall of both positive and negative stimuli was enhanced in a self-
referential encoding task when compared to a semantic encoding task. As in the
present study Kuiper and Derry tested mildly depressed individuals. Therefore it is
possible that changes in the self-positivity bias increase as a function of the severity of
a depressive episode. It would be interesting to investigate this further by testing
clinically depressed individuals. It may also be of interest to investigate if changes in
self-referential processing increase as a function of the number of depressive episodes
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experienced. Both these studies would allow us to identify more fully how these self-
referential biases alter as the severity of depression increases.
5.4.1.2: Self-referential versus emotional decision-making
Previous research employing the self-reference paradigm to investigate
cognitive processing in mildly depressed or depressed individuals has identified
differences in self-referential processing between these groups and healthy individuals
(Bradley & Mathews, Kuiper & Derry; Dozios & Dobson, 2003). The results of the
present study also identified differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups
during self-referential processing. Additionally, the responses of these two groups
were compared during an emotional decision-making task. No differences between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were identified during this task. This
finding suggests that negative mood is not associated with changes in all forms of
emotional decision-making. The results of the present study extend previous research
as we can say with greater confidence that the changes in self-referential processing as
a function of mood are not the result of a more general impairment in all forms of
emotional decision-making.
Several other important effects warrant also some discussion. Firstly a main
effect of task was documented. Regardless of group, individuals were found to be
slower for the self task when compared to the emotion task. This effect is particularly
important for the non-dysphoric group. In both the frequency of response and
response time measures the pattern of responses made by non-dysphoric individuals in
both the self-reference and emotional valence tasks were very similar. It may be
suggested that non-dysphoric individuals are using the same decision-making
processes within both self-referential and emotional decision-making tasks. However
this main effect of task suggests that this is not the case. As expected, individuals
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were much faster at making simple decisions about the valence of stimuli than when
asked to evaluate information as self-referential.
Secondly, a task x evaluation x valence interaction was identified. Post hoc
comparisons revealed that individuals were faster to respond in conditions which fit
the self positivity bias (self-positive & non-self-negative) when compared to
conditions which did not fit this bias (self negative & non-self-positive). In the
emotion task no such differences in response time were identified. One limitation of
the study conducted in Chapter Four was that the differences in response time within
the self task may be the result of differences in the frequency of responses between
the conditions mentioned above. In the present experiment, the frequency of
responses within the evaluation x valence conditions within the self task and the
emotion task were similar, particularly for non-dysphoric individuals. The fact that
no significant differences were identified within response times to the emotion task
despite the large differences in frequency of responses across conditions suggests that
the differences found within the response times in self-reference task do in fact
represent a true self-positivity bias.
5.4.1.3: Summary
Overall the behavioural results of this study consistently support the findings
of previous research. Non-dysphoric individuals show a strong self-positivity bias in
both the information they endorse as self-referential and their response latencies.
Dysphoric individuals also show a similar self-positivity bias in their response
latencies, however this bias is significantly reduced in the frequency of response
measure. Furthermore the addition of the emotional decision-making task extends
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previous research, illustrating that changes in the self-positivity bias as a function of
mood are not the result of a generalised emotional processing bias.
5.4.2: ERP findings
The value of employing ERP techniques within the present experiment was
twofold; firstly to investigate the neural correlate of the self-positivity bias in more
detail and secondly to investigate how self-referential processing within the brain
differs as a function of mood.
5.4.2.1: The neural correlate of the self-positivity bias
In Chapter Four differences in the self-positivity bias were identified in the
brain at fronto-central and central electrodes from 450 to 600 ms. It was hypothesised
that if behavioural differences were identified between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals then these differences should also be evident within the brain at the
temporal and spatial locations mentioned above. The findings of the present study
supported this hypothesis as differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals were identified at midline electrodes (including the fronto-central and
central electrodes) from 400 to 650 ms. These findings are strengthened by the fact
that no such differences were identified in the emotion processing task at these spatial
and temporal locations. This suggests that the correlate identified is specifically
related to self-reference and not the result of generalised differences in emotional
processing. Group differences were identified in the emotion task at an earlier stage
of processing. This effect will be discussed in a later section.
One potential limitation of the present study is that only words which fit the
self-positivity bias (self-positive & non-self-negative) were examined in the ERP
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analysis. Due to the exclusion of the other two conditions the present study cannot
provide a full picture of how self-referential processing takes place within the brain.
It is interesting to note that despite this limitation, evidence for a neural correlate of
the self-positivity bias was still identified. The present study does show that by
comparing the ERP responses of dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals within a
self-referential task we can learn more about the neural correlates of self-referential
processing.
5.4.2.2: In the brain: Self-referential processing as a function of mood
The second aim of the ERP analysis was to investigate, at the neural level,
how self-referential processing is altered as a function of mood. The fact that a
reduction in the amplitude of ERP responses of dysphoric when compared to non-
dysphoric individuals was identified at locations previously found to be involved in
self-referential processing, provides evidence to suggest that self-referential
processing is altered both at the behavioural and neural levels.
It was put forward in Section 4.4 that the ERP differences between words
which fit the self-positivity bias (self-positive, non-self-negative) and those words
outwith the bias (self negative, non-self-positive) could be explained by semantic
mismatch. That is, the N400 becomes more negative to stimuli which do not fit the
current semantic context (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Within the self-referential task
the semantic context consists of the current self-schema being used by the individual
within the decision-making process. Based on this reasoning, the ERP waves of non-
dysphoric individuals are less negative going than dysphoric individuals because the
stimuli presented (self-positive & non-self-negative) are a better fit of the positive
self-schema held by the individual. For dysphoric individuals the ERP wave is more
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negative going because the stimuli are a poorer fit of their more negative self-schema.
These findings support the suggestion that self-referential processing is altered
as a result of negative mood and extend previous research by identifying these
differences at the neural level. Furthermore, the semantic mismatch explanation of
the changes in the N400 complement the previous scientific theory and behavioural
evidence that the nature of the self-schema is altered as a function of mood.
5.4.2.3: Other ERP effects: early differences in emotional processing
As stated above (see section 5.4.2.1) differences between non-dysphoric and
dysphoric individuals were identified in the emotional decision-making task during
the early stages of processing. The results suggests that the ERP waves of dysphoric
individuals are larger than the ERP waves of non-dysphoric individuals at midline,
frontal, fronto-central and occipital regions from 180 to 220 ms. Although this effect
is not relevant to the experimental hypothesis proposed in the study, it is interesting in
its own right and therefore warrants some discussion.
The traditional stages of processing view suggests that early stages of
information processing (pre 200 ms) are related to perceptual or sensory events
(Fabiani et al., 2000). However more recent research suggests that relatively high
level functions may also occur during this early time interval (Ortigue et al., 2004).
During early time intervals (pre 200ms), ERPs have been found to differentiate
between faces (Braeutigam et al., 2001), objects (Murray et al., 2002; Rousselet et al.,
2002) and even word stimuli (see Pulvermȕller, 1999 for a review). In line with the 
traditional stages of processing view, it is possible that these ERP differences are
associated with visual-perceptual processes. However, these early differences have
also been associated with the attributes of word stimuli commonly related to word
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meaning (Pulvermȕller, 2001; Skrandies, 1998), syntax (Pulvermȕller, 2001) and even 
emotional valence (Kissler et al, 2006).
The literature examining the influence of emotion at different stages
processing is sparse, particularly studies looking at early time intervals (Kissler,
Assadollahi & Herbert, 2006). However, a small number of studies have identified
differences in affective processing around and prior to 200 ms. Most of these studies
identified differences between affective word categories namely between emotional
and neutral words. Begleiter and Platz (1969) found that ERP amplitudes were
greater in response to taboo words than neutral words within the first 200 ms after
stimulus presentation. Following this early study, Herbert et al. (2006), Kostandov
and Arzumanov (1977), Ortigue et al. (2004), and Williamson, Harpur and Hare
(1991) and have all identified similar differences between emotional and neutral
words during early stage processing. Other studies have also identified differences
between positive and negative stimuli, although these finding are less robust (Bernat,
Bunce, & Shevrin 2001; Chapman, 1978; Kiehl et al., 1999; Kissler et al., 2006).
These findings from multiple studies illustrate that the processing of emotional
information occurs prior to 200 ms.
As stated above, the traditional stages of processing view states that early ERP
components are associated with visual-perceptual processes. However, research into
eye movements during reading has identified that the average time we fixate on a
word during reading is 250 ms, this finding suggests that the processing of word
meaning may occur earlier than previously thought (Sereno and Rayner, 2003). If the
emotional valence of word stimuli was found to modulate the stages at which word
meaning is accessed it could be said with greater certainty that emotional valence
influences early stages of processing. Previous research has identified that the effects
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of word frequency are linked to the moment of lexical access (Sereno & Rayner,
2003), one recent study by Scott et al. (in press) examined the relationship between
emotional valence and word frequency. They hypothesised that if the effects of word
frequency on ERP components are modulated by emotional valence then this would
support the idea that emotional valence is an important feature of lexical access during
early stages of processing. As predicted, they identified word frequency x emotional
valence interactions during the early stages of processing. This finding lead them to
conclude, contrary to the traditional stages of processing view, that the emotional tone
of a word does modulate early lexical processing. That these differences identified
during the early stages of processing are not solely due to visual-perceptual processes.
All the studies discussed above relate to the processing of emotionally
semantic information. During this type of processing, each word is evaluated
individually and the averaged ERP responses relate to the emotional content of the
presented words. In the present study, the task x group interaction occurs due to the
context in which the words are presented. One study by Begleiter, Porjesz, and
Garozzo (1979) examined task-related differences. They compared an emotional
evaluation task to a vowel identification task and found that the N1 - P2 complex only
differentiated between emotional and neutral words within the emotional evaluation
task. Kanske and Kotz (2007) suggest that the task-related difference in the Begleiter
et al. study occurs because attention is focued on the emotional connotation of the
word stimuli in the emotional evaluation task. This explanation supports the present
results to some extent, in that early differences in emotional processing were
identified in an explicit emotion task but not an implicit emotion task (vowel
identification task).
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The task-related interactions in the present study revealed differences in the
way in which non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals make emotional evaluations at
a neural level. Dysphoric individuals show larger ERP waves between 180-220 ms
when making emotional evaluations when compared to non-dysphoric individuals.
Again the literature in this area is limited. Clinical studies which investigate early
stages of processing using ERPs consider anxious individuals or individuals who
suffer from chronic pain (Kissler et al., 2006). Studies of depressed or dysphoric
individuals generally limit their analyses to the later stages of processing (Dietrich et
al., 2000; Dietrich et al., 2001). The present study provides evidence to suggest
negative mood also alters early ERP components involved in simple emotional
decisions during early time intervals. This finding suggests that further research
should be conducted to investigate the influence of negative mood during the early
stages of processing.
In conclusion, the results of the present study illustrate that self-referential and
emotional decision-making do represent two distinct forms of processing.
Furthermore, the results suggest that negative mood impairs self-referential
processing both at the behavioural and neural level. In the brain, these impairments
occur during the later stages of processing and can be explained with reference to the
semantic mismatch hypothesis. Unexpectedly, differences in the emotional
processing of non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were also identified during the
early stages of emotional decision-making. Little research has been done in this area
and our findings highlight the need to investigate the role of negative mood during
these early stages of emotional processing in more detail.
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- Chapter 6 -
Experiment 4: A comparison of self-referential and emotional processing in skin
conductance and heart rate response.
6.1: Introduction
Previous chapters have identified that a self-positivity bias exists at both
behavioural and neural levels in non-dysphoric individuals (see Chapters Three &
Four). The experiment conducted in Chapter Five also illustrates the benefits of
comparing the processing of information within the self-positivity bias (self-positive
& non-self-negative) across explicitly self-referential and emotional tasks. This
method allows a direct comparison of how the processing of emotionally valenced
information differs within these two tasks, allowing us to determine the extent to
which self-referential processing is associated with emotional processing.
Furthermore it also enables us to identify which features of processing are specifically
related to self-reference.
In the previous experiments conducted (Chapters Three, Four & Five) self-
referential and emotional processing have been investigated by asking individuals to
evaluate the content of word stimuli. It could be argued that this type of semantically
based task may not elicit a true emotional response and therefore that these tasks may
not accurately reflect emotional processing. Measures such as skin conductance and
heart rate reflect how the brain recruits the peripheral nervous system (autonomic
nervous system) in response to external events (see Section 2.4). Therefore, if the
self-reference and emotional valence tasks presented in the previous experiments were
found to elicit autonomic responses, it could be said with more certainty that these
two tasks do reflect some form of emotional processing. As discussed below, these
measures also have theoretical value. Skin conductance is known to index autonomic
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arousal and heart rate is known to index emotional valence (see Sections 2.4.2 &
2.4.3).
6.1.1: Skin conductance: a measure of motivational significance
Ever since Lacey (1967) proposed that changes in skin conductance could be
used as an index of physiological arousal, many researchers have used skin
conductance to investigate arousal. A series of studies by Lang et al. (Greenwald,
Cook III, & Lang, 1989; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990, 1998; Lang, Greenwald,
Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996; Bradley, Codispoti,
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001) investigated behavioural and physiological responses to
emotional pictorial stimuli. Their common methodology was to present participants
with a series of pictures which vary on the dimensions of valence (pleasant –
unpleasant) and arousal (calm – excited). During the presentation of stimuli,
physiological measures such as skin conductance, heart rate and facial
myocardiographic activity were recorded. After presentation, participants were asked
to rate the pictures for emotional valence and arousal using the self-assessment
manikin (SAM). Lang and others found support for Lacey’s hypothesis, that skin
conductance consistently varies with arousal regardless of emotional valence.
Lang et al. (1990) hypothesise that physiological arousal represents the intensity of
motivational activation experienced by an organism. As physiological arousal
increases in an organism, their disposition to react also increases. Through these
experiments, Lang et al. have found that arousal (as measured by participant ratings,
skin conductance & startle blink) is greater for stimuli which have motivational
significance for individuals in terms of survival, i.e pictures of sexual behaviour,
human, and animal attack (Bradley et al., 2001).
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Sedikides and Skowronski (1997) argue that the self-concept is also important
for human survival. From an evolutionary perspective, they suggest that the self-
concept is unique to humans and emerged in response to specific social and ecological
pressures. The self-concept is proposed to have adaptive significance. It provides a
mechanism by which we can assimilate and understand incoming information,
organise and plan future behaviours and communicate at both the personal and group
level. If the self-concept is important for survival, the processing of self-referent
information should be of motivational significance.
Experimental studies have repeatedly indicated that individuals attend to, and
have a better memory for self-referent information (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1985;
Kihlstrom, Beer, & Klein, 2002; Markus, 1977; Symons, & Johnson, 1997;). These
findings imply that self-referent information does have some degree of motivational
significance for the individual. Following this line of reasoning, it can be
hypothesised that self-relevant information should also elicit physiological arousal.
Two studies support this hypothesis to some extent. One study by Nikula,
Klinger, and Larson-Gutman (1993) used skin conductance to determine if individuals
find their own personal current concerns more arousing than those of other
individuals. Nikula et al. presented participants with two sets of words. One set
related to the participant’s own personal concerns (which had been identified
previously) and the other set related to the concerns of another individual.
Participants showed greater skin conductance responses to words which related to
their own concerns when compared to words which related to the concerns of others.
A very different study by Gronau, Ben-Shakar, and Cohen (2005) used an alternative
version of the Stroop task to determine the extent to which skin conductance
responses and response time distinguished between neutral and personally relevant
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information. They asked participants to name the colour of a series of non-personal
(table, pen etc.) and personal (first & last names) words. They found that participants
showed longer response time latencies and larger skin conductance responses to
personal words when compared to non-personal words.
Both these studies provide preliminary evidence to suggest that individuals
show greater physiological arousal to personally relevant information. In terms of the
theory of arousal purported by Lang and others (1990), these findings indicate that
self-referent information may be of greater motivational significance when compared
to other types of information. In the studies discussed above, Nikula et al. (1993)
only examined skin conductance responses to negative information and Gronau et al.
(2005) did not evaluate emotional valence at all. Although these studies investigate
self-reference, they fail to examine if the processing of self-referential information
differs from the processing of emotional information. From these studies a key
research question emerges as to whether individuals show different levels of
physiological arousal when engaged in self-referential processing when compared to
the physiological arousal experienced as a result of general emotional processing as
previously shown by Lang et al.
As discussed in Chapter Four, within the self-referential task, individuals
identify some types of information as ‘like me’ and some types of information as ‘not
like me’. Therefore differences in physiological arousal may not only occur between
self-referential and emotional tasks but also within the self-referential task itself. If
this is the case we would expect that information rated as ‘like me’ would elicit
greater physiological arousal than information rated as ‘not like me’ specifically
within the self-referent task.
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6.1.2: Heart rate: a measure of emotional valence
The results of Lang and others (1990) discussed above also consistently
demonstrated that heart rate differentiates pictures of pleasant and unpleasant
emotional valence. Early studies identified that cardiac acceleration was greater for
pleasant pictures whereas cardiac deceleration was greater for unpleasant pictures
(Greenwald et al., 1989).
More recently, studies have utilised a more detailed measure of heart rate due
to the variability in mean heart rate response found across participants and task
conditions (Greenwald et al., 1989). Bradley et al. (2001) measured how heart rate
changes temporally after picture presentation. They identified a triphasic response
which differed across emotional valence. In response to unpleasant pictures, Bradley
et al. found a large initial increase in cardiac deceleration that was sustained through
out the 6 second stimulus presentation period. In response to pleasant pictures the
initial deceleration was smaller and a large peak acceleration occurred after the initial
deceleration. These findings suggest the heart rate differs in response to emotional
valence and that these responses differ over time. By measuring heart rate in this way
it should be possible to examine the extent to which the emotional content of
information is evaluated within a self-referential context. If emotional valence plays a
large role in the processing of self-reference, then heart rate response within both self-
referential and emotional tasks should be similar. However, if self-reference
represents a unique form of stimulus processing then heart rate response within the
two tasks should differ.
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6.1.3: The present study
The aim of the present study was to investigate the extent to which emotional
processing, as indexed by physiological measures, is involved in self-referential
processing in non-dysphoric individuals.
The measure of skin conductance response has been found to be associated
with arousal. Based on the research of Lang et al. (1990) and Sedikides and
Skowronski (1997) it is hypothesised that self-referential information is of greater
motivational significance and therefore will elicit greater physiological arousal than
other types of information. Two predictions can be made with regards to this
hypothesis. The first prediction is that skin conductance responses should be larger
within the self-referent task when compared to the emotion task. The second
prediction is that within the self-reference task itself, skin conductance responses
should be larger to stimuli identified as ‘like me’ when compared to stimuli identified
as ‘not like me’.
The measure of heart rate response has been found to differentiate between
positive and negative valence. Therefore, heart rate can be used to provide a
physiological measure of emotional processing. If decisions about the self-referential
nature of information are heavily influenced by the emotional content of the stimulus
then it would be predicted that differences in heart rate would be identified in both the
self-referential and emotion tasks. However, if self-referential processing represents a
unique form of stimulus processing, then it would be predicted that differences in
heart rate would only be present in the emotion task.
Behavioural measures such as frequency of response and response time were
also recorded for all participants. It is hypothesised that the results of the present
study will replicate the behavioural results identified in Chapter Five for non-
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dysphoric individuals. In the frequency of response measure an evaluation x valence
interaction is predicted. In the response time measure a task x evaluation x valence
interaction is predicted. This replication would lend support to finding that the self-
positivity bias identified in the response time measure is not simply due to the
frequency of trial responses within the experimental conditions.
6.2: Method
6.2.1: Participants
Thirty eight participants (26 female, mean age: 20.76 years, SD: 3.05 years)
were initially recruited from the University of Strathclyde. All participants took part
in a single session lasting approximately 90 minutes. The language requirements
were the same as in Section 4.2.1.
Participants completed the Beck Depression inventory-II (BDI-II), see Section
2.2.1. On the basis of their scores on the inventory, 11 participants were excluded
from further analyses as their scores were greater than 12. A further 2 participants
were excluded due technical errors during physiological recording. The responses of
25 participants (15 female, mean age: 20.68 years, SD: 3.00 years) were included in
further analyses. All participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the study
and were given a choice of payment (£4 per hour) or class credit for participation.
6.2.2: Stimuli and Apparatus
Word stimuli were presented using Experimental Run Time System (ERTS)
software on a 17-inch CRT monitor controlled by a Pentium PC. Responses were
recorded using two buttons mounted on two separate response panels placed in front
of the participant. Left and right key press responses were made with the index and
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middle fingers of the participant’s preferred hand. The stimuli were identical to those
used in Chapter Four (see Section 4.2.2 for a review).
6.2.3: Procedure
On arrival participants were asked to wash their hands to ensure a baseline
level of sanitation required for measuring skin conductance response. After the
participants provided informed consent, information about age and gender was
obtained, recording electrodes and a respiration strap were secured onto the
participant and the participant was familiarised with the experimental procedure.
The instructions and tasks completed in the first section of the study were the
same as in Section 4.2.3. However the experimental trials were set up differently to
allow for differences in the physiological measures being recorded (see Section 6.2.4)
below. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 0.5 seconds,
followed by the word stimulus, which was presented until response. Five seconds
after stimulus onset, the next trial began. In each condition, four practice trials were
followed by 156 experimental trials (presented in three blocks of 52 trials each) with
words individually presented in random order. The same 156 word stimuli were used
in both the self task and the emotion task.
After the computer based task, the electrophysiological recording equipment
was removed and participants were asked to complete several questionnaires. Finally
participants were debriefed, paid credit and thanked for participation.
6.2.4: Electrophysiological recordings and data analysis
The physiological measures recorded were; heart rate (from the
electrocardiogram, or ECG), autonomic skin conductance response (SCR), and
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respiration rate (RR). All physiological measures were recorded and analysed using
Biopac MP150 hardware system and AcqKnowledge software.
6.2.4.1: Heart rate response
Biopac EL258 (8 mm) unipolar Ag-AgCl electrodes were placed on the
palmer surface of the right and left wrist and anterior surface of the ankle opposite the
preferred hand in accordance with Einthoven’s triangle using the Lead I and Lead II
system (see Section 2.4.3.2). Each electrode was filled with Sigma Gel electrolyte
(Parker Laboratories Inc) and secured with a length of surgical tape. The ECG signal
was amplified using a Biopac model ECG100B amplifier, with a high pass filter at
50 Hz. To cancel out electrical activity associated with movement and muscle
artefact a Band Pass filter of between 10 - 40 Hz was also used.
Heart rate was calculated from the ECG signal and any further distortions
within the heart rate data were transformed using a point to point smoothing function.
Within the self-reference task, a heart rate waveform was calculated for positive
words rated as self-referent, and negative words rated as non-self referent by the
participant. In the emotion task, a heart rate waveform was calculated for words
correctly identified as positive and negative. Change in heart rate was calculated in
reference to a baseline of the average heart rate in the 0.5 seconds prior to stimulus
onset.
6.2.4.2: Skin conductance response
Biopac TSD203 (6 mm) bipolar Ag-AgCl Skin Conductance Electrodes were
placed on the palmer surface of the medial phalanx of the middle and index fingers of
the non-preferred hand. Prior to placement, each electrode was filled with a standard
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electrolyte cream (Med Associates Inc, Vermont, U.S.A) of approx 0.05 m NaCl to
facilitate conduction of the electrical signal. Responses were amplified using a
Biopac model SCR 100 amplifier and sampled at 200 Hz and expressed in micro-
ohms (μΩ).   
The SCR data was collected in accordance with general guidelines for SCR
provided by Venables and Christie (1973). A response was identified as the maximal
change in conductance activity within a specified time period. Within the present
study, responses were only recorded if the onset of response began 1- 4 seconds after
stimulus presentation, and peaked no later than 4.5 seconds (Venables & Christie,
1973). A peak to peak measure from onset of response until peak of response was
measured. Any response in which the slope of the conductance activity was negative
was removed from analysis. Any response which contained irregular conductance
activity, or an associated respiration was also removed from analysis. Respiration rate
(RR) was recorded for this purpose.
6.4.2.3: Respiration rate
RR was measured using a Biopac TSD201 respiratory effort transducer which
measures changes in thoracic or abdominal circumference associated with breathing.
The hardware consists of a Velcro strap and a transducer which are secured around
the chest approximately one inch above the sternum. The RR signal was amplified
using a biopac RSP100C respiration amplifier.
Large intakes of breath are found to be associated with changes in autonomic
arousal (Venables & Christie, 1973). Therefore RR was calculated in order to control
for SCR responses which are directly related to breathing activity and not related to
stimulus-response. During analysis of SCR, every trial in which a large respiration
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occurred within the 3 sec period after stimulus onset was removed from further
analysis. RR will not be discussed further.
6.3: Results
6.3.1: Data analytic strategy
The behavioural and physiological responses recorded for both HR and SCR
measures were analysed, and will be presented separately. This was done for two
main reasons. Firstly, HR was recorded for all twenty-five participants. In contrast,
SCR was only recorded for seventeen of these participants (due to movement artefact
or lack of physiological responses). To provide behavioural information which
corresponds to the physiological measures analysed, behavioural responses were also
analysed separately for each group.
Secondly, HR was analysed for all word stimuli in the conditions with high
amounts of trials (see Section 4.4.1 & Section 5.3.3.1). However, due to the effects of
habituation (see Section 6.3.3) skin conductance responses were only analysed for the
first 20 words in each condition with high amounts of trials. These differences in the
physiological analyses are also reflected in the corresponding behavioural analyses.
As stated above, only conditions with high amounts of trials were included in the
physiological analyses. From the self task this included the self-positive and non-self-
negative conditions, and from the emotion task this included the positively evaluated
positive valence, and negatively evaluated negative valence conditions
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6.3.2: Heart Rate
6.3.2.1: Behavioural Results
In line with the behavioural analyses conducted in Chapter Five, Section
5.3.2.1, all factors were included in the present analyses. Two three way repeated
measures ANOVAs were conducted employing the factors task (self, emotion),
evaluation (positive evaluation, negative evaluation) and valence (positive valence,
negative valence). Frequency of response and response time data were analysed (see
section 5.3.2.1).
 Frequency of response
As predicted, the repeated measures ANOVA revealed an interaction between
evaluation and valence, F (24) = 105.52, p < 0.001. In the self-reference and emotion
tasks positively valenced words were more frequently evaluated as ‘like me’ and
positive respectively, t(24) = 8.21, p < 0.05. Negatively valenced words were more
frequently evaluated as ‘not like me’ and negative, t(24) = 10.18, p < 0.05 (see Figure
6.1). No further main effects or interactions were identified.
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Figure 6.1: Frequency of participants’ responses (%) in all conditions. Participants more
frequently rate positive words as ‘like me’ and positive and negative words as ‘not like me’ and
negative.
 Response time
No main effects were identified in the repeated measures ANOVA. However
several interactions were revealed. Task x valence, F(24) = 5.22, p < 0.005;
judgement x valence, F(24) = 76.96, p < 0.001 and finally as predicted, a task x
judgement x valence interaction, F(24) = 26.14, p < 0.001 (see Figure 6.2). Post hoc
comparisons show that in the self task, individuals are significantly faster when
responding to positive words as ‘like me’ and negative words as ‘not like me’ than
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when responding to negative words as ‘like me’ and positive words as ‘not like me’,
ts(24) > 5.15, ps < 0.05. In the emotion task, the difference between negatively
evaluated positive and negative words did not reach statistical significance, t(24) =
2.69, p > 0.1.
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Figure 6.2: Response times (ms) of participants’ in all conditions. In the self task, individuals
are significantly faster when responding to positive words as ‘like me’ and negative words as ‘not like
me’.
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6.3.2.2: Heart rate results
On inspection of the data, HR was found develop through four stages. Initally
HR decreased between 0 – 1.5 seconds. The lowest point occurred between 1.5 – 2.5
seconds. HR then began to accelerate between 2.5 – 4 seconds and a second positive
peak occurred between 4 -5 seconds (see Figure 6.3). In order to investigate the four
stages of the HR response, the factor time was divided into four epochs; time 1 = 0 –
1.5 seconds, time 2 = 1.5 – 2.5 seconds, time 3 = 2.5 – 4 seconds and time 4 = 4 – 5
seconds. A 3 way ANOVA including the factors task (self, emotion), valence
(positive, negative) and time (time 1, time 2, time 3, time 4) was performed.
The analysis revealed a main effect of valence, F (1, 24) = 6.09, p < 0.05, a
main effect of time, F (3, 72) = 25.30, p < 0.001, and as predicted, a significant time
x valence interaction, F (1.37, 72) = 3.82, p < 0.05. Bonferroni corrected pairwise
comparisons conducted on the time x valence interaction revealed that HR
significantly differed at time 2, t(24) = 2.82, p < 0.05 (positive -1.84 & negative -
2.41), and time 3, t(24) = 2.80, p < 0.05, (positive -0.53 & negative -1.41) but not at
time 1 or time 4, all ts > 1 (see Figure 6.3). No further main effects of task, or
interactions were identified.
The graph illustrates a possible task x valence interaction occurring at time 4
although this difference did not reach statistical significance. The graph suggests that
the valence difference is larger and more sustained within the emotion task when
compared to the self task. A post hoc power analysis was conducted using the
statistical software G*Power. The result suggested that the statistical power to detect
medium sized effects was found to be low in the present study (1-β = 0.10) due to a
relatively small sample size.
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Figure 6.3: Phasic heart rate response (bpm) of all participants across a 5 second period.
Significant differences between positive and negative words occur in both the self-reference task
and the emotion task at time 2 and time 3
Time4
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6.3.3. Skin Conductance Results
Responses were analysed from 17 participants (11 female, mean age: 20.70
years, SD: 2.75). Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences in age, t(40)
< 1, or BDI-II scores, t(40) < 1, between all participants and the SCR group. A chi-
square analysis identified that there were no significant differences in gender between
all participants and the SCR group, χ (1) < 1.   
SCR was recorded for the 156 words presented in each experimental
condition. However, SCR becomes habituated during experimental tasks (Bradley,
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996). Therefore the analysis was completed on the first 20 words
in each condition. Within the self task, the first 20 positive words rated as self and the
first 20 negative words rated as non-self were analysed. In the emotion task the first
20 positive words correctly identified as positive and the first 20 negative words
correctly identified as negative were analysed. The behavioural analyses were
conducted in the same way to provide a comparative analysis of behavioural
responses.
6.3.3.1 Behavioural Results
 Response time
The repeated measures ANOVA for response time revealed a main effect of
valence within the response times F (1, 16) = 6.95, p < 0.01. Participants were faster
to respond to positive words (1352.4), see Figure 6.4 when compared to negative
words (1491.2), regardless of experimental task. This effect was not predicted in the
experimental hypotheses and was not present in the full behavioural analysis of all
twenty five participants. No further main effects or interactions were identified.
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Figure 6.4: SCR participants’ response times (ms). The graph shows a main effect of valence
regardless of experimental task in participants’ response times.
6.3.3.2: Skin conductance responses
A 2 x 2 (task, valence) ANOVA was completed on the participants SCRs. A
significant main effect of valence was identified, F (1, 16) = 7.39, p < 0.05. The main
effect suggests that participants show significantly greater SCR to positive words
(0.060 μΩ) when compared to negative words (0.047 μΩ), regardless of experimental 
task (see Figure 6.5). Contrary to predictions, no effects of task were identified,
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although interestingly the numerically largest SCR was elicited in the self-referential
task, ‘like me’ condition.
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Figure 6.5: Participants skin conductance responses (mS). The graph shows a statistically
significant main effect of valence regardless of experimental task in the participants’ skin conductance
responses.
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6.4: Discussion
In terms of the experimental hypotheses, support was found for the predictions
concerning behavioural and heart rate responses. The hypothesis regarding task
related differences in skin conductance responses was not supported. These findings
illustrate that emotional valence has a larger impact on autonomic response than task-
related processing.
One potential limitation of the research conducted in the previous
chapters is that the effects identified in the self-reference and emotion tasks may
represent some bias at a semantic level. It could be argued that in Chapters Three,
Four and Five that the participants may have been rating the emotional and self-
referential content of information without experiencing an emotional response in
relation to the word stimuli. This experiment provides convincing evidence to suggest
that individuals do experience some form of physiological emotional reaction when
performing both types of decision-making task.
6.4.1: Replication of the Self-positivity bias in the behavioural measures
As predicted, a task x evaluation x valence interaction was identified in the
response time measure. The results suggest that individuals are significantly faster
when responding to words which elicit a self-positivity bias (self-positive & non-self-
negative) when compared to words outwith this bias (self negative & non-self-
positive). This finding provides support for the behavioural experimental hypothesis
and replicates the self-positivity bias identified in Chapter Four and Five in non-
dysphoric individuals.
One potential confound identified in Chapter Four was that the experimental
conditions in which the response time differences were identified also show large
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differences in number of items per condition (see Figure 6.1). Therefore it is possible
that the self-positivity bias identified in response time was the result of differences in
item number and did not represent a true effect. However, in Chapter Five it was
found that despite similar frequencies of items across the experimental conditions, the
response time differences found in the self-reference task were not reflected in the
emotion task. The replication of this effect in the present study provides further
evidence to suggest that the self-positivity bias identified within response times does
represent a true self-positivity bias and is not the result of differences in item
frequency.
In Chapter Five a strong main effect of task was also identified. This effect
did not occur within the present study. Failure to replicate this effect may be due to
slight differences in the methodologies employed. In Chapter Five, the maximum
stimulus presentation and response time was 2 seconds. In the present experiment,
stimuli were presented for a maximum of 5 seconds. This difference was due to the
longer response time required for skin conductance responses to reach their peak.
Although participants in both experiments were told to respond as fast as possible, it
may be that the longer response period in the present experiment lead to participants
taking longer to respond during both experimental tasks. These longer response times
may have lead to a reduction in the potential to identify a main effect of task within
the response time measure. In order to determine if a main effect of task could be
identified, the stimulus presentation and response times could be limited to 1500 ms
within the present study. This could be done by replacing the stimulus with a fixation
cross after 2 seconds, until the end of the 5 seconds trial period required for measuring
skin conductance responses.
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6.4.2: Physiological measures
6.4.2.1: Heart rate response
As predicted, heart rate was found to differentiate between positive and
negative valence regardless of experimental task. The findings illustrate that heart
rate was lower in response to negative words. This effect was evident in both
experimental tasks and was greatest from 1.5 to 4 seconds. This finding supports the
hypothesis that self-referential processing is heavily influenced by emotional valence,
illustrating that a close relationship exists between self-referential and emotional
processing. This result supports the behavioural findings of the previous chapters. In
particular Chapter Three, in which participants showed very similar behavioural
responses when rating a set of words as both emotional and self-referential and
Chapter Four where a main effect of valence was identified within the self-reference
task from 400 to 550 ms at centro-parietal electrodes.
When the results were plotted on a graph (Figure 6.3) the data also reveal a
possible difference in task within the fourth time window (4 -5 seconds). This
difference was not statistically significant. However it seems to suggest that although
the self-reference task does elicit an emotional response, the emotional response is
larger and sustained for longer within the emotion task. A post hoc power analysis
revealed that the statistical power of the analysis was low thereby increasing the risk
of type two errors.
The non-significant task-related difference is interesting as it would provide
further support for the temporal functional hierarchical model of self-referential
processing presented in Chapter Four. Within the self-reference task, the heart rate
response reveals an effect of valence early within the response waveform. Unlike in
the emotion task, this difference between the word categories seems to disappear in
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later time intervals. This later task-related difference would be predicted by the
functional hierarchical model. In this model, emotional processing is involved in the
early stages of self-referential processing, whereas the later stages are devoted to the
processing of self-referential contextual information. This would cause a reduction in
the effect of emotional valence within the self-reference task at later time intervals as
seen in the heart rate response and the ERP responses presented in Chapter Four.
In order to determine if this task-related difference is reliable, the statistical
power of the analysis would need to be increased. Although thirty eight participants
were initially tested, only twenty five were included in the final analyses. A large
number of participants were excluded due to their high BDI-II score. In line with the
other experiments conducted in the present thesis, the BDI-II questionnaire was
presented at the end of the experimental study in order to avoid any potential mood
biases which may occur as a result of completing the questionnaire. To obtain a
larger sample size and thus increase statistical power in future experiments, it may be
more effective to screen participants using the BDI-II prior to conducting the
experimental study itself. Preventative measures could be employed to avoid any
potential effects of mood caused by completing the BDI-II. A pre-test BDI-II could
be completed a week prior to the experimental session allowing time for the potential
mood effects to dissipate. Secondly, the BDI-II could be completed within a set of
other psychological questionnaires which do not assess levels of mood, this would
avoid the influence of any potential demand characteristics which may occur if the
BDI-II was to be completed prior to the two decision-making tasks.
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6.4.2.2: Skin conductance response
Two predictions were made with regard to changes in skin conductance
response during the experimental task. Firstly, it was predicted that skin conductance
responses would be larger when individuals were engaged in self-referential
processing when compared to general emotional processing. Contrary to this
prediction, no task-related differences were identified in skin conductance response.
The second prediction stated that within the self-reference task, individuals would
show larger responses to stimuli rated as ‘like me’ when compared to stimuli rated as
‘not like me’. The analysis revealed a main effect of emotional valence such that
larger skin conductance responses were identified to positive when compared to
negative words in both decision-making tasks. This effect partially supports the
experimental prediction as larger skin conductance responses were identified for ‘like
me’ when compared to ‘not like me’ words within the self-reference task. However
unexpectedly, this difference was also identified in the emotion task such that,
individuals showed larger skin conductance responses to positive when compared to
negative words.
These results replicate the findings of Gronau et al. (2005) and Nikula et al.
(1993) such that skin conductance responses were greater for personally relevant
information (‘like me’) when compared to non-personally relevant information (‘not
like me’). However, the fact that this difference was also identified in the emotion
task, again highlights the close relationship that exists between self-reference and
emotional valence. As in previous chapters, this finding illustrates the importance of
assessing emotional valence when investigating self-referential processing. Based on
these results and the results of previous research, it is not possible to determine if the
differences identified in skin conductance response are the result of increased arousal
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to the self-referential content of the information or the result of differences in
physiological arousal across the positive and negative stimuli presented.
As stated above, the experimental hypotheses that task-related differences
would be identified between self-referential and emotional decision-making tasks was
not supported. Previous research has investigated physiological arousal from an
evolutionary perspective, suggesting that arousal responses such as the orienting
response and the habituation response are essential for survival, as part of the fight or
flight response systems. Differences in physiological arousal in response to different
experimental stimuli have been identified across a wide variety of species (Boucsein,
1992). In fact, much of what is know regarding the brain structures involved in fear
responses comes from research involving rats (LeDoux, 1990). Because differences in
physiological arousal can be identified relatively far back in the evolutionary chain, it
is possible that changes in physiological arousal, such as changes in skin conductance,
may be based on an automatic response system which occurs during early stages of
processing. It is possible that task-related differences were not identified by skin
conductance response as these differences may occur during later stages of processing
which are under greater cognitive control. Some tentative evidence for this
hypothesis is provided by the apparent task-related difference in heart rate response
which, as stated previously, requires further investigation.
The unexpected main effect of valence identified by the skin conductance
response is somewhat difficult to interpret without further investigation. Two
different explanations are possible. Based on the findings of Nikula et al. (1993) and
Groanu et al. (2005) one hypothesis would be that the effect is the result of increased
arousal to stimuli identified as self-referential. According to this hypothesis, the
difference in skin conductance response between positive and negative words during
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an emotional decision indicates that individuals show greater arousal to self-referent
material regardless of the decision-making context being examined. Although
individuals must decide on the emotional valence of the word during the emotional
valence decision task, the positive words are mostly self-referential, and the negative
words are mostly not self-referential, and the greater skin conductance response to the
positive words may indicate implicit processing of the self-referential dimension of
these words.
An alternative explanation may be that the effect is the result of a confounding
dimension between the level of arousal and the emotional valence of stimuli selected
for use within the present study. The word stimuli employed within the present study
have not been previously assessed for arousal. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis
would be that the positive words selected for use in the present study may be higher in
their level of arousal than the negative words selected. Based on previous research
this alternate hypothesis seems unlikely. In studies where individuals were asked to
rate the emotional valence and arousal of picture and word stimuli using the self-
assessment manikin (SAM) it has been found that individuals tend to rate negative
stimuli as more arousing than positive stimuli. Therefore, the relationship between
emotional valence and self-rated arousal identified in the previous research occurs in
the opposite direction than the results of the present study.
One way to distinguish between these two hypotheses would be to focus more
specifically on one aspect of the self-construct. In the early study conducted by
Markus, (1977) she focused on the trait dimension of independence/dependence. By
focusing on one specific trait it may be possible to identify both a number of positive
and negative traits or behaviours associated with this dimension. Examples of
positive and negative behaviours associated with independence would be ‘is able to
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accept her own mistakes and learn from them’ and ‘doesn’t always listen to the
opinion of other people’. If self-referent information does elicit physiological arousal
then individuals who identify themselves as independent would show increased
arousal to stimuli associated with the independence, regardless of emotional valence.
In contrast, individuals who identify themselves as dependent would show increased
arousal to stimuli associated with dependence. Furthermore, by asking participants to
provide an evaluation of the emotion valence and also level of arousal associated with
the stimuli then both these measures could be taken into consideration using
techniques such as structural equation modelling.
In conclusion, the results of the present study provide evidence to suggest that
self-referential processing is heavily influenced by emotional information.
Autonomic measures such as heart rate and skin conductance response seem to
indicate that emotional processing is a relatively automatic process which may be
involved during the early stages of many more complex decision-making processes
such as self-referential processing. No task-related effects were identified using
autonomic measures. The self-referential effects which were identified in Chapters
Four and Five occur during the later consciously controlled states of processing.
Therefore one possible explanation for the lack of task-related effects in the present
study is that, some aspects of self-referential processing represent complex cognitive
processes which occur during conscious components of the decision-making process.
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– Chapter 7 –
Experiment 5: Does the neural processing of self-referential and other-referential
information differ as a function of mood?
7.1: Introduction
In the previous chapters, evidence for a neural correlate of the self-positivity
bias was strengthened. In line with behavioural findings, a difference in ERP
responses within a self-referential decision-making task was identified between non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals. This difference suggests that the self-schema
employed by dysphoric individuals is less positive and more negative than that of
non-dysphoric individuals and that this bias in processing is reflected in the neural
correlate of the self-positivity bias at midline from 400 to 650 ms. The finding also
suggests that these biases are specific to the self-referential decision-making task and
are not the result of generalised biases in emotional processing.
The evidence presented in the previous chapters suggests that changes in the
self-positivity bias associated with negative mood seem to be specific to self-
referential processing. However differences between self-referent and other-referent
processing also need to be investigated. If alterations in the self-positivity bias
associated with negative mood are specific to self-referential processing, then these
changes should not be evident in other forms of person-referent processing.
7.1.1: The relationship between self and person-referent processing
Early studies (Rogers, Kuiper and Kircher, 1977) compared the self-reference
task to semantic, structural and phonetic tasks. From the finding that individuals
showed superior recall in this self-reference task Rogers et al. concluded that the self
is represented by a unique cognitive schema. This conclusion was criticised due to
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the control tasks employed within the experiment. Several researchers proposed that
enhanced recall within the self-reference task may be due to the cognitive
organisation and elaboration of all person-referent information rather than due to the
functioning of a specialised self-schema (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Symons &
Johnson, 1997; see Chapter One, Section 1.3).
In response to this criticism, Kuiper and Rogers (1979) conducted a series of
experiments employing a similar experimental design to the previous studies. In these
studies an other-referent encoding task was also included (Does this word describe the
experimenter?). In the first experiment, they found significant differences in rating
task and recall between the self-referent and other-referent encoding tasks. These
results provided further evidence for the concept of a specialised self-schema.
However in subsequent experiments, differences in recall between self-referential and
other-referential tasks were not identified.
Other differences between the two tasks were observed. During the self-
referential and other-referential decision-making tasks participants were asked to rate
how confident they were when making their decision and also how easy they found
these decisions to make. Differences in participants’ responses to these rating tasks
across self-reference and other-reference suggested that individuals were more
confident when making self-referential decisions and also found these decisions easier
to make. More interestingly, when response time and recall responses were
considered together, Kuiper and Rogers (1979), found that in the self-reference task,
individuals were more likely to recall words which elicited fast responses whereas in
the other-reference task individuals were more likely to recall words which elicited
longer responses. Although the self-reference effect in memory recall was not
consistently identified within this set of experiments, evidence from the other
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behavioural measures suggested that the cognitive strategies employed to process and
encode self-referential information were different to those involved in other-
referential processing.
7.1.2: The role of familiarity in person-referent processing
In the set of experiments conducted by Kuiper and Rogers (1979), the other-
referent target employed was the experimenter involved in running the study. One
issue which was also investigated in this set of experiments was the level of
familiarity with the other-referent target. Throughout the four experiments conducted,
the experimenter was employed as the other-referent target and the same group of
participants were used. The experimenter running the studies was also the lab
instructor for the undergraduate psychology classes taken by the students, therefore
the level of familiarity between the students and the experimenter increased across the
four experimental sessions. The participants’ responses in the rating tasks, and
encoding tasks in experiment four replicated the pattern of results discussed above.
However, a comparison of memory recall for the self and other-referent tasks across
the four experimental sessions revealed that while levels of self-referent recall
remained the same, recall of other-referent information increased across the four
sessions. These findings illustrated that recall of other-referent information is
influenced by the level of familiarity with the other-referent target. Importantly
differences in recall between other-referent and self-referent information were found
to disappear as levels of familiarity increased.
Kuiper and Rogers (1979) conducted one final study to ensure that the
differences observed in experiment four were the result of changes in the level of
familiarity with the other-referent target and not the result of increased familiarity
with the experimental paradigm itself. To do this Kuiper and Rogers tested a separate
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group of students, with no knowledge of the experimental paradigm but with similar
levels of familiarity with the experimenter running the study. The results from this
experiment replicated the results from the previous study and provided further support
for the need to assess the level of familiarity associated with the other-referent target.
Although the study by Kuiper and Rogers (1979) highlighted the importance
of assessing the level of familiarity of the other-referent target, the other-referent
target employed within their experiments was still relatively unknown to the
participants taking part. In fact, during experiment four, participants’ responses on
familiarity ratings indicated that they knew the other-referent only a little less than a
“casual acquaintance”. It is possible that when using a relatively unfamiliar other as
an other-referent target participants may use different cognitive strategies to process
this information when compared to self-referent processing. However it is possible
that as familiarity with the other-referent increases, the amount of information known
about the other-referent also increases.
Researchers suggest that individuals frequently use knowledge about the self
to organise and interpret incoming information, however the same may be true of
knowledge about close friends and family. Individuals may also use their knowledge
of the personal experiences and information about their friends and family in order to
understand the environment around them. Therefore the differences between the self-
referent and other-referent processing may decrease further as the knowledge about
the other-referent increases.
The role of familiarity within self versus other-referent processing was further
examined in a meta-analysis conducted by Symons and Johnson (1997) including over
250 studies. They found that the self-reference effect was reduced when and other-
referent target was used as a comparison task. However the effect was still present,
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for other-referent targets of both high and low familiarity. From this it can be
concluded that self-reference remains a uniquely efficient information processing
construct.
7.1.3: Neural evidence for differences in self and other-referential processing
At a neural level, several studies have found differences in neural processing
between self and other referent tasks. Both Craik et al. (1999) and Kelley et al. (2002)
found significant differences between self-referent and other-referent tasks at medial
frontal prefrontal locations. Fossati et al. (2003) also found task related differences
that this location. Furthermore, Fossati et al. found that regions of the lateral
prefrontal cortex were active during both types of processing.
These findings suggest that neural activations specific to self-referential
processing can be identified within the brain. However the three studies discussed
above all use the same other-referent comparison figure, the current prime minister of
the country in which the study was conducted. Based on the findings of behavioural
studies (see Section 7.1.2), the level of familiarity associated with the other-referent
target is an important aspect of person-referent processing. Although it is likely that
the prime minister would be known to all individuals taking part in the studies, the
level of familiarity with this other-referent target is relatively low. It is unlikely that
participants would use their knowledge of the personal experiences of the prime
minister to learn more about the world around them, in the same way that they may do
with self-referent information or indeed information about a close friend or family
member. Therefore, to examine if self-referential processing differs from person-
referential processing at a neural level it would be valuable to employ an other-
referent figure such as a family member or a close friend. If task-related differences
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were identified between self and other-referent processing it would then be possible to
say with more certainty that these differences are not the result of some other factor
such as differences in familiarity.
7.1.4: Self and other-referential processing as a function of negative mood.
Research discussed in the previous chapter has identified that self-referential
processing is altered as a function of negative mood, however some research has also
considered if negative mood influences other-referential processing. The studies
discussed previously by Bradley and Mathews (1983) and Kuiper and Derry (1982)
identified biases towards negative information specifically within the self-reference
task. When considering the other-referential conditions Bradley and Mathews found
that both non-depressed and depressed individuals exhibited the same bias towards
recalling positive information. Kuiper and Derry found no differences in the recall of
non-depressed adjectives between the self and other-referent conditions. Both these
studies suggest that the negative biases associated with negative mood are specific to
self-referential processing.
A study conducted by Bargh and Tota (1988) aimed to investigate the
automatic nature of the negative self-schema in depression. They argued that if the
association between self-reference and negative emotional valence was strong during
depression, then the processing of this type of information would be automatic. If the
activation of negative information during self-referential processing was automatic,
then it would involve minimal attentional resources. The allocation of attentional
resources was measured by the extent to which a concurrent cognitive load task
(keeping in mind six digits) increased response time latencies during decision-making,
when compared to the response time latencies during decision-making with no
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cognitive load task. If negative self-representations are automatically activated during
depression, then the slowing of depressed participants’ response latencies to negative
information should be minimal when compared to the slowing of response latencies to
positive information during self-referential decision-making when comparing the
cognitive load and no cognitive load conditions.
Bargh & Tota (1988) asked non-dysphoric and dysphoric students to complete
self-referent and other-referent decision-making tasks during cognitive load, or no
cognitive load conditions. The responses of depressed individuals were compared
during self-referential processing, across cognitive load and no cognitive load
conditions. As predicted, the results revealed that the cognitive load condition
resulted in less slowing of response latencies to negative than positive information.
The reverse was found to occur for non-depressed individuals. They showed less
slowing of response latencies to positive than negative information. These findings
found support for the automatic activation of self-negative representations during
depression and self-positive representations as part of healthy cognition.
Bargh and Tota (1988) also examined the influence of a cognitive load task
during other-referent decision-making. This was done in order to determine if
depressed individuals were impaired in self-referential processing, or if these
impairments were also evident in more general social-perceptual constructs.
Differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were not identified
during other-referential processing. Both groups showed less slowing of response
latencies to positive than negative words during other-referential decision-making.
The results illustrate that emotional biases during self-referential processing seem to
be due to the automatic activation of a positive self-schema during healthy cognition
and negative self-schema during depression. Importantly this study also found that
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between group differences do not occur in other tasks which involve person-
evaluation such as other-referent decision-making. This study used an average-other
as a comparison individual. Therefore the same limitation of the other-referent can be
applied here as in the neuroimaging studies discussed above, namely that the other-
referent is less similar than the self-referent target. It would be valuable to employ a
more familiar other in a comparison task in order to further examine the role of
person-evaluation in negative mood.
7.1.5: The present study
The overall aim of the present study was to examine how self-referential and
other-referential processing differ as a function of mood. Previous research suggests
that the advantages of self-referential processing are minimised when the control task
employs a similar social comparison figure. The effects of self-reference may not be
due to the functioning of a specialised self-schema but the result of a highly practiced
and commonly employed form of person-referential processing. It is possible that the
effects identified at both the behavioural and neural levels in Chapters Four and Five
may also be present in other forms of person-referent processing. In order to examine
this possibility further, both non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals took part in self-
referential and other-referential decision-making tasks. During these two tasks
behavioural and neural responses were recorded. One limitation of the previous
neuroimaging and clinical studies is that they commonly use a non-familiar other as
the other-referent target. In order to provide a strict test of person-referent processing
‘a close friend’ has been selected for use as the other-referent target within the present
study.
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Based on previous research into the self-reference effect (Symons & Johnson,
1997) and the results of previous chapters, it is hypothesised that differences between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals will be identified within the self-reference
task. In the behavioural measures it is predicted that a self-positivity bias will occur
for both non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals, however that this bias will be
significantly reduced for dysphoric individuals. If changes in the self-positivity bias
associated with negative mood are specific to self-referential processing then these
differences should not be evident in other-referent processing even when a familiar
other is employed as the other-referent target. Based on the findings of Bargh and
Tota (1988), it is predicted that no such differences will be identified in other-referent
processing and positivity bias will be identified for both non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals.
The findings of Chapters Four identified a neural correlate of the self-
positivity bias in ERP responses at fronto-central midline electrodes from 400 to 600
ms. The results of Chapter Five suggested that this correlate is altered as a function of
mood within self-referential decision-making. In the present experiment it is
predicted that a task x group, or task x group x electrode interaction will occur at
fronto-central electrodes from 450 to 600 ms, such that differences between non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals will be identified at these temporal and spatial
locations within the self-reference task but not within the other-reference task.
If differences are identified between dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals
within the self-reference task and not the other-reference task then this will allow us
to say with more certainty that the reduction in the self-positivity bias during negative
mood, is specific to self-referential processing.
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7.2: Methods
7.2.1: Participants
Forty participants took part in the study. Non-dysphoric and dysphoric
participants were classified in the same way as in Section 5.2.1. See Table 7.1 for
participant information.
Table 7.1: Comparison of participant variables across non-dysphoric and dysphoric
groups.
Non-dysphoric Dysphoric
Number 20 20
Gender 11 female 15 female
Handedness 19 right-handed 20 right-handed
Mean Age 21.81 20.25
Mean BDI-II Score 5 20.6
BDI-II Range 0-9 12-39
7.2.2: Stimuli and Apparatus
Stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in Chapter Four (see
Section 4.2.2 for a review).
7.2.3: Procedure
The experimental procedure employed was similar to the procedure employed
in Chapters Four and Five (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3 for a review). The
emotion decision-making task was replaced with an other-referent decision-making
task. This decision-making task was altered by changing the instructions provided to
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participants. Prior to beginning the other-referential decision-making task participants
were provided with the following instructions:
“In this section of the study you will be presented with a series of words and asked the
question ‘Is this word personally relevant to my best friend?’ Prior to beginning this
task please think of one individual, somebody close to you, such as a family member
or a close friend. Please rate all the words in relation to this individual.”
All other aspects of the procedure were identical to those outlined in Section 4.2.3.
7.2.4: Electrophysiological Recordings
The set up of the electrophysiological recording was the same set up employed
in Chapter Four (see Section 4.2.4 for a review).
7.3: Results
7.3.1: Participants Variables
As in Section 3.3.3.1 and Section 5.3.1, statistical analyses were conducted to
identify any possible confounds between the two groups in terms of participant
variables. Chi-square analysis revealed no significant differences between non-
dysphoric and dysphoric groups for gender, χ2(1, N = 40) = 1.28, p > 0.2. A one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant differences in age between non-dysphoric and
dysphoric groups, t(28) = 1.23, p > 0.2
7.3.2: Behavioural Results
7.3.2.1: Data Analysis
The behavioural analysis was identical to the analysis conducted in Chapter
Five (see Section 5.3.2.1).
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7.3.2.2: Frequency of response
The mixed ANOVA revealed no main effects however, several interactions
were identified, an evaluation x valence interaction, F (1, 38) = 428.28, p < 0.0001,
and a task x evaluation interaction, F (1, 38) = 7.19, p < 0.01. Finally, as predicted a
four way group x task x evaluation x valence interaction was identified, F (1, 38) =
4.40, p < 0.05 (see Figure 7.1).
The four-way interaction was further evaluated using Bonferroni corrected t-
tests. Comparisons between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were conducted
within self-referential and other-referential processing in order to investigate if these
two types of processing were altered as a function of mood. Because the predictions
are based on the findings of the previous experimental chapters and the expected
direction of the effects are known, one-tailed comparisons were employed. The post
hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between the responses of non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals within the self task (all ts > 1.8, all ps < 0.05).
Non-dysphoric individuals rated most positive words as self-related (82.5 %) and
most negative words as non-self-related (83.0 %). In contrast, dysphoric individuals
rated fewer words in this way; self-positive (71.7 %) and non-self-negative (70.6 %).
Conversely, where non-dysphoric individuals rate few negative words as self-related
(17.0 %) and few positive words as non-self related (17.4 %), dysphoric individuals
show increased responses within these conditions; self negative (29.7 %) and non-
self-positive (28.2 %). This result replicates the findings of Chapter Four and
illustrates that although dysphoric individuals do show a self-positivity bias, this bias
is reduced when compared to non-dysphoric individuals.
The post hoc comparisons conducted in the other-referent task revealed no
significant differences between the non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals in the
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other-referent task (all ts < 1). The four way interaction identified supports the
prediction that changes in the self-positivity as a function of mood are specific to self-
referential processing and do not occur in other forms of person-reference such as
other-referent processing.
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Figure 7.1: The frequency of responses (%) of non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups in all
conditions. Individuals rate positive words as ‘like’ and negative words as ‘not like in both the self-
referent and other-referent conditions.’
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7.3.2.3: Response time
No main effects, and only one interaction reached statistical significance in the
response time analysis. Similar to the effects in the frequency of response analysis, an
evaluation x valence interaction, F = 97.45, p < 0.001 was identified (see Figure 7.2).
Individuals were found to respond faster to positive words rated as ‘like me’ or ‘like
them’ (1049.4 ms) and negative words rated as ‘not like me’ or ‘not like them’
(1050.2 ms) when compared to negative words rated as ‘like me’ or ‘like them’
(1399.8 ms) and positive words rated as ‘not like me’ or ‘not like them’ (1360.4 ms),
all ts > 7.59, ps < 0.001. No effects involving task or group were identified.
7.3.2.4: Behavioural results summary
Differences were identified between self-referential and other-referential tasks
in the frequency of response analysis, but not the response time analysis. The
frequency of response results illustrate that differences between self-referential and
other-referential processing can be identified, but only during the experience of
negative mood. These findings provide evidence to suggest that self-referential
processing represents a specialised form of processing which is specifically altered as
a function of mood. This result was not replicated in the response time measure,
providing evidence to suggest that differences between self-referent and other-referent
processing are not evident across all behavioural measures.
A positivity bias was identified in response times, in both the self-referent and
other-referent decision-making tasks. This finding suggests that the positivity bias
identified in response times is not specific to self-referential processing but also
occurs in other forms of person-referent processing.
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Figure 7.2: Response times (ms) of non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups in all conditions.
Individuals were fastest to respond to positive words rated as ‘like’ and negative words rated as ‘not
like’.
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7.3.3: ERP results
7.3.3.1: Data Analysis
Three way ANOVAs were conducted on the ERP data, including the between
subjects factor group (non-dysphoric, dysphoric) and the repeated measures factors
task (self, other) and electrode. For further information on how this analysis was
conducted (see Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.1).
7.3.3.2: Early effects
A task x electrode interaction was identified at midline electrodes from 180 to 220
ms. This task x electrode interaction was largest at the Pz electrode during early time
intervals, F = 5.32, p < 0.05 (see Figure 7.3). This effect illustrates an early
difference between self-referent and other-referent processing at the neural level. No
significant task x group, or task x group x electrode interactions were identified
during the early time intervals.
7.3.3.3: Late effects
Similar to the task effects identified during the early time interval, a task x
electrode interaction was identified at midline electrodes from 300 to 400 ms, All Fs >
3.05 and all ps < 0.05. This effect suggests that differences between self-referent and
other-referent processing are evident at the neural level (see Figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.3: ERP waveforms at Pz electrode and topographical scalp distribution (spline-
interpolated voltage map) depicting the main effect of task occurring during early and late
processing. The waveforms for words representing self-referent and other-referent decision-
making are superimposed.
In order to find support for the hypothesis that the neural activations
associated with self-referential processing are specifically altered as a function of
mood, task x group or task x group x electrode interactions should be identified within
the ERP analysis. No such task x group interactions were identified. However, a
group x electrode interaction was found to occur. This interaction was evident at
fronto-central electrodes from 350 to 500 ms, all Fs > 3.97, all ps < 0.05 (see Figure
7.4). The interaction, which is maximal over the left hemisphere (FC3 & FC5),
suggests that ERP waves of dysphoric individuals are more negative going than the
ERP waves of non-dysphoric individuals, regardless of experimental task. As no
group x electrode interactions were observed in any other spatial locations no further
post hoc analyses were performed. In terms of the predicted spatial and temporal
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locations, the interaction identified occurred slightly earlier than 400 - 600 ms, and
was also identified at fronto-central electrodes over left hemisphere rather than fronto-
central midline electrodes as predicted.
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Figure 7.4: ERP waveforms at FC electrode and topographical scalp distribution (spline-
interpolated voltage map) depicting the main effect of group occurring during late processing.
The waveforms for words representing non-dysphoric and dysphoric groups are superimposed.
7.3.3.4: ERP summary
Main effects of task were identified at frontal and midline electrodes during
both the early and late stages of processing. These findings suggest that self-
referential and other-referential processing are represented by different levels neural
activity.
Although task x group differences were identified at the behavioural level, no
such differences were identified in the ERP analysis. However, a group x electrode
interaction was identified at fronto-central electrodes from 350 to 500 ms. This
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finding suggests that mood influences both self-referent and other-referent processing
at the neural level. Contrary to predictions, mood causes impairments in all forms of
person-referent processing, not just self-reference.
7.4: Discussion
The overall aim of the present study was to examine how self-referential and
other-referential processing differ as a function of mood. By employing both
behavioural and ERP techniques the goal was to provide a broad representation of the
cognitive processes underlying the two tasks. By testing both non-dysphoric and
dysphoric individuals, the goal was to investigate how these cognitive processes differ
as a function of mood. Initial discussion will focus on the main hypothesis that
changes in the self-positivity bias as a function of mood are specific to self-referential
processing. Further discussion will focus on effects identified within the ERP
analysis which do not support this hypothesis. Finally task-related differences
between self-referential and other-referential processing will be examined.
7.4.1: Changes in the self-positivity bias as a function of mood.
The hypothesis investigated in the present study stated that changes in the self-
positivity bias during negative mood were specific to self-referential processing and,
that these differences would not occur in other forms of person-referent processing.
Evidence from the behavioural measure frequency of response provides some support
for this hypothesis. Within the frequency of response measure significant differences
were identified between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals within the self-
reference task. Although both groups of individuals did show a self-positivity in the
frequency of response measure, this bias was reduced in dysphoric individuals. When
compared to non-dysphoric individuals, dysphoric individuals responded less
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frequently to positive words as self-referential and negative words as non-self-
referential, and more frequently to negative words as self-referential and positive
words as non-self-referential. This finding replicates results identified in previous
chapters (Chapters Three & Five) and provides further evidence to suggest that self-
referential processing is altered as a function of mood (see Chapter Five for a review).
Importantly, differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals
were not identified within the other-referential decision-making task. Both dysphoric
and non-dysphoric individuals responded more frequently to positive information as
other-referential and negative information as non-other-referential when compared to
the frequency with which they evaluated negative information as other-referential and
positive information as non-other-referential. This finding replicates previous
research by Bargh and Tota (1988) in that negative mood was associated with specific
alterations in self-referential processing while other-referential processing remained
unchanged. In the study conducted by Bargh and Tota the other-referent target
employed was an average other. Therefore the results of the present study extend
these findings by illustrating that other-referent processing is not influenced by
negative mood, even when a familiar other such as a close friend is employed as the
other-referent target. However, it could still be argued that even a familiar other-
referent is less familiar than the self-referent target.
7.4.2: The positivity bias in self and other-referent processing
Although differences were identified in the frequency of response measure, no
interactions involving task x group differences were identified in the response time
measure. This finding replicated the results of previous research as no between group
differences in self-referential processing were identified in the response time measure
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in Chapter Five. As stated previously, changes in self-referential processing during
negative mood have been less consistent in response time than in frequency of
response or recall measures (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4.1.1).
In previous chapters, (Chapters Four, Five & Six) the faster responses to self-
positive and non-self-negative stimuli when compared to non-self-positive and self
negative stimuli in response times has been taken as evidence for the existence of a
self-positivity bias in response times. The finding that this bias was not identified
within the emotional decision-making task contributed to this conclusion. However in
the present study, this positivity bias was also identified in both non-dysphoric and
dysphoric individuals during other-referential decision-making. Two possible
explanations for the observation of the positivity bias in both self-referent and other-
referent processing will be put forward.
One possibility is that individuals hold a positively biased schema which is
involved in the processing of information about close friends and family members.
This would suggest that the schema held about familiar others is similar in emotional
valence to the positive self-schema associated with healthy cognitive processing.
Previous research has shown that self-serving biases such as the above-average effect
are reduced when a familiar other is used as the other-referent target. These findings
support the results of the present study in that the evaluations of other-referent targets
are positive when a familiar other-referent is used as a comparison figure (Sedikides
& Strube, 1997; Alicke, et al., 1995). In previous chapters, the faster response times
and changes in the ERP correlate known as the N400, have been explained in terms of
the semantic mismatch hypothesis. It was suggested that the context of the self-
reference decision-making task activates the positive self-referent schema held by
healthy individuals. Therefore incoming information which does not fit this positive
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self-schema elicits longer response times and more negative going N400 responses
when compared to information which does fit the positive self-schema. The results of
the present study suggest that this explanation of the difference in response times
could also be used to explain differences in the response times associated with other-
referent processing. However, an alternative explanation is that the differences in
response times in both self-referent and other-referent processing are the result of a
more general match to context effect.
Within both self-referent and other-referent processing, incoming information
is evaluated on two dimensions which have been found to be highly correlated during
normal cognitive processing; person-reference and emotional valence. It is possible
that the differences in response time identified within the present study are the result
of more general differences in cognitive processing, such that faster response times
are elicited to information which is correlated on both dimensions (i.e self/other
positive & non-self/non-other negative) when compared to information which is not
correlated on both dimensions (i.e self/other negative & non-self/non-other positive).
This explanation would also account for the differences between response times
across the self-referential and emotional decision-making tasks. The emotional
decision-making task only focuses on one dimension (positive-negative valence)
therefore the lack of a positivity bias identified within the emotion task may be due to
the fact that this task did not involve a comparison between two highly correlated
dimensions. This alternative explanation highlights that it is important to consider the
differences identified within the present study in the context of more general cognitive
processing, rather than focusing on specific forms of person-referent processing.
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7.4.3: Group differences identified in ERPs
Group differences in self-referential but not other-referential decision-making
were identified at the behavioural level. However no interactions involving task x
group differences were identified in ERP responses. Surprisingly, a main effect of
group was identified for both self-referent and other-referent decision-making tasks
from 350 to 500 ms at fronto-central locations over the left hemisphere. The results
of the present study partially replicated the findings of Chapter Five. The ERP
responses of non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were found to differ during
self-referential decision-making. However these group differences were more
lateralised over the left hemisphere. Furthermore, similar between group differences
were also identified within the other-referential decision-making task. One
explanation for the lack of task-related effects within the ERP analyses is that the
statistical power of the study was too low. However this is unlikely as task-related
effects were identified in the study conducted in Chapter Five which employed the
same number of participants and the same statistical analyses. Overall, these findings
provide evidence too suggest that negative mood is associated with changes in both
self-referential and other-referential processing at the neural level.
In previous chapters, the neural correlate identified in self-referential decision-
making has been discussed in terms of the N400 and the semantic mismatch
hypothesis. In Chapter Four, ERP responses in the self-reference task were more
negative-going to words which did not fit the positive self-schema employed by non-
dysphoric individuals. In Chapter Five, ERP responses within the self-reference task
were more negative-going for dysphoric than non-dysphoric individuals. This
difference between the two groups can be explained in terms semantic expectancy.
Due to the positive self-schema held by non-dysphoric individuals, a semantic
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expectancy is set up in the self-reference task. Positive words are likely to be
identified as self-referent and negative words are likely to be identified as non-self-
referent. Because the self-schema employed by dysphoric individuals is more
negative than that of non-dysphoric individuals, there is a reduced correlation between
self-reference and emotional valence (see Chapter Three). As this correlation is
reduced, the expectancy that positive information will be self-referent and negative
information will be non-self-referent is reduced in dysphoric individuals. Based on
this rationale, task x group differences would also be expected at the neural level
within the present study. Because group differences were identified in ERPs
responses in both the self-referent and other-referent decision-making tasks it is
difficult to explain the findings of the present study in relation to the more negative
self-schema held by dysphoric individuals. This lack of task differences within the
present study suggest that the group differences identified are not in line with the
explanation involving the N400, or the semantic mismatch hypothesis employed to
explain differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals in Chapter Five.
Previous research has indicated that the N400 occurs around 400 ms at fronto-
central and central electrodes. Curran, Tucker, Kutas and Posner (1993) investigated
the topography of this effect in a semantic expectancy paradigm during which
participants were presented with sentences ending in semantically congruous or
incongruous words. They found that the N400 is relatively symmetrical across the
two hemispheres. The between group differences in ERP responses within the present
study are lateralised; they are only evident in the left hemisphere. Therefore one
possible explanation is that the ERP differences identified presently may not reflect
the same neural correlate of the self-positivity bias identified in previous chapters.
Furthermore, as the ERP effects identified in Chapters Four and Five were found to
Experiment Five
172
occur on the midline electrodes, the ERP responses across hemisphere were not
included as separate regions of spatial analysis within the present study. In light of
the lateralised group x electrode effect identified presently it may be useful in future
research to examine the lateralisation of effects in more detail.
In their study of healthy individuals; Craik et al. (1999) compared neural
processing during self-referent, other-referent, general and syllable encoding tasks
(see section 1.3.1). They found that increases in activations in the left prefrontal
cortex occurred in self-reference, other-reference and general encoding tasks when
compared to a syllable encoding task. They hypothesised that these left-sided
activations were involved in the meaningful processing of individual words. This
finding is in line with previous research conducted in relation to the hemispheric
encoding/ retrieval model (HERA) put forward by Tulving, Kapur, Craik,
Moscovitch, and Houle (1994).
In relation to the present study, the left sided activations identified by Craik et
al. (1999) suggest that the left hemispheric differences in ERP responses between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals may be the result of general impairments in
the processing of meaningful word stimuli. Other research has identified that the
processing of meaning in the left prefrontal cortex is associated with a good episodic
memory for processed events (Kapur et al., 1994; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, &
Raichle, 1988). Although memory performance was not recorded within the present
study, previous research has repeatedly indicated that negative mood is associated
with poor memory for both episodic and autobiographical retrieval (Williams et al.,
1997; Williams et al., 2007). These findings provide some support for the possibility
that the differences in left lateralised activations are the result of general differences in
the processing of meaningful stimuli during negative mood. This explanation is
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tentative, however it would be interesting to investigate this potential relationship
between left hemispheric activation, the processing of meaningful stimuli, memory
and mood further. Again these findings highlight the need to consider the results of
the present findings outwith the context of self-referent or person-referent processing.
7.4.4: Task-related differences in self and other-referential processing
The results of the present study illustrate that during normal mood, the
processing of self-referent and other-referent information represent similar decision-
making processes. It is only during the experience of negative mood that the
differences between the two types of decision-making task are evident at the
behavioural level. However, further evidence for differences between self-referent
and other-referent processing was provided by the analysis of ERP responses.
Differences within the brain between the self-referent and other-referent tasks were
identified at frontal and midline locations at both the early and late stages of
processing. These differences occurred for both non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals. Although task-related differences were not evident at the behavioural
level in non-dysphoric individuals, this finding illustrates that decisions involving
self-reference elicit significantly different levels of neural activity than when
compared to other forms of person-referent processing supporting the findings of
previous neuroimaging studies done by Craik et al. (1999), Fossati et al. (2003) and
Kelley et al. (2002). These studies found that different regions were active during self
and other-referent processing using a non-familiar other as an other-referent target.
The results of the present study extend the previous research by illustrating that
differences in the neural activations associated with self-referent and other-referent
processing remain even when familiarity is controlled for.
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In conclusion, the present research provides partial support for the proposition
that negative mood is associated with specific impairments in self-referential
processing. At the behavioural level, high levels of negative mood result in an
alterations within self-referential but not other-referential decision-making. This
difference between self-referential and other-referential processing as a function of
mood was not identified in the brain as in previous research. It was proposed that the
group differences identified in both person-referent processing tasks may be the result
of impairments in the way that dysphoric individuals process all forms of meaningful
word stimuli. The results of the present study extend the findings of previous research
as differences between the self-referent and other-referent tasks were identified at
both behavioural and neural levels, even when a familiar other target is employed.
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- Chapter 8 –
Discussion
8.1: Introduction
The two main aims of the present research were to clarify the relationship between
self-reference and emotional valence in more detail, and to investigate changes in self-
referential processing as a function of mood. The present research employed a novel
methodology to conduct a comprehensive investigation of both self-referential and emotional
processing across behavioural, neurophysiological and autonomic responses. Using this
methodology we have learned about the extent to which both cognitive and affective systems
are involved in each type of processing. Furthermore, we have identified that changes in self-
referential processing as a function of mood are not only evident at the behavioural level, but
also at the neural level. These findings lead the way to developing a comprehensive
framework of self-referential processing which considers the role of emotional information, is
informed by each level of the physiological response system and is relevant to both healthy
and disordered cognition.
The next section will present a brief overview of the experimental findings in relation
to the two main aims of the research. Based on these findings, a possible theoretical model of
self-referential processing will be proposed. This model will then be compared to two other
general theories of cognition and emotional disorder. Finally some limitations of the research
will be discussed and future directions will be proposed.
8.2: Overview of experimental findings
8.2.1: Investigating the relationship between self-reference and emotional valence
The results of the present research replicated previous findings that a close
relationship exists between self-reference and emotional valence (Alicke et al., 1995; Alison
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et al., 1989; Mezulis et al., 2004). For non-dysphoric individuals, a self-positivity bias was
identified in all experimental chapters when individuals were asked to make evaluations
about self-reference. This positivity bias was identified at the behavioural level using Likert
scale, frequency of response and response time measures. The results of the experiment
reported in Chapter Four extended this research by using ERPs to identify a
neurophysiological correlate of this self-positivity bias.
Chapter Four provided supporting evidence for a two stage model of self-reference.
That is, ERP data revealed a main effect of emotional valence beginning prior to, and at
different spatial locations from, an interaction between self-reference and emotional valence.
This finding indicates that a general evaluation of emotional valence begins prior to any
evaluations involving self-reference. Using a very different methodology to asses the
physiological affective system, the experiment conducted in Chapter Six revealed that
individuals’ autonomic responses (heart rate & skin conductance) were very similar during
both self-referential and emotional decision-making. This result illustrates that the
processing of self-referential information elicits a similar form of emotional response as the
processing of emotional information. These results provide further evidence to suggest that
the processing of emotional information represents a large component of self-reference.
These results illustrate that the recognition of self-referent material relies on the recognition
of emotional valence and these two highly integrated processes work together in order to
assess the importance of incoming information.
8.2.2: Investigating changes in self-referential processing as a function of mood
As stated above, the self-positivity bias was consistently identified during self-
referential processing. However, changes in self-referential processing as a function of mood
were just as consistent. No relationship between self-reference and emotional valence was
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identified for dysphoric individuals in Chapter Three. In Chapters Five and Seven dysphoric
individuals more frequently rated negative information as self-referent, and positive
information as non-self-referent when compared to non-dysphoric individuals. The
experiments conducted in Chapters Five and Seven represent the first investigations into
changes in self-referential processing as a function of mood at the neural level. Clear
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were identified during self-
referential processing in the ERP data.
In order to investigate whether mood was associated with more general changes in
emotional processing, the responses of non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals during self-
referential decision-making were then compared to their responses when engaged in an
emotional decision-making task. In the experiment reported in Chapter Five, the behavioural
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals identified during self-reference
were not evident during the emotion task. Between group differences were identified at the
neural level. However these differences were found to occur at different spatial and temporal
locations from the differences identified during self-reference. When self-referent and other-
referent decision-making were compared to investigate changes in person-referent
processing, similar between group differences in self-reference but not other-reference were
identified at the behavioural level. However, no such task-related differences were identified
in the ERP data. Differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were
identified at the same spatial and temporal locations during both types of decision-making.
One possible explanation for the difference in neural activations between self-
reference and other-reference when compared to the emotion task may be the amount of
complex processing involved. The emotion task represents a simple form of processing,
whereas both self-referent and other-referent decision-making represent more complex forms
of processing. It is possible that differences in decision-making as a function of mood occur
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during the early stages of simple cognitive processing and during the later stages of complex
cognitive processing. Despite the behavioural evidence that negative mood results in changes
in unique features of self-reference, the findings from the ERP data provide evidence to
suggest that negative mood is associated with changes in both simple and complex forms of
cognitive processing.
8.3: A theoretical model of self-referential processing
The present set of studies is the only body of research to date that has employed both
psychophysiological and behavioural methods to investigate self-referential processing. The
use of this methodology presented two unique opportunities. The first opportunity was to
examine self-referential processing on a temporal scale. Using ERPs and autonomic
responses it was possible to access various stages of self-referential processing across a
variety of psychophysiological systems. Second, the present research represents the only
investigation into changes in self-referential processing as a function of mood within the
brain. Importantly, the results of the present research identified components of self-
referential processing in both cognitive and affective systems which could not have been
identified using behavioural methods alone. These findings should now be incorporated into
the existing literature, in order to create a more comprehensive understanding of self-
referential processing that encompasses the psychophysiological system.
At a broad level, the results of the present research provide further evidence to
support several established findings. Early behavioural and neuroimaging research identified
that the self is a highly elaborated and organised representation, which is served by a widely
distributed network of brain regions (Craik et al., 1999; Symons & Johnson, 1997). In the
present research, differences were identified between the self-referent task and both other-
referent and emotion tasks across a number of spatial and temporal locations within the brain.
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This finding provides support for the existence of such a self-representation, served by a
distributed network of brain regions. The results of the present research also replicated
previous research which identified that a self-positivity bias is present during low levels of
negative mood and altered during high levels of negative mood (Bradley & Mathews, 1983;
Dozois & Dobson., 2001; Mezulis et al., 2004). It is important to replicate these previous
research findings using different stimuli and methodologies in order to ensure the reliability
and validity of these effects. However, some of these findings have been established for
almost a decade, and very little has been done to bring together these findings in order to
develop a theoretical framework of self-referential processing. Such a framework should
attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation of the psychological processes which
underlie self-reference.
More recently using fMRI, Moran et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between
self-reference and emotional valence within the brain. Activations specific to self-reference,
independent of emotional valence were identified within the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC). Furthermore, activations specific to the processing of self-referent (like me)
positive words were identified within the adjacent region, the ventral anterior cingulate cortex
(vACC). Based on the spatial proximity of these regions, Moran et al. proposed the first
functional hierarchy of self-referential processing. Within this hierarchy, it was suggested
that incoming information is initially assessed for self-reference within the mPFC before
information identified as highly self-referent (like me) was then tagged for emotional valence
within the vACC. Although this was an important step towards the development of a
theoretical framework for self-referential processing, the findings were very limited. Moran
et al. focused specifically on self-referential processing, with little discussion of the wider
context of general emotional processing. Furthermore although the sequence of processing
was described on a temporal scale, no measures of temporal processing were analysed. The
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results of the present thesis make a substantial contribution within this area. Based on the two
stage model of self-referential processing identified on a temporal scale, and the changes
identified in self-reference as a function of mood, a tentative model of self-referential
processing will be proposed. This model is the first theoretical framework of self-referential
processing, informed by both psychophysiological and behavioural responses. In order to
place this model within the wider context of emotional processing, the model will then be
compared to two current multilevel theories of cognitive and emotional processing.
8.3.1: Self-reference
The studies reported in the present thesis employed relatively simple self-referent,
other-referent and emotional decision-making tasks to investigate self-referential processing.
As stated above, the results suggest that self-reference represents a complex form of
processing. Figure 8.1 illustrates a tentative model of self-reference identified on a temporal
scale within the present research. Firstly, the model will be discussed in terms of how it
relates to the empirical effects observed within the present thesis. Secondly, the model will
be discussed in relation to how it relates to a broader range of real life phenomenon such as
goal attainment and social and environmental cues.
8.3.1.1: The model of self-reference: empirical effects
Figure 8.1 represents a basic default model of self-referential processing in healthy
individuals. The psychophysiological measures employed within the present research
examine different components of the physiological response system. ERPs access cognitive
processes at a neural level, whereas autonomic measures are responsive to emotional
information (See Section 2.4). Within the present model these components were divided into
two systems and labelled as the Cognitive and Affective Systems respectively. The value of
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recording psychophysiological responses is that they access information processing at both
preconscious and conscious stages. These temporal changes in physiological response are
represented on the vertical axis of the model, beginning with Incoming information and
continuing in a linear fashion with a number processes occurring in parallel across the two
Systems until the Response output.
As stated above, the neural responses identified in relation to self-referential
processing are reflected in the Cognitive System. In Chapter Four, during the later stages of
processing, two components of a self-referential evaluation were identified. A general
evaluation of emotional valence was found to occur prior to, and at different spatial locations
from an evaluation of both self-reference and emotional valence. These two stages are
reflected in the Cognitive System within the model of self-reference. In Chapter Six
autonomic measures such as heart rate and skin conductance also differentiated between
positive and negative information. This finding is reflected in the Affective System, this
system directly influences the evaluation of the emotional valence of information in
combination with the Cognitive System. This model of self-referential processing adequately
deals with the psychophysiological responses identified in the previous experimental
chapters. Behavioural responses are based on information from both the Cognitive and
Affective systems, within the present set of experiments a self-positivity bias was identified
consistently in both the frequency of response and response time measures. This bias is
reflected in the elaboration of self-reference and emotional valence stage, during which,
information about the emotional valence of information from the Cognitive and Affective
Systems is integrated with self-referential information.
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8.3.1.2: The model of self-reference: within a broader context
The studies reported in the present thesis employed relatively simple self-referent,
other-referent and emotional decision-making tasks to investigate self-referential processing.
As stated above, the results suggest that self-reference represents a complex form of
processing. Figure 8.1 illustrates a tentative model of self-reference identified on a temporal
scale within the present research. It is proposed that this model represents a basic default
system of self-reference in healthy individuals. In this system, information is evaluated for
emotional valence prior to being integrated with self-referent information at later temporal
stages.
Incoming Information
Cognitive System
(semantic meaning)
Affective System
(body state feedback)
Elaboration of self-reference and emotional valence
Response
Extent to which contextual information engages the self-representation in memory
Double headed arrows highlight reciprocal connections between processing stages
Dashed arrows highlight aspects of the model which require further investigation
Figure 8.1: The default system of self-referential processing in healthy individuals
Evaluation of the emotional
valence of incoming information
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In the present set of experiments participants were asked to make decisions about the
extent to which a word stimulus was personally relevant to them. This task was done in a
darkened room with minimal feedback from the environment. In this situation individuals
would receive minimal feedback from their cognitive and affective systems. In situations
with minimal contextual information it would be advantageous for self-referential processing
to be based on a default system which relies on basic processing of emotional information.
This would allow individuals in unfamiliar situations to identify appetitive, and avoid
aversive outcomes in relation to their own goals. This situational context sets up a close
relationship between the processing of emotional information and the self-representation.
Therefore, the outcome of this basic default system explains the self-positivity bias identified
at both the behavioural and neural level (Chapter Four, Moran et al., 2006). This system
would also be useful in other forms of person referent processing, although further research is
required. Previous research has shown that the positivity bias is strongest for familiar others
(Alicke et al., 1995). The default system of complex processing of emotional information
may also be applied to familiar in-group members. In situations with minimal context, a
close relationship between other-reference and emotional information would enhance the
representation of a familiar other. This may facilitate team work to achieve desirable
outcomes for a group.
The diagram in Figure 8.1 illustrates that, as the self-representation is engaged to a
greater extent by richer contextual information, the decisions about self-reference may
become less dependent on the emotional valence of incoming information, within the
cognitive system. Under these circumstances, it is possible to speculate that as richer
contextual information facilitates access to the self-representation, self-referential processing
would become less dependent on automatic processes, and make greater use of episodic
memory and previously employed problem-solving techniques. This would lead to self-
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referential processing becoming less reliant on the emotional valence of incoming
information. Engaging these processes could be termed engaging the cognitive components
of the self-representation. It would be predicted that in situations with higher levels of
contextual information, while the general evaluation of emotional valence would remain, the
relationship between self-reference and emotional valence would be reduced as specific
autobiographical memory is engaged. Although tentative, this component of the model is
testable at both the behavioural and neural levels. Possible future directions will be discussed
in following sections (see Section 8.6).
8.3.2: Self-reference and depression
The results of the present thesis identified changes in self-referential processing as a
function of mood. These behavioural and neural changes are reflected in the self-positivity
bias, indicating that negative mood is associated with changes in self-referential processing
during the final stage, when self-referent decisions begin to incorporate emotional
information. The self-positivity bias at this stage was found to be reduced but not reversed
during the experience of negative mood. This finding suggests that the self-positivity bias
may serve as a protective mechanism against incoming negative information or short term
negative events. It is possible that negative moods become more enduring or depressive
episodes occur, when this reserve of self-positive information is depleted.
Based on the changes in self-reference which occur during the experience of negative
mood and depression (Chapter Five, Chapter Seven, Dozois & Dobson, 2001), a model of
self-referential processing should also consider how this system is altered during the
experience of depression. Figure 8.2 presents a speculative model of how a depressive
episode is maintained within this model. In Chapter Five and Seven, differences between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were identified in the self-reference task during the
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later stages of processing. These differences were found to occur in similar spatial and
temporal locations to the self-positivity bias identified in the ERP responses of non-dysphoric
individuals in Chapter Four. It is proposed that the main changes in self-referential
processing as a function of mood are associated with alterations in the engagement of the
self-representation within the cognitive system. Although the terminology differs, these
alterations in self-reference are similar to those proposed by two more general theories of
cognition and emotional disorder, the integration vs. elaboration model (Williams et al.,
1988, 1997) and Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS, Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). The
relevant components of each model will be discussed respectively.
Williams et al. (1997) suggest that information processing can be separated into two
main stages. A relatively simple and automatic integration stage, where information is
integrated into schematic representations, and a later more strategically controlled elaboration
stage, in which the new relationships formed between new and old information within the
self-representation activate other aspects of the self-representation in memory. Williams et
al. proposed that anxiety is associated with impairments during the attention or integration
stage whereas depression is associated with impairments during the strategic elaborative
stage. In relation to the current model, both the integration and elaboration stages would
occur within the cognitive system. However within this model, it is proposed that it is the
reciprocal relationship between these two processes which are disrupted within the cognitive
system during the experience of depression. This disruption causes depressed individuals to
get caught within this stage of the cognitive system leading to the cognitive symptoms of
depression specified in Figure 8.2.
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Low mood system biases the processing of
incoming information
Cognitive System
(semantic meaning)
Affective System
(body state feedback)
Alterations in the elaboration of self-reference and emotional valence
Response
Extent to which contextual information engages the self-representation in memory
Double headed arrows highlight reciprocal connections between processing stages
Dashed arrows highlight aspects of the model which require further investigation
Figure 8.2: The model of self-referential processing during a depressive episode
The disruption in the model is similar to the “depressive interlock” proposed by
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) in which individuals who are experiencing negative mood
Evaluation of the emotional
valence of incoming information
Cognitive symptoms:
Increased self-focused attention
Increased indecision
Awareness of discrepancy between ideal
and ought selves
Somatic symptoms:
Increased awareness of body state
Insomnia
Weight loss
Interlock
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process new information in a negative context due their negative cognitions, this circular
pattern of thinking leads to the maintenance of the negative mood. This interlock occurs
within the two subsystems which work at the highest level of abstraction in the interacting
cognitive subsystems model (ICS), see Figure 8.3. This model will be discussed in more
detail within section 8.4. The depressive interlock occurs between the propositional
subsystem which processes the semantic meaning of information, and the implicational
subsystem which co-ordinates information from the basic sensory subsystems and
propositional subsystem to create a “holistic sense of knowing”. In this model, the holistic
representation of self at the implicational level leads to the generation of negative truth
statements (i.e I am a hopeless individual) at the propositional level. These propositions are
then used to generate feedback to the self-representation at the implicational level. In this
model, a depressive episode occurs as the reciprocal connections between the two systems
become interlocked. This depressive interlock provides a parsimonious account of the
changes which occur during self-referential processing as a function of mood.
When processing incoming information during the early stages of a depressive
episode, individuals can still make accurate evaluations about the emotional valence of
information. However as negative mood biases their cognitive system, negative self-
representations are activated. At this stage, the discrepancy between the negative self-
representation and the emotional valence of incoming information becomes apparent. In an
attempt to resolve this discrepancy, two processes may occur. One possibility is that the
depressed individual searches within their cognitive self-representation. This extended
search may lead to some of the cognitive symptoms of depression, such as increased self-
focused attention in the form of rumination, increased indecision and a slowing of responses.
If the discrepancy cannot be resolved then it would lead to the maintenance and consolidation
of the negative self-representation within memory. If this discrepancy cannot be resolved
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within the cognitive system, then the depressed individual may search for other sources of
information within the affective system in an attempt to facilitate the process. This search of
the affective system may lead to more of the somatic symptoms of depression, for example,
increased awareness of physiological stress. If this discrepancy can be resolved using these
two search processes then flexibility within self-reference would be maintained. This may
lead to a reduction in the activation of the negative self-representation and consequently the
experience of negative mood. However, if the discrepancy cannot be resolved, then the
negative self-representation would be maintained. After the completion of the decision-
making process, feedback loops within the system would lead to further biases in both the
cognitive and affective systems.
The commonalities between this model of self-representation and two current
multilevel theories of cognition and emotional disorder will be discussed within the following
section (see Section 8.4). Overall this model illustrates that a depressive episode is
maintained when individuals identify a discrepancy between the emotional valence of
incoming information and their self-representation. Furthermore this model is maintained
through an interlock within the cognitive subsystem and the reciprocal relations between this
system and other components of the psychophysiological system as a whole.
8.3.3: Other models of self-referential processing
Moran et al. (2006) identified that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was active
during the processing of self-referential information regardless of emotional valence. In
contrast to this result, evaluations involving self-reference were not found to be independent
of emotional valence within the present research. This difference in findings may be due in
part, to the differences in spatial and temporal resolution of the neuroimaging measures
utilised. It is important to consider the results of both studies as complementary. It is possible
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that the alternative measures employed highlight different components of the same functional
hierarchy of self-referential processing, or that the differences in experimental design
activated different components of the cognitive system. However as no general evaluation of
self-reference was identified on a temporal scale, it is not possible to determine at what stage
this general evaluation of self-reference would occur. It is important to note that the results
of the present research do not rule out the possibility that a general evaluation of self-
reference occurs at some point during self-referential processing.
It is important to reiterate that this model, although currently specific to self-
referential processing, may also represent other forms of complex emotional processing.
Further research is required to identify if this is the case. From the results of the present
research, an obvious choice of comparative complex emotional processing would be other-
reference. If a similar pattern of findings was identified on a temporal scale during healthy
cognition then this would provide evidence to suggest that all forms of complex processing of
emotional information are based on similar mechanisms.
8.4: Commonalities and Differences to other theoretical models
As discussed previously, only one other study has attempted to develop a theoretical
framework for self-referential processing. However, the model of self-reference presented
above shares a number of similarities with other more general theories of cognition and
emotional disorder. The following section will present a brief discussion of the similarities
and the differences between this model and two multilevel theories of cogntion. The
interacting cognitive subsystems model discussed previously (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993)
and the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
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8.4.1: Overview of ICS
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) is a macro theory of cognition proposed by
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) in order to account for a broad range of laboratory and real life
phenomenon associated with human cognition. On first inspection ICS appears to be a
relatively complex account of cognition. It consists of nine subsystems which work together,
through a series of reciprocal relations, to process incoming sensory and proprioceptive
information, integrate this information with previous knowledge, abstract higher levels of
meaning and provide the contextually appropriate output for real world situations. This
single, but complex model provides a more parsimonious account of a range of cognitive
phenomenon when compared to a combination of limited cognitive theories which only
attempt to explain selected components of cognitive experience (Barnard, 2004).
ICS is represented in Figure 8.3. The nine subsystems illustrated are each involved in
processing qualitatively distinct forms of information (i.e., sound, meaning, movement).
Each subsystem is based on the same design in which two main processes occur. After
relevant information is collected in the information array, a copy of this information is stored
within the subsystems in its original form as an image record. Another process transforms
the information collected in the information array to allow further processing by other
subsystems within the model.
The nine subsystems can be further subdivided based on the type of information they
encode. Three of the subsystems deal with sensory information taken directly from the
external world; the acoustic (sounds), visual (dimensions of light) and body state (touch,
smell) subsystems. Two subsystems encode intermediate structural descriptions. These
subsystems identify recurring patterns of information detected in the sensory subsystems and
abstract these patterns and the relationships between these patterns; the morpholexical
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subsystem deals with relationships in sounds space and the object subsystem with
relationships in visual space.
The two subsystems, discussed previously (see Section 8.3.2), which work at the
highest level of abstraction are the propositional and implicational subsystems. These two
subsystems deal with the more complex concept of meaning. Both subsystems work on the
principle of abstraction; they process the relationship between information presented in the
information array in a more generic format than the previous level. The propositional
subsystem deals with semantic meaning, such as true or false statements i.e., monkeys have
tails. This system provides us with semantic knowledge. The implicational subsystem co-
ordinates low-level and high-level information from the sensory and propositional
subsystems. Teasdale and Barnard (1993) propose that it is an interlock between these two
systems which leads to the onset and maintenance of a depressive episode.
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Figure 8.3: The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems Model (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993)
Taken from http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/~philb/
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Using this abstracted information, the subsystem creates contextual schemata which
provide us with a broad knowledge base without specific linguistic referents. This base
forms what is known as our “holistic sense of knowing”. Importantly, Teasdale and Barnard
(1993) propose that it is the relations between these two subsystems that form the main crux
of cognitive experience and that emotional experience only results from activity within the
implicational subsystem. The final two subsystems are involved in system output. The
articulatory and limb subsystems prepare information for suitable vocal or movement action.
In relation to previous research, this model can competently deal with both cognitive and
affective forms of processing. It can explain phenomena such as mood congruent and
incongruent memory, memory for autobiographical events and evaluations and attributions of
success and failure (for a review see Teasdale and Barnard, 1993).
8.4.2: ICS and the self-referential model
The model of self-referential processing represents a micro-theory of cognition in that
is seeks to explain only one specific type of cognitive process, self-reference. However some
of the principles on which this model is built parallel those which underlie more complex
macro-theories of cognition such as ICS. Firstly, both models recognise that a model of
cognition should first set out to understand normal cognitive function and the underlying
psychological processes involved before seeking to explain the alterations in these models
which are associated with disordered cognition (Barnard, 2004). In the present set of
experiments a two stage model of self-referential processing was identified on a temporal
scale in healthy individuals prior to any investigations into alterations in this model during
the experience of negative mood.
Second, both models incorporate information from the psychophysiological system as
a whole and the reciprocal relations between the subsystems. ICS is composed of a set of
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nine subsystems which work together in parallel at a number of levels. This framework
generates a powerful system which acknowledges the richness of the contextual information
obtained from the environment, and also the elaboration of this information in relation to
previous knowledge. Both these processes lead to the experience of our conscious awareness
and sense of self (Barnard, 2003). The model of self-reference also acknowledges the
information obtained from the psychophysiological system as a whole and the reciprocal
relations within this system, as evidenced by the division of the cognitive and affective
systems. Further evidence is required to examine self-referential processing in relation to
other forms of sensory feedback, such as visual information from facial responses or auditory
information from tone of voice.
At a more theoretical level, Barnard (2004) states that the self-model in the
implicational subsystem at the highest level of abstraction generates propositions with
specific meanings, and that those propositional meanings are fed back into the implicational
model to regenerate the self-model (see Figure 8.3). Although the results of the present
research cannot untangle these two subsystems, this explanation provides a parsimonious
explanation of the processes which may occur within the cognitive system within self-
reference (see Figure 8.1). The results of the present research identified a neural correlate of
the self-positivity bias in the same spatial and temporal locations as the N400. In previous
research, the N400 has been identified as a correlate of semantic processing. Therefore, in
terms of the ICS model this finding may provide evidence that our self-representation at the
implicational level (i.e., our general bias to view ourselves as positive) does generate truth
statements in the propositional subsystem at the semantic level. Furthermore, the interlock
within the cognitive system parallels the depressive interlock in ICS and importantly the
notion that this interlock may be heightened by reciprocal links with other body state
subsystems.
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One limitation of macro-theories of cognition and their power to explain a variety of
real life phenomenon is the difficulty in developing hypotheses which can be tested
experimentally in order to evaluate these models (Williams et al., 1997). The parallels
between some aspects of the micro-theory of self-reference and the macro ICS model
illustrate that both types of theoretical model are valuable at different levels of explanation.
It is useful to develop a micro theory of self-reference which can be tested experimentally. In
turn the results of the present research suggest that these models can then be incorporated in
to a larger macro-theory of cognition. Theoretical explanations at both micro and macro
levels may ultimately result in more powerful macro-theories of cognition. This will lead to a
better understanding of much broader concepts, such as our implicit sense of self which are
difficult to understand using micro-theories alone.
8.4.3: Schematic, Propositional, Analogical, and Associative Representation System (the
SPAARs Approach)
A more recent macro-theory of cognition and emotion was proposed by Power and
Dalgleish (1997). This model has strong parallels in terms of its structure with the structure
of the ICS model proposed by Teasdale and Barnard (1993). Both models attempt to explain
a broad range of both healthy and disordered cognition. Both models are based on a set of
subsystems which process mental representations at different levels of abstraction. The
levels of abstraction in the SPAARs approach are the schematic level, the propositional level
and the analogue level. Although the processes differ, the output from these three levels are
largely similar to the implicational level, the propositional level and the sensory levels
respectively in ICS. One further level of abstraction proposed in the SPAARs approach is the
associative level. Unlike in ICS, this level represents a direct association between contextual
information and previous information, such that an automatic emotional response can be
Chapter Eight
196
generated without the need for further cognitive elaboration at the level of schematic
representations.
At first glance, this direct route to emotional processing in the SPAARs approach
seems like a major difference between the two models. However, a direct link between the
body state subsystem and the implicational system is present in the ICS account of cognition.
This direct link serves the same function as the associative level in the SPAARs approach. In
both models this direct link to emotional processing is based on the automatic physiological
responses as indexed by the affective system in the current model (see Figure 8.1). These
similarities between the two macro-theories and the current model of self-reference illustrate
that this model fits comfortably in the context of more general theories of emotional
processing.
Although both models address the functionality of the experience of emotion within
the cognitive system, a unique feature of the SPAARs model is that it identifies a set of five
basic emotions which occur through a process of interpretation and appraisal at the schematic
level. Power and Dalgleish (1997) propose a sequential process of emotional experience (see
Figure 8.4):
Psychological
Reactivity
Event Interpretation Appraisal
Action Potential Behaviour
Figure 8.4: Emotional appraisal in SPAARs
Modified from Power and Dalgleish (1997, p150)
The appraisal stage of this process is an important feature of emotional processing within the
model. It assesses incoming information in relation to the current roles or goals of the
individual. The value of the incoming information in relation to these roles or goals is then
reflected in the emotion experienced. For example, an individual may experience sadness in
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response to finding out that his hiking partner is ill the weekend that they had planned to go
away hiking.
Power and Dalgleish (1997), state that individuals may have complementary or
conflicting roles or goals in three domains, self, others and world. The appraisal of emotional
experience in relation to the current roles or goals of the individual is not a feature of the
model of self-referential processing at this stage of development. However, this difference
between the two models is an interesting point of discussion. The goals of the individuals
who took part in the present research were not assessed within the experiments conducted.
Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether individuals were working towards goals, if
they were trying to maintain a positive self-view, if they were showing the experimenter they
could keep on task, or even if they were simply trying not to fall asleep. It is possible that the
robust self-positivity bias occurs in this experimental situation across a variety of goals, all of
which may have contributed to keeping participants on task. As with ICS, as a macro-
cognitive theory, it is difficult to create testable hypotheses with regards the SPAARs model
which can be tested experimentally.
Within the current model of self-referential processing it is the reciprocal relations
between the self-representation and the incoming information which serve to alter or maintain
the currently held self-representation which is important to healthy cognition, rather than the
roles and goals themselves. Despite this position, the SPAARs model highlights limitation of
the current model of self-referential processing to assess the value of specific features of the
self-representation. Within the current model, it is proposed that the roles and goals of an
individual are a very important part of the cognitive self-representation. These features are
commonly employed in a socio-cognitive setting and are reflexive to the needs of the
individual and the constraints of the situational circumstances. An important point for future
research may be to identify how alterations in specific features of the self-representation (i.e.,
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failure to obtain a promotion at work) may spread to other components of the self-
representation during the experience of negative mood.
8.6: Some limitations
Although the psychological construct of self has been investigated for almost a
century, the present thesis represents the first systematic investigation into self-referential
processing using psychophysiological methods. As with all exploratory investigations, some
aspects of the methodology employed were successful and some were not. Using this
methodology we learned more about self-referential processing on a temporal scale, and also
about how self-reference is altered as a function of mood at the neural level. However
limitations of the research were also identified. In the following section some of these
limitations will be discussed in order to constrain the theoretical framework proposed and
inform future directions.
8.6.1: Differences in trial number within frequency of response
The results of the present study consistently identified differences in trial numbers
within the frequency of response measure. In line with previous research, the self-positivity
bias was evident such that individuals responded to self-positive and non-self-negative
information frequently (approx > 80% of trials) when compared to self negative and non-self-
positive information (approx < 20% of trials). This difference in trial number was
problematic at several stages of the research. During the testing phase of the study conducted
in Chapter Three, it was difficult to find participants who responded frequently enough on the
non-self-positive and self negative trials in order to control for the inter subject variability
which is high in ERP responses to conditions with low trials numbers. During the analysis
and interpretation stages, it was difficult to determine if the differences identified in response
times and the ERP data, were due to this difference between the high and low trial conditions,
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or the result of an actual self-positivity bias. In order to avoid this limitation in the following
experimental chapters only the conditions with high trial numbers (self-positive & non-self-
negative) were included in the analyses of psychophysiological responses.
The one of the aims of the ERP experiment conducted in Chapter Five was to identify
if changes in self-reference as a function of mood could be identified at the neural level. The
analysis of the ERP data revealed that differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals could be identified within the brain. However, the generalisability of these
findings is limited to the processing of self-positive and non-self-negative information.
Based on this finding, and the temporal and spatial locations at which this difference was
identified, it was proposed that this difference may be be due to an alteration in the N400
during negative mood, within a self-referential context. However this difference was also
identified in the neural responses to an other-referent decision-making task in Chapter Seven,
despite no between group differences at the behavioural level.
The difference identified at the neural level in the other-referent task puts into
question the interpretation of the between group difference identified within self-referential
processing in Chapter Five. Based on the findings of the present research, it is not possible to
clarify if these differences are specific to changes in the positivity bias identified in both self-
referent and other-referent decision-making or, if this difference is the result of more general
changes tasks which involve complex decision-making. One way of investigating this issue
would be to conduct a full analysis of the ERP data including all the factors analysed at the
behavioural level. However, due to the difficulty in finding participants who respond in both
the high and low trial conditions, and also the increase in statistical power required for such
an analysis, a much larger participant group of both non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals
would need to be tested. An alternative method would be to develop a decision-making task
of similar complexity (using two highly correlated dimensions) with no emotional
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component. If between group differences were identified in this task, then the evidence
would suggest that negative mood is associated with changes in all forms of complex
decision-making.
8.6.2: Validity of the experimental decision-making tasks and word stimuli employed
The results of the present thesis illustrate that it is useful to examine psychological
processes across a variety of psychophysiological systems. Self-reference and emotion tasks
and self-reference and other-referent tasks were compared in using this method. However it
is also important to discuss the value of comparing self-reference to other forms of emotional
decision-making.
One issue relates to the level of complexity of the emotion task when compared to the
self-reference task. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the emotion task involves individuals
making decisions on one dimension (emotional valence), whereas two dimensions are
involved in the self-reference task (self-reference & emotional valence). It is possible that
some of the task-related differences identified between the two tasks may be related to the
level of complexity of the decision-making task, rather than due to the involvement of a self-
schema. Within the present research an other-referent task was compared to the self-
reference task in Chapter Seven, this task controlled for the complexity of emotional
decision-making. However the comparison between these tasks raises a question about the
value of comparing self-reference to a more basic emotion task.
It was outlined in the general introduction in Chapter One that it would be useful to
compare self-reference to an emotion task in order to identify the processes which are similar
in each task and the processes which differ. In non-dysphoric individuals, differences
between the self-reference and emotion tasks were identified in the reaction time measure and
in the ERP data. It is possible that these differences are due to differences in the level of
complexity of the two decision-making tasks. However, in the frequency of response
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measure and both autonomic measures (heart rate & skin conductance) no differences were
identified between the two tasks. These findings illustrate that it is beneficial to identify
similarities between self-reference and emotion tasks despite the differences in complexity,
the similarity in the responses suggests that the self-reference task does involve some form of
emotional decision-making.
In Chapter Three, the self-reference task was not compared to any other form of
emotional processing. This focus on the self-reference task was to allow a comparison
between the results of the experimental study to previous neuroimaging research. The model
of self-reference discussed above suggests that a general evaluation of emotional valence
occurs prior to the interaction between self-reference and emotional valence. If this general
evaluation of emotional valence was also evident in more basic forms of emotional
processing such as the emotion task, it would be possible to say with greater certainty that the
initial evaluation of emotional valence is based on a more basic form of emotional
processing. This line of research also highlights the benefit of comparing self-reference to a
more basic form of emotional processing on a temporal scale, and argues that comparisons
between self-referent and simple emotional decision-making should be employed in the
future.
8.6.2.1: The role of environmental context and word content
The research conducted in experimental chapters three to seven all employed the same
word stimuli. The use of word stimuli within the present set of experiments raised some
issues about how word meaning can be interpreted, both in relation to the context in which
words are presented and also in relation to the content of the words themselves. In the main,
words were presented in either a self-referential or emotional context. Within these two
contexts, participants were asked to rate words on either a 5-point Likert scale, or a two
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choice decision making task. Both these evaluation methods are relatively simple and
address self-reference and emotionality as uni-dimensional constructs. Although it is useful
to begin experimental research with simple tasks in order to establish a strong foundation for
future research, it is possible that these methodologies may fail to capture the richness of such
complex evaluations. For example, as discussed in chapter six (see sections 6.1.1 & 6.4.2.2),
an emotional evaluation involves both emotional valence (whether the stimuli is positive or
negative) and arousal (motivational significance for the individual). This arousal component
of emotional evaluations was not taken into consideration in other studies presented within
the thesis. It is important for future research to consider both emotionality and self-reference
as multi-faceted constructs which are rich, both in quality and quantity of information
processing.
When considering self-reference and emotionality as multi-faceted constructs, these
constructs can be influenced by a number of factors. Within the emotion task it is important
to note that the emotionality of a word can be influenced by the context in which it is
presented. For example, if the word “hospital“ is presented to someone with a broken arm
they may view the word as positive. Conversely, if the word is presented to someone who
has recently experienced a death in the family, “hospital” may be viewed in a more negative
light. As the number of word stimuli employed within the present thesis was relatively large
(78 words per condition) and the participant sample was relatively homogeneous (student
population, aged between 18 & 25 approximatley), it could be argued that the variability in
responses caused by such differences in contextual interpretation would minimised. In the
future, experimental research should consider the role of contextual interpretation in more
detail. Employing a task in which the success or failure of a participant is experimentally
manipulated (i.e solvable versus unsolvable anagrams) would be one way to examine the
extent to which emotional judgements are influenced by contextual interpretation. Equally,
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socially relevant contextual information may also bias the interpretation of word meaning
within the self-reference task. If a particular social identity is made salient, for example if the
word “black” is presented to a non-coloured individual who has been primed with a racial
identity task, it is possible that an evaluation of “not like me” would be of greater similarity
to a “like them” judgement than when compared to an evaluation of self-reference without a
racial identity prime.
Finally, one question which was raised by the research conducted presently is why are
some words identified as self-referential and some words identified as non-self-referential?
The results of the present research suggest that the emotionality of word stimuli strongly
influences this type of evaluation. The issues discussed above suggest that the social and
environmental context in which stimuli are presented also play a role. However, features of
the word stimuli itself are also important. Previous research has shown that the familiarity of
a word, and word type influence self-reference (Symons & Johnson, 1997), such features
were controlled for in the present research (See section 2.5). However, one feature of the
word stimuli which was not controlled for was the ease with which words can relate to the
construct of self. For example the words “fun” and “tank were words which were employed
as self-positive and non-self-negative respectively. It is clear from this example that it is
relatively easy to identify the word “fun” as self-related, whereas it is much more difficult to
relate the word “tank” to the self. Future research into self-reference should also include a
measure which can asses how easily participants can relate stimuli to their self-construct.
Importantly ease of relatedness to self should be controlled for across positive and negative
stimuli.
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8.6.3: Use of a dysphoric student sample
The second aim of the present study was to investigate changes in self-referential
processing as a function of mood. As the experimental studies were only conducted with
non-dysphoric and dysphoric student samples it is not possible to generalise the findings of
this research to the experience of a depressive episode. It is possible that the mechanisms
which underlie transitory mood states and clinical disorders such as depression differ
(Wenzlaff, Rude, Talyor & Stultz, 2001). In order to control for this as much as possible,
several practices were put in place to obtain a relatively stable dysphoric population. During
the experimental design phase of the research, the DSM-IV criteria for a depressive episode
were discussed. The minimal criteria for a depressive episode are feelings of negative mood,
or loss of pleasure or interest in normally enjoyable activities for a minimum period of two
weeks. Participants were contacted with this criteria in mind, these two criteria were stated
clearly on both poster and e-mail advertisements which were placed through out the
university campus. Furthermore, on first contact with participants (usually via e-mail) these
selection criteria were restated. Secondly scores on the Beck Depression Inventory-II were
recorded during the experimental session as an index of negative mood. This questionnaire
asks participants to evaluate their mood over a two week period and questions were
formulated to concur with the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for a depressive episode. Despite
these control procedures, these experiments should be replicated with a clinically depressed
sample before any further conclusions can be drawn.
It is interesting to note that differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric
individuals were identified during complex processing, indicating that these changes are not
dependent on the experience of clinical depression. Investigating psychological processes
across populations which increase in the severity of the negative mood being experienced
would help clarify if depression is a spectrum disorder or a specific form of psychopathology.
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Therefore it is important to consider findings from experiments conducted with all three
populations when discussing clinical depression. It would be expected that if the present set
of experiments were conducted with a clinically depressed population then these individuals
would show even greater changes in self-referential processing, with a possible reversal of
the self-positivity bias. It is also expected that these individuals would also show changes in
other forms of emotional processing not just self-reference.
As stated above, the BDI-II was employed as a measure of negative mood within the
present study. The BDI-II shows good divergent validity with some measures of other
psychopathologies, such as anxiety (Beck et al., 1996; Osman et al., 1997). However, other
indices of anxiety have shown a moderate correlation with the BDI-II; for example, the Beck
Anxiety Inventory (r = 0.60) (Beck et al., 1996). As no measure of anxiety was recorded
within the present research, it is not possible to determine if the differences between non-
dysphoric and dysphoric individuals are the result of changes in ruminative or anxiety based
thinking, or indeed, a combination of changes in both types of thinking. Williams et al.,
(1997) proposed that anxiety is associated with impairments during the early stages of
processing, whereas depression is associated with impairments during the later stages of
processing. Therefore, this restriction is particularly relevant to the finding that differences in
the ERP waveforms of non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals were identified during both
early and late time intervals. Further research investigating differences in non-dysphoric and
dysphoric individuals should employ measures of both negative mood and anxiety. This type
of research is important for two reasons. Firstly, it would help clarify whether it is negative
mood or high levels of anxiety which are driving the behavioural and ERP effects identified
within the present research. Secondly, it would also help clarify if the differences identified
within ERP waveforms at both early and late time intervals have common origins, or if they
are influenced by different aspects of a dysphoric mood.
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8.7: Future Directions
The results of the research and the theoretical framework presented lead to the
formulation of future research questions. This section will present a number of future
research directions which could extend this line of research further.
8.7.1: An evaluation of the model of self-referential processing
One important direction for future research is to evaluate the model of self-referential
processing proposed within the present thesis. The research conducted within the present
thesis represents the first set of experiments to use ERPs to investigate self-referential
processing. In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the findings identified presently,
these findings should be replicated. This would provide further evidence to support the two
stage model of self-referential processing identified, and the changes in this model associated
with negative mood.
In Figure 8.1 two dashed lines represent features of the model which were not
examined within the present thesis. One of these features is the engagement of the self-
representation in a contextually rich environment. In the model of self-referential processing
it was proposed that as higher levels of attention are devoted to decision-making, or greater
feedback is provided by the environment, self-referential processing should become less
dependent on the emotional valence of incoming information. This could be tested by
comparing two groups of participants on a self-referential decision-making task and asking
one group to explicitly attend to their self-representation. An experiment could be conducted
in which one group of participants are asked to make self-referential decisions to personality
adjectives and also supplement this decision with three behavioural examples from their
memory. In this experiment, the model would predict that a reduction in the self-positivity
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bias would be evident for the engagement group when compared to group who were not
asked to explicitly engage with their self-representation.
A second component of the self-reference model which has not been investigated is
the feedback loop from the elaboration of self-reference and emotional valence to the
physiological responses within the affective system. As discussed in Chapter Six (see
Section 6.4.2.2), although no differences between physiological responses were identified
across the self-reference and emotion tasks, individuals did show increased skin conductance
responses to words rated as ‘like me’ and positive in the self-reference and emotional valence
tasks respectively. Based on previous research, this finding provides some tentative evidence
that information from the self-representation is fed back into the affective system. However,
it would be interesting to investigate this result in more detail. As discussed in Chapter Six
one way of investigating this would be to focus on one specific dimension of the self-
representation such as independence. By asking individuals who identify with trait of
independence it would be possible to identify if these individuals show increased
physiological arousal to word stimuli which have been incorporated into their self-
representation. If independent individuals showed greater arousal to independence related
adjectives, whereas dependent individuals showed greater arousal to dependence related
adjectives then this would provide some evidence to suggest that information from the self-
representation is fed back into basic emotional responses within the affective system.
8.7.2: An evaluation of the model of self-referential processing in depression
As stated in Section 8.6, the tentative model of self-referential processing during
depression is based on the differences identified during self-referential processing between
non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals. Therefore, before any further conclusions can be
drawn, the experiments conducted within the present thesis should also be examined in
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individuals who are currently classified as experiencing a depressive episode. This research
would not only tell us more about the representation of self during depression, it would also
provide us with a continuum of ordered to disorder cognition.
It would also be useful to further investigate the neural mechanisms which underlie
the self-positivity bias using self-focus or mood induction procedures. Using these
techniques it would be possible to identify the parameters of the neural correlate of the self-
positivity bias. Would a positive mood induction lead to an enhancement of this bias and a
negative mood induction result in an impairment? In this way it would be possible to
investigate the effects of transitory mood states on the self-positivity bias. If these findings
were then compared to research conducted with clinically depressed individuals it may be
possible to separate the effects of transitory mood states and stable mood states on both the
behavioural and psychophysiological correlates of the self-positivity bias.
8.8: General Conclusions
This final chapter presented an overall view of the results obtained in the previous
experimental chapters. Based on these results, a model of self-referential processing was
proposed, which considered the responses made during self-referential processing across
several levels of the psychophysiological system. This model was developed to account for
the experience of self-referential processing during normal mood and also during the
experience of negative mood. This model was then compared to a number of more general
theories of cognition and emotional experience. This comparison illustrated that the model is
in line with the current explanations of cognitive processing within a broad
psychophysiological system. Furthermore it highlighted the reciprocal relationship between
micro and macro theories of cognition. The current model of self-referential processing can
be employed to develop testable experimental hypotheses in relation to self-representation
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which can then be used to further inform macro theories of cognition. In contrast, macro
theories of cognition can provide a powerful explanation of the core of our conscious
experience and an overall understanding of our sense of self.
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Test of Word Reading Efficiency: Subtest 1
(See overleaf)
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1. Is 27. Work 53. Crowd 79. Uniform
2. Up 28. Jump 54. Better 80. Necessary
3. Cat 29. Part 55. Inside 81. Problems
4. Red 30. Fast 56. Plane 82. Absentee
5. Me 31. Fine 57. Pretty 83. advertise
6. To 32. Milk 58. Famous 84. Pleasant
7. No 33. Back 59. Children 85. Property
8. We 34. Lost 60. Without 86. Distress
9. He 35. Find 61. Finally 87. Information
10. The 36. Paper 62. Strange 88. Recession
11. And 37. Open 63. Budget 89. Understand
12. Yes 38. Kind 64. Repress 90. Emphasis
13. Of 39. Able 65. Contain 91. Confident
14. Him 40. Shoes 66. Justice 92. Intuition
15. As 41. Money 67. Morning 93. Boisterous
16. Book 42. Great 68. Resolve 94. Plausible
17. Was 43. Father 69. Describe 95. Courageous
18. Help 44. River 70. Garment 96. Alienate
19. Then 45. Space 71. Business 97. Extinguish
20. Time 46. Short 72. Qualify 98. Prairie
21. Wood 47. Left 73. Potent 99. Limousine
22. Let 48. People 74. Collapse 100. Valentine
23. Men 49. Almost 75. Elements 101. Detective
24. Baby 50. Waves 76. Pioneer 102. Recently
25. New 51. Child 77. Remember 103. Instruction
26. Stop 52. Strong 78. Dangerous 104. Transient
Number of word read correctly ______
If examinee finishes list before 45 seconds, not time to finish _______
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Appendix III
The word stimuli presented in the National Adult Reading Test
Word Word
1. CHORD 26. SUPERFLUOUS
2. ACHE 27. SIMILE
3. DEPOT 28. BANAL
4. AISLE 29. QUADRUPED
5. BOUQUET 30. CELLIST
6. PSALM 31. FAÇADE
7. CAPON 32. ZEALOT
8. DENY 33. DRACHM
9. NAUSEA 34. AEON
10. DEBT 35. PLACEBO
11. COURTEOUS 36. ABSTEMIOUS
12. RAREFY 37. DÉTENTE
13. EQUIVOCAL 38. IDYLL
14. NAÏVE 39. PUERPERAL
15. CATACOMB 40. AVER
16. GAOLED 41. GAUCHE
17. THYME 42. TOPIARY
18. HEIR 43. LEVIATHAN
19. RADIX 44. BEATIFY
20. ASSIGNATE 45. PRELATE
21. HIATUS 46. SIDEREAL
22. SUBTLE 47. DEMESNE
23. PROCREATE 48. SYNCOPE
24. GIST 49. LABILE
25. GOUGE 50. CAMPANILE
Words are presented to the participants on individual cards, in order of difficulty from word
number one to word number fifty.
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Appendix IV
395 words selected from previous research for use in the pilot study
Word Valence Word Valence
Accident Negative Hurt Negative
Agony Negative Immature Negative
Ashamed Negative Inadequate Negative
Awful Negative Incapable Negative
Bad Negative Incompetent Negative
Betray Negative Inferior Negative
Blackmail Negative Insecure Negative
Blame Negative Isolated Negative
Bored Negative Jail Negative
Boring Negative Jealousy Negative
Coward Negative Leprosy Negative
Death Negative Loneliness Negative
Debt Negative Lonely Negative
Defeated Negative Mad Negative
Depressed Negative Malaria Negative
Despise Negative Massacre Negative
Discourage Negative Miserable Negative
Disgusted Negative Misery Negative
Disliked Negative Mistake Negative
Displeased Negative Nervous Negative
Distressed Negative Obesity Negative
Dreadful Negative Pathetic Negative
Dreary Negative Pollute Negative
Drown Negative Prison Negative
Dumb Negative Punishment Negative
Enraged Negative Pus Negative
Fault Negative Rabies Negative
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Fearful Negative Rage Negative
Foolish Negative Regretful Negative
Foul Negative Rejected Negative
Germs Negative Sad Negative
Gloom Negative Seasick Negative
Gloomy Negative Silly Negative
Grave Negative Sinful Negative
Guilty Negative Slum Negative
Helpless Negative Smallpox Negative
Hopeless Negative Solemn Negative
Hostage Negative Stupid Negative
Humiliate Negative Suffering Negative
Humiliated Negative Suffocate Negative
Humiliation Negative Sulking Negative
Word Valence Word Valence
Terrified Negative Context Neutral
Tired Negative Cork Neutral
Toxic Negative Corner Neutral
Toothache Negative Corridor Neutral
Torture Negative Costly Neutral
Tragic Negative Deputy Neutral
Traitor Negative Desolate Neutral
Ugly Negative Door Neutral
Ulcer Negative Engine Neutral
Uneasy Negative Entirely Neutral
Unhappy Negative Equivalent Neutral
Unpopular Negative Expert Neutral
Unwanted Negative Extreme Neutral
Upset Negative Fabric Neutral
Useless Negative Fashion Neutral
Weakness Negative Finger Neutral
Wicked Negative Foot Neutral
Worse Negative Furnishing Neutral
Worthless Negative Gene Neutral
Abrupt Neutral Gigantic Neutral
Absence Neutral Graphite Neutral
Adjusted Neutral Grass Neutral
Anxious Neutral Habit Neutral
Appliance Neutral Hairdryer Neutral
Banner Neutral Hay Neutral
Bathe Neutral Headquarters Neutral
Bench Neutral Hospital Neutral
Bereavement Neutral Hydrant Neutral
Bland Neutral Icebox Neutral
Bread Neutral Imperative Neutral
Bunch Neutral Imported Neutral
Appendices
233
Butter Neutral Incorporate Neutral
Cabinet Neutral Inflated Neutral
Catalogue Neutral Initial Neutral
Causal Neutral Ink Neutral
Chin Neutral Inorganic Neutral
Civilian Neutral Internal Neutral
Clock Neutral Item Neutral
Closer Neutral Jelly Neutral
Clumsy Neutral Kerosene Neutral
Coast Neutral Ketchup Neutral
Cohesive Neutral Kettle Neutral
Column Neutral Kitchen Neutral
Composite Neutral Ladder Neutral
Consoled Neutral Lantern Neutral
Word Valence Word Valence
Lawn Neutral Reprint Neutral
Lazy Neutral Reserved Neutral
Library Neutral Resident Neutral
Lion Neutral Resistant Neutral
Locker Neutral Revised Neutral
Lodge Neutral Rhythm Neutral
Manner Neutral Rough Neutral
Mantel Neutral Runner Neutral
Material Neutral Scissors Neutral
Medicine Neutral Search Neutral
Medium Neutral Seated Neutral
Mild Neutral Serviette Neutral
Moderate Neutral Shallow Neutral
Monastic Neutral Short Neutral
Muddy Neutral Shy Neutral
Museum Neutral Sideboard Neutral
Mysterious Neutral Slush Neutral
Naval Neutral Sometimes Neutral
Nearest Neutral Spacious Neutral
Noisy Neutral Spray Neutral
Nonchalant Neutral Stagnant Neutral
Nursery Neutral Startled Neutral
Obey Neutral Statue Neutral
Occasion Neutral Stiff Neutral
Office Neutral Street Neutral
Okay Neutral Table Neutral
Onion Neutral Tamper Neutral
Package Neutral Tank Neutral
Pamphlet Neutral Teacher Neutral
Part Neutral Terminology Neutral
Pedestrian Neutral Theatre Neutral
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Pencil Neutral Thermometer Neutral
Pendulum Neutral Totally Neutral
Pertinent Neutral Trumpet Neutral
Phase Neutral Trunk Neutral
Pianist Neutral Twelve Neutral
Pig Neutral Umbrella Neutral
Pottery Neutral Uncle Neutral
Primitive Neutral Upright Neutral
Quart Neutral Vanity Neutral
Raincoat Neutral Village Neutral
Rapid Neutral Wagon Neutral
Recipe Neutral Whistle Neutral
Refund Neutral Wildlife Neutral
Related Neutral Window Neutral
Word Valence Word Valence
Yellow Neutral Euphoric Positive
Youngest Neutral Excellence Positive
Achievement Neutral Excited Positive
Admirable Neutral Exhilarated Positive
Admired Positive Flirt Positive
Alert Positive Freedom Positive
Amazed Positive Friendly Positive
Amusing Positive Fun Positive
Applause Positive Generous Positive
Aroused Positive Glorious Positive
Attentive Positive Glory Positive
Attractive Positive Good Positive
Bath Positive Grateful Positive
Bright Positive Greet Positive
Cake Positive Happy Positive
Calm Positive Honour Positive
Capable Positive Hopeful Positive
Car Positive House Positive
Carefree Positive Incentive Positive
Careful Positive Intelligent Positive
Caring Positive Intimate Positive
Cash Positive Joke Positive
Champ Positive Jolly Positive
Champion Positive Joy Positive
Charming Positive Jubilant Positive
Cheer Positive Kind Positive
Cheerful Positive Kiss Positive
Clever Positive Knowledge Positive
Competent Positive Laughter Positive
Confident Positive Lively Positive
Considerate Positive Love Positive
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Cosy Positive Loveable Positive
Creative Positive Loving Positive
Dazzle Positive Lucky Positive
Desire Positive Luscious Positive
Devoted Positive Masterful Positive
Diamond Positive Memories Positive
Dog Positive Merry Positive
Eager Positive Orgasm Positive
Easy Positive Outdoors Positive
Elated Positive Paradise Positive
Eloquent Positive Peaceful Positive
Enjoyment Positive Pillow Positive
Entertaining Positive Pleasant Positive
Enthusiastic Positive Pleased Positive
Word Valence
Popular Positive
Pretty Positive
Profit Positive
Promotion Positive
Proud Positive
Rainbow Positive
Relieved Positive
Saviour Positive
Scholar Positive
Sexy Positive
Ski Positive
Skilful Positive
Sky Positive
Smart Positive
Smile Positive
Snuggle Positive
Soothe Positive
Spirit Positive
Spouse Positive
Star Positive
Success Positive
Successful Positive
Sunny Positive
Sunrise Positive
Sweetheart Positive
Talent Positive
Tender Positive
Terrific Positive
Toy Positive
Triumphant Positive
Trophy Positive
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Trustworthy Positive
Unselfish Positive
Untroubled Positive
Wealthy Positive
Win Positive
Wit Positive
Witty Positive
Appendix V
Characteristics of the three word categories employed within the experimental chapters
Words
Word
Category
Word
Length
Word
Frequency
(occurrences
per million)
Word
Type
Self-
Rating
Emotion
Rating
Absence ns-neg 7 5.78 Noun 2.43 1.89
Accident ns-neg 8 6.399 Noun 2.4 1.88
Agony ns-neg 5 0.914 Noun 2.03 1.25
Anxious ns-neg 7 3.083 Verb 1.89 1.89
Bereavement ns-neg 11 0.337 Noun 1.64 1.64
Betray ns-neg 6 0.256 Verb 1.7 1.43
Blackmail ns-neg 9 0.242 noun 1.81 1.55
Blame ns-neg 5 0.777 noun 2.49 1.7
Bored ns-neg 5 0.832 verb 2.45 1.95
Coward ns-neg 6 0.161 noun 2.34 1.57
Death ns-neg 5 20.061 noun 2.09 1.54
Debt ns-neg 4 4.798 noun 2.44 1.54
Despise ns-neg 7 0.075 verb 2.24 1.29
Discourage ns-neg 10 0.411 verb 2.27 1.85
Disliked ns-neg 8 0.44 noun 2.29 1.59
Displeased ns-neg 10 0.063 verb 2.15 1.67
Distress ns-neg 10 0.214 verb 2.46 1.47
Drown ns-neg 5 0.289 verb 1.28 1.28
Germs ns-neg 5 0.11 noun 1.89 1.59
Gloom ns-neg 5 0.816 noun 2.11 1.41
Grave ns-neg 5 0.75 noun 2.15 1.65
Hospital ns-neg 8 13.79 noun 2.25 2.25
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Hostage ns-neg 7 0.276 noun 2.05 1.42
Humiliated ns-neg 10 0.108 noun 2.19 1.4
Humiliation ns-neg 11 0.587 noun 2.25 1.37
Isolated ns-neg 8 2.813 adjective 1.4 1.4
Jail ns-neg 4 1.068 noun 1.46 1.39
Jealousy ns-neg 8 0.713 noun 2.46 1.39
Lazy ns-neg 6 0.802 adjective 2.47 1.74
Leprosy ns-neg 7 0.071 noun 1.3 1.3
Loneliness ns-neg 10 0.571 adjective 1.39 1.39
Lonely ns-neg 8 1.753 adjective 2.36 1.46
Mad ns-neg 3 3.149 adjective 2.35 2.22
Massacre ns-neg 8 0.51 noun 1.54 1.45
Miserable ns-neg 9 1.193 adjective 1.4 1.4
Misery ns-neg 6 1.266 noun 2 1.23
Muddy ns-neg 5 0.633 adjective 2.49 2.32
Obesity ns-neg 7 0.189 noun 1.7 1.36
Pathetic ns-neg 8 0.635 adjective 1.42 1.42
Pig ns-neg 3 1.047 noun 2.11 2.41
Primitive ns-neg 9 1.149 adjective 2.25 2.39
Prison ns-neg 6 6.421 noun 1.55 1.55
Pus ns-neg 3 0.091 noun 1.8 1.68
Rabies ns-neg 6 0.082 noun 1.68 1.34
Rage ns-neg 4 1.063 noun 2.37 1.49
Regretful ns-neg 9 0.063 adjective 2.41 1.8
Rejected ns-neg 8 0.17 adjective 1.17 1.17
Rough ns-neg 5 3.311 adjective 2.23 2.16
Sad ns-neg 3 3.439 adjective 2.4 1.52
Seasick ns-neg 7 0.041 adjective 1.7 1.7
Shallow ns-neg 7 1.406 adjective 2.07 1.41
Short ns-neg 6 13.547 adjective 2.43 2.43
Shy ns-neg 3 1.072 adjective 2.11 2.3
Sinful ns-neg 6 0.185 adjective 1.7 1.7
Slum ns-neg 4 0.279 noun 1.84 1.58
Smallpox ns-neg 8 0.16 noun 1.69 1.32
Solemn ns-neg 6 0.474 adjective 2.32 2.49
Stagnant ns-neg 5 0.226 adjective 2.49 2.16
Startled ns-neg 6 0.2 adjective 2.31 2.22
Stupid ns-neg 6 3.207 adjective 1.51 1.51
Suffering ns-neg 9 2.663 noun 1.81 1.15
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Tamper ns-neg 8 0.038 noun 2.32 2.2
Terrified ns-neg 9 0.161 adjective 2.27 1.66
Toothache ns-neg 9 0.092 noun 1.95 1.48
Toxic ns-neg 5 1.177 adjective 1.4 1.4
Tragic ns-neg 6 1.216 adjective 1.98 1.16
Traitor ns-neg 7 0.241 noun 1.59 1.2
Ugly ns-neg 4 1.365 adjective 2.48 1.47
Ulcer ns-neg 5 0.991 noun 1.56 1.35
Uneasy ns-neg 7 0.978 adjective 2.22 1.68
Unhappy ns-neg 7 1.901 adjective 1.78 1.39
Unpopular ns-neg 9 0.642 adjective 2.34 1.4
Unwanted neutral 8 0.81 adjective 2.3 1.43
Upset ns-neg 5 0.408 adjective 2.49 1.55
Useless ns-neg 7 1.305 adjective 2.34 1.5
Vanity ns-neg 5 0.334 noun 2.47 2.02
Weakness ns-neg 8 1.727 adjective 2.34 1.7
Wicked ns-neg 6 1.046 adjective 1.89 1.65
Worse ns-neg 5 6.258 adjective 2.41 1.39
Worthless ns-neg 9 0.356 adjective 1.61 1.3
Banner neutral 6 0.531 noun 2.96 3.2
Bath neutral 4 2.655 noun 3.46 3.46
Bench neutral 5 1.667 noun 2.82 3.03
Bread neutral 5 3.179 noun 2.88 3.32
Bunch neutral 4 1.194 verb 2.81 3.08
Butter neutral 6 1.977 verb 2.75 2.93
Causal neutral 6 1.163 adjective 2.96 2.98
Chin neutral 4 1.569 noun 2.92 2.98
Clock neutral 8 2.785 noun 2.94 3.13
Composite neutral 9 0.591 adjective 2.93 2.98
Context neutral 7 8.453 noun 2.82 2.84
Cork neutral 4 0.266 noun 2.81 3.34
Corner neutral 8 7.177 noun 2.53 2.53
Door neutral 4 25.36 adjective 2.95 3.13
Easy neutral 4 1.089 adjective 3.03 3.4
Engine neutral 6 5.005 noun 3.06 3.06
Equivalent neutral 6 1.448 adjective 2.96 3.29
Extreme neutral 7 3.062 adjective 3.08 3.08
Finger neutral 6 3.209 verb 2.96 3.16
Foot neutral 4 7.141 noun 2.84 2.87
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Gigantic neutral 8 0.391 adjective 2.53 3.19
Habit neutral 6 2.314 noun 3.16 2.77
Imperative neutral 10 0.237 adjective 2.72 2.85
Imported neutral 8 0.507 verb 2.85 3.05
Incorporated neutral 11 0.052 verb 2.93 2.91
Initial neutral 7 4.371 adjective 3.02 3.25
Ink neutral 3 0.63 noun 2.7 3
Inorganic neutral 9 0.22 adjective 2.57 2.54
Internal neutral 8 6.721 adjective 3.2 3
Kitchen neutral 8 8.244 noun 2.8 3.16
Lantern neutral 7 0.218 noun 2.9 3.27
Library neutral 7 8.206 noun 2.71 2.92
Lion neutral 4 0.96 noun 2.75 3.09
Locker neutral 8 0.239 noun 2.94 2.94
Manner neutral 6 6.063 noun 3.31 3.47
Material neutral 8 11.084 adjective 3.18 2.98
Mild neutral 4 1.444 adjective 3.26 3.26
Moderate neutral 8 0.79 adjective 2.95 3.21
Monastic neutral 8 0.435 adjective 2.58 2.67
Mysterious neutral 10 1.336 adjective 2.88 3.58
Naval neutral 5 1.5 adjective 2.89 3.2
Nearest neutral 7 1.988 adjective 3.07 3.5
Noisy neutral 5 1.023 adjective 3.05 2.55
Nonchalant neutral 10 0.065 adjective 2.92 2.97
Obey neutral 4 0.158 verb 3.07 2.77
Okay neutral 5 1.334 adjective 3.54 3.2
Onion neutral 5 0.657 noun 2.66 2.79
Pedestrian neutral 10 0.485 adjective 3.06 3.06
Pencil neutral 6 1.146 noun 3.04 3.04
Pendulum neutral 6 0.216 noun 2.89 2.89
Pertinent neutral 9 0.269 adjective 2.96 2.98
Phase neutral 6 4.628 noun 2.93 2.7
Pianist neutral 7 0.325 noun 2.71 3.32
Raincoat neutral 8 0.255 noun 2.89 3
Rapid neutral 5 3.417 adjective 2.9 3.31
Related neutral 7 2.155 adjective 3.32 3.39
Reprint neutral 7 0.05 noun 2.68 2.78
Reserved neutral 8 0.22 adjective 2.91 2.89
Resident neutral 10 0.851 noun 2.82 3.05
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Resistant neutral 9 0.002 adjective 2.85 2.7
Search neutral 6 4.363 verb 3.15 3.32
Seated neutral 6 0.136 noun 3.15 3.07
Silly neutral 5 2.828 adjective 3.09 2.89
Slush neutral 5 0.06 noun 2.52 2.63
Sometime neutral 9 20.517 adjective 3.13 2.81
Spray neutral 5 0.673 noun 2.81 2.93
Statue neutral 6 0.823 noun 2.86 3.22
Stiff neutral 7 0.827 adjective 2.5 2.59
Street neutral 6 9.511 noun 3.02 3.11
Thermometer neutral 11 0.137 noun 2.76 3.2
Totally neutral 7 5.807 verb 3.17 3.48
Trophy neutral 6 0.905 noun 2.95 3.5
Trumpet neutral 7 0.264 noun 2.53 3.44
Trunk neutral 5 0.659 noun 2.63 2.83
Upright neutral 7 0.307 adjective 3.25 3.5
Village neutral 7 10.31 noun 2.88 3.16
Wagon neutral 5 0.476 noun 2.82 2.98
Youngest neutral 8 1.183 adjective 3.21 3.25
Achievement self-pos 11 3.031 noun 4.3 4.7
Adjusted self-pos 8 0.256 verb 3.51 3.66
Admirable self-pos 9 0.457 adjective 3.51 4.47
Admired self-pos 7 0.569 verb 3.52 4.44
Alert self-pos 5 0.676 adjective 3.51 3.82
Amazed self-pos 7 0.334 verb 3.61 3.77
Amusing self-pos 7 0.618 adjective 4.26 4.26
Applause self-pos 8 0.485 noun 3.7 4.31
Aroused self-pos 7 0.376 verb 3.5 4.34
Attentive self-pos 9 0.255 adjective 3.78 4.17
Attractive self-pos 10 5.152 adjective 3.51 4.39
Bathe self-pos 5 0.099 verb 3.56 3.62
Bright self-pos 4 5.442 adjective 4.04 4.39
Cake self-pos 4 2.796 noun 3.56 3.88
Calm self-pos 6 1.011 adjective 3.87 4.29
Capable self-pos 7 4.943 adjective 4 4.5
Car self-pos 3 7.798 noun 3.62 3.62
Carefree self-pos 8 0.178 adjective 3.67 3.77
Careful self-pos 7 5.218 adjective 3.61 3.96
Caring self-pos 6 1.011 verb 3.87 4.45
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Cash self-pos 4 8.125 noun 3.54 3.96
Charming self-pos 8 1.376 adjective 3.67 4.24
Cheer self-pos 5 0.244 noun 3.73 4.46
Cheerful self-pos 8 1.144 adjective 3.95 4.75
Clever self-pos 6 2.357 adjective 4.19 4.5
Closer self-pos 6 2.333 adjective 3.89 3.89
Coast self-pos 5 3.736 noun 3.63 3.73
Competent self-pos 9 0.131 adjective 3.66 4.25
Confident self-pos 9 3.242 adjective 4.64 4.64
Consider self-pos 11 0.216 adjective 4.09 4.54
Consoled self-pos 8 0.066 verb 3.54 3.57
Cosy self-pos 4 0.63 adjective 3.95 4.4
Creative self-pos 8 2.444 adjective 3.5 4.34
Dazzle self-pos 6 0.058 verb 3.51 3.84
Desire self-pos 6 4.91 noun 4.02 4.02
Devoted self-pos 7 0.544 adjective 3.89 4.41
Diamond self-pos 7 1.061 noun 3.56 4.29
Eager self-pos 5 1.432 adjective 4.02 4.02
Elated self-pos 6 0.049 adjective 3.76 4.13
Eloquent self-pos 11 0.211 adjective 3.74 3.74
Enjoyment self-pos 9 1.026 noun 4.18 4.68
Entertainment self-pos 12 0.136 adjective 4.19 4.5
Enthusiastic self-pos 12 1.419 adjective 3.83 4.69
Euphoric self-pos 8 0.08 adjective 3.98 4.48
Excellent self-pos 10 0.704 noun 3.54 4.55
Excited self-pos 7 0.525 adjective 4.34 4.34
Exhilarated self-pos 11 0.027 adjective 3.56 4.25
Expert self-pos 6 1.206 noun 4.19 4.19
Faithful self-pos 8 0.95 adjective 4.18 4.36
Fantasy self-pos 7 1.252 noun 3.96 4.02
Festive self-pos 7 0.39 adjective 3.98 4.57
Flirt self-pos 5 0.036 adjective 3.53 3.76
Freedom self-pos 7 6.042 adjective 4 4.57
Friendly self-pos 8 4.058 adjective 4.29 4.83
Fun self-pos 3 2.376 noun 3.98 4.85
Generous self-pos 8 2.307 adjective 3.95 4.47
Honour self-pos 6 1.95 noun 3.71 4.53
Joke self-pos 4 2.019 noun 4.19 4.19
Joy self-pos 3 2.392 noun 4.58 4.58
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Kiss self-pos 4 1.355 noun 4.04 4.61
Knowledge self-pos 9 14.586 noun 3.7 4.45
Love self-pos 4 12.093 noun 4.31 4.62
Loving self-pos 6 0.518 noun 4.93 4.93
Medicine self-pos 8 2.344 noun 3.54 3.74
Memories self-pos 8 2.633 noun 3.77 3.87
Occasion self-pos 8 5.274 noun 3.5 3.57
Profit self-pos 6 5.39 noun 3.65 4.15
Promotion self-pos 9 3.142 noun 4.45 4.45
Rainbow self-pos 7 0.421 noun 3.56 4.32
Rhythm self-pos 6 1.475 noun 3.64 3.82
Runner self-pos 6 0.644 noun 3.52 3.52
Scholar self-pos 7 0.704 noun 3.61 3.77
Sky self-pos 3 4.956 noun 3.56 3.88
Smile self-pos 5 6.124 noun 4.11 4.36
Spirit self-pos 6 6.473 noun 4.07 4.07
Sweetheart self-pos 9 0.144 noun 3.55 4.58
Talent self-pos 6 2.095 noun 4.02 4.48
Tender self-pos 6 1.116 noun 4.08 4.08
Toy self-pos 3 0.524 noun 3.74 3.95
Wildlife self-pos 8 1.956 noun 3.52 3.98
Ns-neg = non-self-negative word category, self-pos = self-positive word category. Emotionality and Self-
Reference ratings were obtained from the pilot study (see Section 2.5). Word Frequency information
taken from the British National Corpus (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/).
